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Abstract 
 
This thesis has two goals. Firstly, we consider the problem of model selection for the 
purposes of prediction. In modern science predictive mathematical models are 
ubiquitous and can be found in such diverse fields as weather forecasting, 
economics, ecology, mathematical psychology, sociology, etc. It is often the case 
that for a given domain of inquiry there are several plausible models, and the issue 
then is how to discriminate between them – this is the problem of model selection. 
We consider approaches to model selection that are used in classical [also known as 
frequentist] statistics, and fashionable in recent years methods of Akaike Information 
Criterion [AIC] and Bayes Information Criterion [BIC], the latter being a part of a 
broader Bayesian approach. We show the connection between AIC and BIC, and 
provide comparison of performance of these methods. 
 
Secondly, we consider some philosophical arguments that arise within the setting of 
the model selection approaches investigated in the first part. These arguments aim to 
provide counterexamples to the epistemic thesis of scientific realism, viz., that 
predictively successful scientific theories are approximately true, and to the idea that 
truth and predictive accuracy go together. 
 
We argue for the following claims: 1) that none of the criticisms brought forward in 
the philosophical literature against the AIC methodology are devastating, and AIC 
remains a viable method of model selection; 2) that the BIC methodology likewise 
survives the numerous criticisms; 3) that the counterexamples to scientific realism 
that ostensibly arise within the framework of model selection are flawed; 4) that in 
general the model selection methods discussed in this thesis are neutral with regards 
to the issue of scientific realism; 5) that a plurality of methodologies should be 
applied to the problem of model selection with full awareness of the foundational 
issues that each of these methodologies has. 
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1. Introduction and Classical Methods of Model Selection 
 
1.1 The Three Problems of Model Construction 
 
In life in general, and in science in particular, one is often interested in issues as to 
how to explain, or predict various phenomena. For instance, where would the cannon 
ball fall if one were to shoot it from a certain cannon? And, for that matter, what is 
the explanation as for why it is to fall [or has already fallen] in the predicted place 
[or, indeed, elsewhere]? Explanation is a fascinating subject in itself. However, in 
this thesis we shall concentrate on the no less fascinating subject of scientific [more 
specifically, statistical] prediction. 
 
So, let us get to the cannon ball example. How are we to predict where the cannon 
ball is to land if shot? In order to do so we come up with a model. That is, we engage 
into the process of abstraction and idealisation from the ‘real world’. We abstract 
from the features of the world that are deemed irrelevant for our purposes and take 
into account only the relevant facts according to Newton’s physics [which we will 
take for granted in this example] such as the angle of elevation of the cannon with 
respect to the ground level, the velocity of the cannon ball as it exits the barrel of the 
cannon, the weight of the cannon ball, the speed and direction of wind, friction in the 
barrel of the cannon, etc. We idealise certain features. For example, it may be 
impractical and costly to calculate the friction within the cannon’s barrel as it is, so 
we may assume that it is a totally smooth surface. We make further assumptions 
such as that the speed and direction of wind are both constant. We may sketch our 
model on the back of the envelope for ease of representation. Once we have done all 
of these, we have our predictive model. 
 
For our purposes we can think of a scientific model as a tool, which aids us in 
generating predictions of phenomena of interest. We are certain that the cannon ball 
model [quite possibly not in exactly the same way as it is envisaged here, but, we 
would venture, closely enough] was an important predictive tool utilised by the 
Western armies of a couple of centuries back. 
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At this junction let us draw an important distinction between theoretical and 
statistical modelling. This is not the only distinction one can draw, and for the 
purposes of this thesis we shall use it rather loosely, for we are concerned with 
statistical modelling that has theoretical influence/elements in it. However, this 
distinction provides conceptual clarity to our proceedings. A theoretical model is a 
model constructed using a general theory without involving data. The preceding 
example of a model is in fact an example of theoretical modelling. In this example 
such theory is Newtonian mechanics. We feed the initial conditions into the 
equations of Newton’s mechanics to yield our prediction. However, this thesis is 
going to be concerned with statistical models. These models are predominantly built 
from the data upwards without much use of the general theory, if any. To illustrate, 
let us use the setup of the cannon ball example. If we wanted to construct a ‘pure’ 
statistical predictive model, we would shoot several cannon balls from the cannon 
every time observing the quantities that we consider relevant such as the amount of 
gun power input, the angle of elevation of the cannon barrel, exit velocity, velocity 
and direction of wind, etc. When shooting cannon balls we would vary the relevant 
quantities – e.g., we would vary the amount of gunpowder, change the angle of 
elevation, etc. to see how it affects the distance that our cannon balls travel. Then we 
would come up with a model by means of correlating these data. We imagine 
[although we have not undertaken research into this matter] that early Chinese users 
of cannon technology and the medieval Western armies would have modelled the 
phenomenon in a way akin to our description of statistical modelling1. 
 
There is also a salient distinction within modelling between deterministic and 
probabilistic models. It has to be emphasised that this distinction is independent of 
the theoretical vs. statistical distinction. Deterministic models are such that the 
predictions that they issue are of a definitive nature. For example, a deterministic 
model may predict that given the current amount of gunpowder, the elevation of the 
cannon barrel and the velocity and direction of wind, the cannon ball will land 
exactly 552 metres due north if shot now2. Whereas, using the same example, the 
                                                 
1
 Reader interested in the historical development of projectile technology is referred to Crosby (2002). 
2
 For our purposes we take Popper’s definition of scientific determinism, viz.: ‘…the doctrine that the 
state of any closed physical system at any given future instant of time can be predicted, even from 
within the system, with any specified degree of precision, by deducing the prediction from theories, in 
conjunction with initial conditions whose required degree of precision can always be calculated [in 
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probabilistic variant thereof would yield a distribution of likely landings with 
probabilities attached to them. The following table provides examples of each of the 
four types of models. 
 
Models Theoretical Statistical 
Deterministic Cannon model constructed by using 
general theory which issues definitive 
“non-chancy” predictions  
Cannon model constructed 
by correlating data which 
yield a definitive curve such 
that all the data points lie on 
it 
Probabilistic A model of radioactive decay of 
radioactive elements.  
Cannon model constructed 
by correlating data which 
yield a definitive curve such 
that the data points lie close 
to it reflecting imprecision of 
measurement 
 
It is clear that the cannon ball model fits into the deterministic theoretical category. 
On the other hand, an example of a theoretical probabilistic model is the radioactive 
decay model, which is solidly based on the theory of quantum mechanics that issues 
probabilistic predictions. Deterministic statistical models, although logically 
possible, are in practice rather fictitious, for their construction involves highly 
restrictive conditions. For instance, in our cannon ball example, the cannon would 
have to be fired indoors to remove the factor of the wind, or a deterministic theory of 
the wind movement would have to be added, which on current scientific thinking is 
not feasible, because, among other conditions, it requires infinite precision of 
measurement of the initial conditions3. Still, we shall use deterministic statistical 
models for ease of introduction to the issue of model selection among probabilistic 
statistical models. 
 
                                                                                                                                          
accordance with the principle of accountability] if the prediction task is given.’ [Popper (1982):36] 
For a thorough discussion of determinism cf. Earman (1986). 
3
 For a thorough introductory text on the mathematical chaos theory, of which this is an instance, 
please see Stewart (2002). 
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Indeed, in this thesis we concentrate on statistical probabilistic models. The reason 
for the focus on statistical modelling is that such models have gained prominence 
and play an enormous role in many sciences. The list of sciences that use statistical 
modelling keeps growing. It finds application in economics, sociology, mathematical 
psychology, environmental sciences, etc. 
 
A probabilistic statistical model is a mathematical equation, with the aid of which 
one describes the phenomenon under study in terms of random variables that have 
probability distributions ascribed to them. The explanation of what these terms are 
will be provided in section 1.3. As we mentioned at the very beginning of this 
chapter, in this thesis we concentrate on use statistical models for the purposes of 
prediction. 
 
Let us now turn to statistical models and see how they are constructed using a simple 
example. 
 
Suppose, for instance, that we are interested in finding out how the heights and 
weights are correlated with each other of, say, males, who are in their 20’s and who 
live in the London borough of Waltham Forest. The reason for such a fascination 
with the heights and weights could be that we are perhaps acting on behalf of the 
local health authority, which is in the process of planning a new hospital. The 
authority may be interested in obesity [e.g., they may want to predict what the Body 
Mass Index4 within the Borough would be], or in predicting as to what would be the 
optimal height of the doorways, the sizes of beds, weight load of equipment such as 
wheel chairs. They may also hold a general interest in the demography of the 
Borough.  
 
Let us suppose that we would like to predict the weight of any such male given his 
height. In order to draw an inference we need to do three things. First, we collect a 
sample of data from the population. Second, we choose the structure of the model 
                                                 
4
 BMI is one of the most widely recognised indices used in order to classify weight of adults. It is 
defined as weight (kilograms) / height2 (metres). If one’s BMI is below 18.5, one is considered to be 
underweight (in particular, if BMI < 16, one is classified as “severely thin”) whereas if one’s BMI > 
25 one is considered to be overweight (in particular, if BMI > 30, one is classified as “obese”). 
Source: World Health Organization: http://apps.who.int/bmi/index.jsp?introPage=intro_3.html 
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[that is, the functional form of the model or, in other words, the family of models 
which have the same functional form but differ in that their parameters are set at 
different values] according to which the weights and heights are related. Third, 
having chosen the structure, we determine the values of parameters, that is, we pick a 
particular model5 from the family of models. Let us consider these steps in turn. 
 
1.1.1 Sampling 
 
This section is here solely for completeness of presentation of statistical modelling 
process. The focus of the thesis shall be entirely on the issue on model selection and 
on parameter estimation. We will be concerned with parameter estimation insofar as 
it is relevant to model selection. Hence we gloss over quite interesting issues in 
sampling6. We mention the solutions that we find reasonable and appealing without 
much argumentation in order to give the reader a sense of where we stand on these 
issues. 
 
The question as to how to draw such a sample properly has attracted a lot of attention 
in statistics. Sampling techniques can be divided into two categories – random 
sampling and judgement [representative] sampling7. 
 
1.1.1.1 Random Sampling 
 
In random sampling every member of the population has to have a known objective 
probability of being selected for sampling to be called random. In our example one 
way that this can be achieved is by assigning every known male in the borough of 
Waltham Forest a unique natural number, then putting each number on a separate 
ball, then placing all the balls in an urn and drawing n balls [n corresponding to the 
size of the sample] from the urn without looking [so that each ball has an equal 
                                                 
5
 Our usage of the term ‘model’ here closely follows van Fraassen’s: ‘Thus in the scientists’ use, 
‘model’ denotes what I would call a model-type. Whenever certain parameters are left unspecified in 
the description of a structure, it would be more accurate to say … that we described a structure-type. I 
will continue to use the term ‘model’ to refer to specific structures, in which all relevant parameters 
have specific values.’ [van Fraassen (1980):44] Our notion of a model corresponds to van Fraassen’s 
‘model-type’ or ‘structure-type’.  
6
 For further details and discussion of sampling cf. Stuart (1962), Stuart (1984), Urbach (1989). 
7
 Ibid. 
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chance of being picked], noting down the numbers and contacting the individuals 
who had those numbers associated with them to find out what their heights and 
weights are. In fact, this is an example of simple random sampling, where every 
member of the population has an equal probability of being selected.  
 
A different way to do random sampling would be to divide the population into sub-
populations [strata] with respect to some characteristics that are believed to be 
correlated with the attributes of primary interest. So, in our weights/heights example, 
weights and heights of individuals are such attributes of primary interest, and the 
characteristics according to which the population of males can be divided could be 
the countries of their origin [for instance, it is commonly observed that males from 
Scandinavian countries tend to be relatively tall and slender, and, say, males from the 
Indian subcontinent also tend to be slender, but are relatively shorter than the 
Scandinavians], the level of their disposable income [males on the relatively lower 
incomes seem to consume more unhealthy foods], etc. Once the population is 
stratified in this way, the simple random sampling is done within each stratum. The 
merit of stratified sampling in comparison to simple random sampling is that in 
situations where there is at least some amount of prior knowledge about possibly 
correlated characteristics, stratification results in more precise estimation [i.e., 
inferences from stratified samples almost always have smaller variance – the 
measures of precision are to be discussed in subsequent sections]. Stratification 
maximises precision when the average values of observations are as different as 
possible, and their variances are as small as possible8. Intuitively, the maximal 
difference implies that the characteristic according to which the stratification was 
done is correlated with the attributes of interest. In fact stratification with respect to 
any characteristic leads to an increase in precision, so long as the size of the sample 
is small in proportion to the population, and the strata contain more than one 
member. 
 
Another type of random sampling is cluster sampling. In cluster sampling one also 
divides the population into sub-populations, but instead of doing random sampling 
within each sub-population, one randomly selects a single sub-population, and then 
                                                 
8
 cf. Stuart (1962):49 
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makes up the sample from all the individuals within the selected sub-population.  An 
example of cluster sampling is list sampling. If we take the list of all the relevant 
males in our particular example in alphabetical order of their surnames, then divide 
the population with respect to the first letter of their surname in such a way that the 
number of individuals in each cluster is about the same [so if the number of 
individuals that have the letter S as the first letter of their surname is about the same 
as the number of males that have their surname begin with X or Y or Z, then we 
form two clusters – one S cluster and one XYZ cluster, and carry on in this fashion 
with respect to the other letters of the alphabet] and then randomly select one such 
sub-population to constitute our sample, then we will have done cluster sampling. 
An advantage of cluster sampling over stratified sampling is that sometimes 
population is naturally arranged into clusters – for example, into districts, or 
households, into groups of employees or different companies, etc. On the other hand, 
for cluster sampling to achieve an improvement in precision over stratified sampling, 
the individuals within the clusters have to be maximally varied. Intuitively that 
means that clusters should be as representative of variation within the population as 
possible. So, following the earlier example, if we are to do list sampling, under each 
first letter of a surname we would like to have some Scandinavians, some males 
from Indian subcontinent, etc., in our clusters roughly in proportion in which they 
occur in the whole population. If, however, our clusters are not varied, cluster 
sampling achieves much lower precision than both simple random and, a fortiori, 
stratified sampling. That is, if, say, the cluster ABC is randomly selected, and it so 
happens that young adult males from Scandinavia predominantly have such 
surnames, then we would have a sample skewed towards relatively slim tall males. 
 
1.1.1.2 Judgement Sampling 
 
Judgement [also known as representative] sampling is the same as stratified random 
sampling, but for one important feature – it is not random. The idea behind 
judgement sampling is that the most important thing that one [that is, a researcher 
who does sampling] has to do is to choose according to which categories the 
population should be divided into sub-populations. Once that is done, one then 
determines how many individuals should be ‘observed’ in each sub-population based 
on the proportion of the quantity of individuals in a given sub-population with 
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respect to the total number of individuals in the population. Then one picks the 
determined number of individuals in each sub-population [hence it is sometimes 
referred to as quota sampling] in whatever way it is most practicable to do so – 
randomisation in this case is not the sine qua non. 
 
Let us further clarify what the difference between stratified and judgement sampling 
is. Indeed, it is the case that in both methods one divides the population into sub-
population according to some salient characteristics. However, in stratified random 
sampling one has to draw samples from sub-population by randomised sampling, 
whereas in judgement sampling one is free to pick individuals for one’s sample 
according to one’s own ideas. 
 
1.1.2 Model Selection 
 
So, suppose that we have picked a sample in one of the ways described in the sub-
section above. What do we need to do further? We need to choose [or construct] a 
statistical model, which involves choosing the mathematical structure, and pick the 
values of parameters. In our usage ‘model selection’ refers to choosing the 
mathematical structure. The issues of what scientific models are, how they interact 
with theories and observations, etc. have attracted a lot of attention in the recent 
years9. However, as we mentioned in the beginning of this section, in this thesis we 
will consider statistical models only. 
 
Now, why do we need a statistical model in our example? Since we are interested in 
finding out the relationship between weights and heights of the males [say, we are 
trying to come up with a generalisation for the purposes of prediction as to what the 
height of any such male within the Borough will be, given his weight], we would 
like to know the form of this relationship. That is, for a given unit increase in height 
of a male, would his weight be expected to increase in linear proportion, or perhaps 
quadratic, or cubic, or in some other way? Would a unit change in height correspond 
to the same change in the weight if the person is relatively ‘tall’ rather than if he is 
                                                 
9
 For a comprehensive survey cf. Frigg and Hartmann (2006). 
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somewhat ‘short’? To begin with, let us see what form statistical models can take in 
order to make sense of the model selection approaches. 
 
For now we will introduce deterministic statistical models, since they are in a sense 
simpler than probabilistic statistical models. It shall be easier to move onto 
probabilistic statistical models once we consider deterministic ones because these 
two types of models have many features in common. 
 
Y = aX + b is an example of a linear model [call it LIN]. Each combination of the 
values of parameters a and b would pick out a particular element within the linear 
model – an element of LIN. LIN has two variables – X is usually referred to as the 
independent variable and Y as the dependent variable. To make this model 
probabilistic one would need to introduce a random component [it is also often 
called an error term] ε: Y = aX + b + ε, where ε has a probability distribution10. 
Another example of a deterministic statistical model is the quadratic one [call it 
PAR]: Y = aX2 + bX + c. The elements of PAR for which a ≠ 0 are represented by 
parabolic curves in the Cartesian plane. Since in our example we are interested in 
predicting the weight, the dependent variable Y represents the weight measured, say, 
in kilograms, and the independent variable X represents the height measured, say, in 
centimetres. 
 
Now, the two schools of statistical thought within which the vast majority of 
statistical reasoning takes place are the so-called Classical statistics and Bayesian 
statistics. We defer consideration of Bayesian statistics until chapter 4. 
 
In chapter 2 we consider some of the methods of Classical statistics. These methods 
are not traditionally thought to be about model selection, although they can be 
viewed as such, at least to a limited extent [cf. Forster (2001)]. Roughly speaking, 
the methods of Classical statistics usually assume that the functional form of a 
hypothesis [or, in our usage above, a model] is known, and proceed to use samples 
of data to test models with the parameters set at particular values either by 
themselves or against an alternative model with different values of parameters, or to 
                                                 
10
 This notion, among others, will be elucidated in section 1.3. 
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test two subsets of the same model against each another, or estimate parameters from 
samples of data by particular values [thus picking out an element of the model] or by 
ranges of values [thus narrowing the range of plausible elements within the model]. 
 
The reasons as to why we consider Classical statistical methods even though they are 
related to model selection in a rather limited sense are the following. Firstly, 
Classical statistics is the most influential type of statistical reasoning, familiarity 
with at least the major points of which is pre-requisite for any field of statistical 
analysis. Secondly, the methods of Classical statistics are used by many as the ‘gold 
standard’ against which all other methods are judged, including the methods which 
we consider in chapters 3 and 4, that take model selection as their explicit aim. 
Thirdly, the methods of Classical statistics have featured in the philosophical debate 
with regards to the putative connection between model selection methods and 
scientific realism, to the consideration of which we turn in chapter 5. 
 
In section 4.1 we consider the main features of Bayesian statistics, which has been 
the main rival to the Classical statistical thought in modern statistics11. In Bayesian 
statistics the issue of model selection arises quite naturally. 
 
1.1.3 Parameter Estimation 
 
At this point let us state that throughout this thesis we are concerned with parametric 
modelling. That is, with models which have finite-dimensional vector-valued 
parameters. For non-parametric methods see Silvey (1975):chapter 9 and Spanos 
(2001). 
 
As we mentioned in section 1.1.2, choosing a statistical model amounts to choosing 
a set of mathematical equations that have the same structure. E.g., Y = aX + b is a 
linear model specifying an uncountably infinite set of particular lines that have 
distinct values of parameters a, b. As we noted above, this linear equation does not 
amount to a probabilistic statistical model [it lacks a random component as it stands] 
but that will matter later on in the thesis. For the ease of introduction a deterministic 
                                                 
11
 For an insightful summary of the debates both internal and external to the Classical statistics see 
Mayo (2005). 
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statistical model will do. Once we have picked/found our statistical model [suppose 
for now that we picked the linear model in our height/weight example, where X 
denotes the heights variable and Y denotes the weights variable], the task is to 
estimate the values of the parameters a and b from the sample data that we have. 
These values would give us a particular statistical model [that is, a particular element 
of linear model]. A formula whereby estimation is carried out is called an estimator, 
whereas the particular values that it takes are called the estimates. Logically there are 
infinitely many ways of doing so. Let us briefly see how the Classical and Bayesian 
approaches attempt to solve the issue. We shall go deeper into the Bayesian approach 
in section 4.1. The introduction below is conducted in very general terms because the 
definition and explanation of statistical terms necessary for more precise rendition is 
forthcoming in later sections. 
 
Classical statistics has a list of properties that an admissible estimator should have. 
The most important and most commonly used properties are unbiasedness, 
consistency, efficiency and possession of minimum squared error. Let us look at 
these in turn. 
 
An estimator is unbiased when the estimates that it yields across different samples 
are on average equal to the value of the true parameter.  An estimator is said to be 
consistent when, as the sample size tends towards infinity, the estimates provided by 
the estimator converge on the true value. An estimator is efficient just in case the 
estimates yielded from the estimator have the minimum spread among the estimators 
within the same class. That is, the range within which such estimates lie is on 
average the shortest [in statistical terminology, this is expressed as the estimator has 
the minimum variance]. Here is an example. Let us go back to the linear model Y = 
aX + b. Let us suppose that we want to estimate the value of the parameter a. In 
classical statistics we assume that the value of a is fixed but unknown. How should 
we go about the estimation? Again, without getting into the formal details, one way 
to do so would be this. We can plot the data points in the Cartesian plane and draw a 
line [that would be a particular manifestation of the linear model] in such a way that 
the sum of the squared vertical distances [that is, along the y-axis] from each point to 
the line is minimised. Thus this line would lie closer to each data point than any 
other element of the linear model [in the sense of minimal vertical square distance]. 
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The reasoning behind adopting such a method is that presumably our model should 
reflect the data as closely as possible in order to have any predictive success. We 
shall return to this point in chapter 3.  
 
Suppose now that our line is y = αx + β, where α and β are such that the line Y = αX 
+ β has the minimal sum of square distances to all data points within the sample. 
Now, suppose that we are restricting our attention to the group of linear estimators. 
That is, we are to pick estimators of a among the functions  = cα + d, ( stands for 
an estimator of a), so that a is a linear function of α. Now, what would be the best 
linear estimator among the infinitely many? The “classical” answer is that the best 
one is where c = 1 and d = 0. That is,  = α. It is demonstrated that this estimator is 
unbiased, consistent and, under further conditions known as Gauss-Markov 
conditions [which there is no need to go into at this point], it has the minimum 
variance, i.e., that it is efficient. 
 
In Bayesian statistics point estimates are generally not provided because the 
inference is based on the full posterior distribution12, but point estimates can be 
derived. One popular method is called MAP – maximum a posteriori. Under this 
method the point estimator of a parameter is such that it provides the maximum 
posterior probability of the model in the light of the sample. This is equal to the 
mode of the posterior distribution. The mode of any sample is the value of random 
variable that occurs most frequently. To give a simple example, suppose that we 
rolled a die 7 times, and that the following is our sample of numerical outcomes: {1, 
1, 2, 4, 5, 5, 5}. In this case the mode is 5.13  
 
There is also the method of Maximum Likelihood Estimation. We defer 
consideration of this method until chapter 3, because understanding it will be crucial 
for the discussion of the Akaike Information Criterion in that chapter. 
 
                                                 
12
 Roughly speaking, posterior probability distribution comprises a set of probabilities associated with 
each possible value of the parameters within a model in the light of data. We say more on this point in 
section 4.1. 
13
 If the distribution is symmetrical univariate [i.e., it has only one random variable in it; we will see 
that the normal distribution is an example of such a distribution], the mean, mode and median are the 
same. The median of any sample is the middle value when the values arranged from the smallest to 
the largest in order. In this case the median is 4. 
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1.2 Methodological  Issues 
 
1.2.1 Sampling 
 
Please note that this section is here solely for the purpose of completeness of 
introducing the issue of model selection. The issues with sampling will not be 
considered in the rest of the thesis. It will be assumed that our data were gathered by 
some satisfactory method. So the issues in this section are flagged for possible 
interest of the reader, and some signposts are indicated as to where our philosophical 
opinion lies without much argument for or against, which is done deliberately. 
 
‘…Principle of Random Sampling asserts that satisfactory estimates can 
only be obtained from samples that are objectively random…’      
Howson and Urbach (2006):178 
 
The primary motivation for random selection of individuals to constitute the sample 
is that such a selection allows one to obtain a sample free of biases. A salient 
example of a possible bias is the selection bias. That is, conscious or unconscious 
tendency on behalf of the researcher to select members for the sample on the basis of 
some subjective idea as to what the salient characteristics of the population are. In 
random sampling what is important is the procedure whereby the sample is chosen, 
and not the actual outcome. The procedure has to be fair. That is, paradoxically [and 
it is called the central paradox of sampling theory14], if one selects the members of 
the sample solely on the basis of one’s own prejudices or ideas as to which particular 
members should be in the sample, and if exactly the same sample is chosen by the 
random process, the former sample would be inadmissible whereas the latter would 
be perfectly fine. Stuart says that this paradox is a hard pill to swallow. Nevertheless, 
he argues that the pill has to be swallowed in order to safeguard against unscrupulous 
researchers exercising their subjective biases. The notion of bias, incidentally, is 
different to that which we encounter in classical statistics with regards to the 
parameter estimation [cf. section 2.4.1]. Here the term ‘bias’ is used in synonymy 
with the term ‘prejudice’. 
 
                                                 
14
 Stuart (1962) 
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So, from the point of view of a proponent of random sampling lack of randomisation 
opens judgement sampling to influence by biases or prejudice on behalf of 
researchers. However, there are several advantages that judgement sampling enjoys 
over random sampling. Judgement sampling focuses on the quality of the outcome of 
the procedure rather than on the procedure itself. This implies that the proponents of 
judgement sampling find it impossible to ‘swallow’ the paradox of random 
sampling. Judgement sampling is less costly and can be carried out much faster than 
random sampling. Judgement sampling avoids the issue of non-response. That is, 
situations when the individuals who have been painstakingly selected by random 
sampling cannot be reached or refuse to participate. Moreover, there is some 
inductive support for the effectiveness of representative sampling – for instance, 
success of political pre-election opinion polls, although it can be argued that the polls 
themselves lead to changes in behaviour on behalf of the electorate. Voters may 
engage in strategic voting on the basis of the results of such polls, thus creating a 
self-fulfilling prophecy. 
 
On balance, it seems that a halfway house approach is desirable. That is, doing a 
stratified random sampling depending on the amount of knowledge in the field, 
costs/speed required. If a lot is known about the phenomenon, and costs of random 
sampling are prohibitive, then representative sampling is just the ticket. 
 
1.2.2 Model Selection 
 
Model selection of a certain kind forms a considerable part of this thesis. So, 
suppose we have gathered our sample in a way suitable for us. We now have several 
models/equations that could be candidates for the predictive model we are to use. On 
what basis are we to pick one?  
 
The first choice that we have to make is whether we are to 
confirm/validate/test/choose between models that we have arrived at prior to 
considering our sample, or whether we are to attempt to construct the model by 
looking at the data – that is, by ‘letting the data speak for themselves’.  In this thesis 
we will be concerned with the former approach. There is a consensus that the latter 
methodology often leads to problems with spurious correlations and models that are 
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not useful for the purposes of prediction. More will be said of this topic in chapter 3, 
particularly in section  3.4.1.4. 
 
The second choice is the choice of the method thereby the model is to be chosen. As 
it is already mentioned in section 1.1.2, chapter 2 is dedicated to elucidation of the 
traditional statistical approaches to this issue. However, the core of this thesis [i.e., 
chapters 3 to 5] is dedicated to considering more novel approaches. 
 
1.2.3 Parameter Estimation 
 
We saw in section 1.1.3 that in the Classical approach to statistics one uses 
estimators that satisfy the list of desirable properties, whereas in Bayesian statistics 
one does not focus on estimation as such, but when one does do estimation, then one 
usually uses estimators that provide maximum a posteriori probability of the model 
being correct. Consequently, given these different objectives, the estimators, and 
hence the estimates, often differ between these methods. As we stated previously, we 
consider parameter estimation only insofar as it is relevant to our central issue of 
model selection. The parameter estimation debate is tangential to the issue of model 
selection, so we will not be going into it in any detail. For some arguments within 
the parameter estimation debate, see Howson and Urbach (2006).  
 
1.3 Probability Theory 
 
1.3.1 Probability Primer 
 
Statistical modelling is done in terms of random variables and probability 
distributions. These notions are part and parcel of the probability theory. So, in order 
to come to grips with how statistical modelling is done, we have to familiarise 
ourselves with central tenets of probability theory. This is the task of this section. 
There are several notions in this as well as in subsequent sections such as variance 
and statistical expectation, which are prima facie do not seem to do any useful work. 
However, familiarity with these formal tools is needed, for without it one would find 
it very difficult to comprehend the arguments given in later chapters of the thesis. 
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For the purposes of this section we introduce ‘probability’ as a primitive term [cf. 
Gillies (1973):232]. We shall not engage into the issue of interpretation of 
probabilities unless required for the discussion at hand15. 
 
The mathematical theory of probability can be thought of as a study of logical 
structure of uncertainty. This logical structure is determined by the axioms and all of 
their deductive consequences16.  
 
By way of introduction, let us consider a game of chance – for instance, that of the 
throwing of a die. What are the possible outcomes? We can get either 1, 2, 3, 4, 5 or 
6. The set of these values constitutes the outcome space: {1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6}, that is, the 
set of all possible mutually exclusive outcomes of the process. Each of these 
outcomes is called a basic event. An event is a set of basic events. An event occurs 
when one of the set of the constitutive basic events occurs. For example, in our case 
an event can be ‘the number on the die is odd’. The corresponding set of the basic 
events is: {1, 3, 5}. 
 
We can think of events as propositions that are closed under the truth-functional 
logical operators of conjunction, disjunction and negation. For our purposes the 
distinction between propositions and events is not important. We treat them as 
mutually substitutable. 
 
Probability is measured by a real number between 0 and 1, where number 0 
corresponds to a logical contradiction and 1 corresponds to a tautology17.  
 
                                                 
15
 For comprehensive surveys of the issues involved in interpreting probabilities please see Gillies 
(2000) and Hájek (2009). 
16
 The presentation of the probability theory in this section including the axioms thereof closely 
follows Howson and Urbach (2006): chapter 2. 
17
 Also, it is important to note that formally, an impossible event has the probability of 0, and an event 
which is certain to occur has the probability of 1, but the converse does not hold in either case [cf. 
Kolmogorov (1956):5]. That is, if an event has zero probability of occurring, it does not imply that it 
is impossible to occur. Let us once more use the cannon ball example. What is the probability of the 
shot cannon ball landing exactly 125 metres away from the cannon? The answer is that it is zero, for 
we represent distance by real numbers, of which there are uncountably infinitely many. So the 
probability of picking one of them at random would be 1/∞ that is zero. But clearly the event of the 
cannon ball landing exactly 125 metres from the cannon is not impossible. 
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The intuitive idea of probability is formalised in terms of the following axioms [in 
what follows P(Y) stands for the probability of any event Y]: 
 
(1) 0 ≤ P(A) ≤ 1 for any event A in the domain of P 
(2) P(logical truth) = 1 
(3) P(A or B) = P(A) + P(B) for any mutually exclusive events A and B 
(4) P(A|B) = P (A and B) / P(B) where P(B) > 0 
 
Conditional probability P(A|B) is the probability of occurrence of event A given that 
event B has occurred. For example, suppose that event A is that a roll of the die 
results in number six, and B is that a roll of the die results in an even number. 
Supposing further that the die is fair [this is the case when, for instance, its centre of 
gravity lies in its geometrical centre], P(A) = 1/6. However, conditional on the die 
giving us an even number as the outcome, the probability of observing six is 1/3. 
That is, P(A|B) = 1/3. 
 
Axiom 3 is sometimes extended to countably infinite sets of events mostly for 
mathematical convenience18. This, however, introduces some conceptual issues, but 
these need not concern us here19. 
 
Axiom 4 is sometimes introduced as a definition of conditional probability. 
However, we will treat it as a postulate on par with the other three. ‘The reason for 
this is that in some interpretations of the calculus, independent meanings are given to 
conditional and unconditional probabilities, which means that (4) cannot be true 
simply by definition.’ [Howson and Urbach (2006):16] Again, nothing in this thesis 
hangs on this point. 
 
An important deductive consequence of the Axiom 4 is Bayes Theorem [its 
importance is discussed at length in section 4.1]. In its most commonly used form it 
is: 
                                                 
18
 ‘For, in describing any observable random process we can obtain only finite fields of probability. 
Infinite fields of probability occur only as idealized models of real random processes. We limit 
ourselves, arbitrarily, to only those models which satisfy [the Axiom of Countable Additivity]. This 
limitation has been found expedient in researches of the most diverse sort.’ [Kolmogorov (1956):15] 
19
 For discussion cf. Gillies (2000):66-69, Howson (2008), Williamson (1999). 
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P(A|B) = P(B|A)P(A) / P(B) where P(B) ≠ 0 
 
Also, often P(B) can be substituted by the expression which is called the total law of 
probability: P(B) = [P(B|A)*P(A) + P(B|notA)*P(notA)] 
 
Let us illustrate the use of Bayes theorem with the following example. Suppose that 
we have a group of 100 students, 70 of whom study at college R and 30 are at 
college U. These students are to sit an examination, in which they either succeed or 
fail. Let us introduce the following propositions. J: A student studies at college R. C: 
A student studies at college U. S: A student passes the exam. F: A student fails the 
exam. Suppose further that we believe that a student from college R has 0.8 
probability of passing the exam, whereas a student from college U has 0.4 
probability of succeeding. We can represent these by conditional probabilities: P(S|J) 
= 0.8, P(S|C) = 0.4. Also P(J) = 0.3, P(C) = 0.7. Now suppose we would like to find 
out what the probability is of a student who passes the exam to have studied at 
college R [that is P(J|S)]. For this we employ the total probability form of Bayes 
theorem [since J and C are mutually exclusive exhaustive events]: 
 
P(J|S) = P(S|J)*P(J)/[P(S|J)*P(J) + P(S|C)*P(C)] = 0.8*0.3/[0.8*0.3+0.4*0.7] = 
0.24/0.52 = 0.46 [approximated to 2 decimal places – hereafter 2 d. p.] 
 
An important concept in the theory of probability is that of the probabilistic 
independence. Events A and B are said to be probabilistically independent just in 
case P(A and B) = P(A)xP(B). Hence substituting this expression into the Axiom 4 
[cf. page 23] we obtain the result that A and B are probabilistically independent if 
and only if P(A|B) = P(A) and P(B|A) = P(B). 
 
An important concept in statistics is that of a random variable. A random variable is 
a mathematical function from the space of elementary events to the elements of the 
set of real numbers. For example, suppose that we roll a die twice and record the 
outcomes of both rolls. A random variable in this case could be a summation 
between the two outcomes. So, if the first throw yields 1, and the second throw 5, 
then the realised value of the random variable is 6. By convention we denote random 
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variables by capital letters, and particular numerical realisations thereof by small 
letters. We are interested in how probability values are distributed over every 
possible realisation of the random variable(-s). Various probability distribution 
models provide a summary of this information. A probability distribution model is a 
function that maps numerical values of random variables onto probability values. 
That is, a probability distribution model tells one what probability value is associated 
with each value of a given random variable. We will ordinarily refer to probability 
distribution models as just probability distributions, as it is conventionally done in 
statistics. The following table is an example of a probability distribution P(X) for the 
random variable in this paragraph [denoted here as X] on the assumption that every 
elementary event is as probable as every other elementary event: 
 
X 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 
P(X
) 
1/36 2/36 3/36 4/36 5/36 6/36 5/36 4/36 3/36 2/36 1/36 
 
 
A cumulative probability distribution shows the accumulation of probability up to a 
given value of the random variable. It is commonly denoted as F(X=x), where x is a 
particular realisation of the random variable as a result of the experiment. F(X=x) is 
the probability that X takes on a value smaller than or equal to x. E.g., in our case of  
the die throwing experiment, F(X=4) = P(X=2) + P(X=3) + P(X=4) = 6/36. 
 
There is also a distinction between discrete and continuous probability distributions. 
In discrete distributions random variables can take on a finite or countably infinite  
number of values. So in our example with the rolling die we have a discrete 
probability distribution, since the random variable can only take discrete values. Let 
us illustrate the idea of a probability distribution with the example of the Binomial 
distribution, since it is reasonable to suppose that our experiment of throwing the die 
follows the Binomial distribution, which is a particular example of a discrete 
distribution. 
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The Binomial distribution applies in cases when there are just two exhaustive [that 
is, the sum of the probabilities of such events equals to one] and mutually exclusive 
[i.e., if one event takes place then the other event has the probability zero and vice 
versa] events. One event is usually referred to as ‘success’ and the other is ‘failure’. 
If the experiment is repeated n times, with the repetitions being independent of one 
another, and if the probability of success p each time is the same, then  
P(x) = n!px(1-p)(n-x)/x!(n-x)!, where x is the variable that denotes the number of 
successful outcomes. 
 
So, let us apply it to the die-throwing example. Suppose that we define event A as 
‘the number on the die is even’ and event B – ‘the number on the die is odd’. Events 
A and B are mutually exclusive – either A or B happen, but both of them cannot do, 
and exhaustive – every basic event belongs to either one20. Let us suppose that we 
are going to throw the die 10 times, and suppose that these throws will be 
independent of each other [that is, the probability of observing an even or odd 
number on each throw does not depend on the outcomes of the previous throws21]. 
Suppose further that each time we throw, the probability of A [let us call it ‘success’] 
and B [call it ‘failure’] is 0.5 respectively. Let us define a random variable X as 
representing the number of successes. So, for example, what is the probability that 
we will see exactly four even numbers? 
P (x = 4) = 10! 0.54 x 0.56 / 4!6! = 0.205 [correct to 3 decimal places] 
 
Now, continuous probability distributions are such that the random variables that 
they cover can take on an uncountably infinite number of values. Some random 
variables are continuous, i.e., they belong to the set of real numbers rather than just 
integers, as it is the case for discrete distributions. E.g., X is the volume of milk that 
a herd of cows yields, or the temperature in a room at certain time. Also continuous 
distributions are often introduced for mathematical convenience. Continuous 
distributions have probability density function f(x) such that f(x) = dF(x)/dx 
 
                                                 
20
 Thus, B is called a complement of A. I.e., A is logically equivalent to not B, and P(B) = 1 – P(A). 
21
 A more rigorous definition of probabilistic independence is this: X is probabilistically independent 
of Y just in case P(X|Y) = P(X). That is, the probability associated with various values of random 
variable X stays the same whatever value random variable Y takes on. 
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The distributions of continuous variables are called probability density functions 
rather than just probability distributions because, for any point x, they show the 
probability of the random variable taking on a value in the region of x. We are 
referring to probabilities in the region of certain values rather than to probabilities of 
point values themselves, because every point value [of uncountably infinitely many 
point values] of a continuous random variable has probability zero. An example of a 
continuous distribution is the Normal distribution. We shall say more of Normal 
distribution later. 
 
Another notion that we ought to introduce is that of statistical expectation. The 
expectation operator is quite convenient in order to define important properties of 
probability distributions. The expectation of a random variable is defined as a 
probability weighted average of all the values that the variable can take. That is, 
E(X) = Σni=1 xi P(xi), i = 1, 2, 3, …, n in the discrete case and E(X) = ∫ xp(x)dx [on 
the range of values of X from the smallest to the largest] when X is a continuous 
variable. Intuitively E(X) can be thought of as an average value of the random 
variable in the long run. 
 
Moments of a probability distribution are convenient ways to summarise some 
important properties of the distribution. We will concentrate on the two most 
important quantities – the mean µ and the variance σ2. The mean is a measure of 
location. It shows us where the centre of the distribution is. The mean is equal to the 
expectation of the random variable. I.e., µ = E(X). For instance, consider the die 
rolling example with the discrete random variable X and the following probability 
distribution: 
 
Xi 1 2 3 4 5 6 
P(Xi) 1/6 1/6 1/6 1/6 1/6 1/6 
 
In this case µ = E(X) = 1/6(1 + 2 + 3 + 4 + 5 + 6) = 21/6 = 3.5 This of course does 
not mean that we would expect to obtain an outcome of 3.5 at some point in our 
experiment, for such an outcome is not in the set of possible values that our random 
variable can take on.  
28 
 
 
There are other measures of location such as the median [which refers to the middle 
value of the random variable rather than the probability-weighted average thereof], 
which have their advantages [the median is not affected by the outliers – the values 
that lie far away from the main body of data]. However, the mean is the predominant 
measure of location chiefly because it has ‘nice’ mathematical properties.  
 
Another important moment of a probability distribution is variance [σ2]. Variance is 
a measure of dispersion. It indicates how spread out the values of the random 
variable are around the mean of the distribution. In the discrete case, the variance is 
equal to the sum of the probability-weighted square deviations of every possible 
value of the random variable from the expectation of the random variable. In its 
simpler form, it can be demonstrated that the variance is equal to the expectation of 
the squared random variable minus the squared expectation of the variable itself. 
That is, Variance (X) = E(X2) – [E(X)]2. The standard deviation σ is the square root 
of the variance. The standard deviation is measured in the same units as the variable 
itself. Quite often the mean and variance are sufficient to uniquely define a 
probability distribution function [p.d.f.] – e.g., this is the case for normal 
distribution. In the die-rolling example above σ2 = 1/6(12 + 22 + 32 + 42 + 52 + 62) – 
3.52 = 81/6 – 12.25 = 13.5 – 12.25 = 1.25. Thus σ = 1.11822 (3 d. p.)  
 
1.3.2 Normal Distribution 
 
Quite possibly the most important probability distribution that is used in statistics is 
the so-called Normal Distribution. Firstly, a lot of phenomena have been observed 
[at least approximately] to follow this distribution – e.g., distribution of heights, 
exam marks, etc. Secondly, the importance of Normal Distribution stems from the 
Central Limit Theorem – if the individual observations constituting a sample are 
independently identically distributed, and as the number of such observations 
becomes large, the sample mean tends to be normally distributed, irrespective of the 
form of the distribution of the population itself, as long as the population variance is 
finite. An implication of the Central Limit Theorem [CLT] is that the binomial 
                                                 
22
 Neither variance nor standard deviation can take on negative values. 
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distribution becomes approximately Normal as the number of observations n 
increases (some authors claim that in practice the approximation is reasonably close 
once n > 50).  
 
A continuous random variable X is said to be normally distributed with mean µ 
(E(X) = µ) and variance σ2 (Var(X) = σ2) [ordinarily represented as X ~ N(µ, σ2)] 
when its probability density function (PDF) is f(x) = e-(x-µ) (x-µ)/2σσ / (2πσ2)1/2 
 
Diagram 1 
 
The picture above represents the p.d.f. of the standard normal distribution. That is, 
the distribution of a random variable Z such that Z ~ N(0,1). We measure the p.d.f. 
of Z along the vertical axis, and the values of Z along the horizontal one. The 
standard normal distribution has practical importance because it has been tabulated. 
Any linear combination of the normally distributed random variable is itself normal, 
so if X ~ N(µ, σ2), then Z = [(X – µ) / σ] ~ N (0,1). Hence, any normal distribution 
can be transformed into the standard normal for ease of calculations. For example, 
suppose that our random variable X represents the heights of males within the 
London Borough of Waltham Forest [recall the example used in the beginning of this 
chapter]. Suppose further that X is normally distributed with E(X) = 180 cm, and σ = 
10 cm. That is, X ~ N(180, 10). Given this set up, suppose that we would like to find 
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out what the probability of observing at random a male who is taller than 195 cm is. 
In order to do so, we convert our random variable X into Z thus: 
P(X > 195) = P(Z > (195 – 180)/10) = P(Z > 1.5) In order to calculate this value by 
ourselves we would need to integrate the probability density function between 1.5 
and infinity. This is quite a laborious task, so instead we can look the value up in the 
tables for standard normal23. From such tables, P(Z > 1.5) = 0.0668. 
 
Now, let us pause for a short while to see what we have done so far and where are 
going to in the rest of the chapter, and, indeed, in the rest of the thesis. To begin 
with, we considered the issue of scientific prediction, restricting our attention to 
statistical problems. The example that we used was that of wishing to predict the 
weight of a male who resides within the London Borough of Waltham Forest on the 
basis of his height. We saw that in order to get to grips with a problem of this sort we 
needed to gather a suitable sample of observations, select a statistical model and 
estimate the parameters within the chosen model. We said that we would restrict our 
attention to the issue of model selection. Since statistical models are formalised in 
terms of probabilities, probability distributions and their moments, etc., we 
overviewed the probability theory and the necessary concepts and terms which 
equipped us to understand how statistical models work. In chapter 2  and in section  
4.1 we consider the two methodologies that currently dominate the field of statistical 
reasoning, viz., Classical and Bayesian respectively. We consider the issues that each 
of these methodologies has. From the third chapter onwards the thesis is dedicated to 
two major alternative approaches to model selection which have been developed 
since the early 70s of the 20th century, viz., Akaike Information Criterion (AIC) and 
Bayes Information Criterion (BIC). The chapter five considers the putative 
philosophical consequences of the model selection methodologies. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
23
 These tables are widely available. E.g. http://www.math.unb.ca/~knight/utility/NormTble.htm 
31 
 
2. Classical Statistics 
  
The name Classical statistics is, strictly speaking, a misnomer. Rather than being a 
unified methodology, it is in fact a heterogeneous collection of various methods such 
as R. A. Fisher’s, Neyman-Pearson’s, parameter and confidence interval estimation 
techniques, etc. However, we will follow the numerous text books on practical 
application of statistics in using this somewhat misguided terminology as a 
convenient umbrella term in cases when it does not matter which particular 
technique or method within it we refer to.24 
 
At the outset of the expositions of Classical statistics in this section, let us note a 
salient distinction between uses of probability between the Classical and Bayesian 
schools of statistical thought. In the latter, ‘…probability is used to provide a post-
data assignment of degree of probability, confirmation, support or belief in a 
hypothesis…’, whereas in the former ‘…probability is used to access the 
probativeness, reliability, trustworthiness, or severity of a test or inference 
procedure.’ [Mayo (2005):803] Simply put, in Bayesian statistics probability applies 
to hypotheses and data whereas in Classical statistics probabilities are used for 
assessment of inference procedures themselves. In other words, in Bayesian statistics 
hypotheses have probabilities whereas in the Classical context probabilities are used 
to control of various types of errors given inference procedures may generate. Note, 
incidentally, that we use the terms ‘hypothesis’ and ‘model’ interchangeably.  
 
2.1 Fisher25 
 
The modern approach to statistical inference was started by R. A. Fisher [Mayo 
(2005):804]. He considered that 
‘…the object of statistical methods is the reduction of data. A quantity of 
data, which usually by its mere bulk is incapable of entering the mind, is to 
be replaced by relatively few quantities which shall adequately represent the 
whole, or which, in other words, shall contain as much as possible, ideally 
the whole, of the relevant information contained in the original data. 
                                                 
24
 Classical statistics is also often referred to as Frequentist due to the eponymous interpretation of 
probability that these methods usually use. 
25
 The exposition of Fisherian and Neyman-Pearson methodologies closely follows Royall (1997) and 
Newbold (1995). 
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The problems which arise in reduction of data may be conveniently divided 
into three types:- 
(1) Problems of Specification. These arise in the choice of the mathematical 
form of the population. 
(2) Problems of Estimation. These involve the choice of methods of 
calculating from a sample statistical derivatives, or as we shall call them 
statistics, which are designed to estimate the values of the parameters of 
the hypothetical population. 
(3) Problems of Distribution. These include discussions of the distribution of 
statistics derived from samples, or in general any functions of quantities 
whose distribution is known. 
As regards problems of specification, these are entirely a matter for the 
practical statistician, for those cases where the qualitative nature of the 
hypothetical population is known do not involve any problems of this type. In 
other cases we may know by experience what forms are likely to be suitable, 
and the adequacy of our choice may be tested a posteriori. We must confine 
ourselves to those forms which we know how to handle, or for which any 
tables which may be necessary have been constructed. More or less elaborate 
forms will be suitable according to the volume of the data. Evidently these 
are considerations the nature of which may change greatly during the work of 
a single generation.’ 
Fisher (1922):311, 313, 314  
 
It does show that Fisher thought that the problems of model selection [or as he 
referred to them as problems of model specification] are important. However, in his 
methodology he confined himself to problems of estimation and distribution. On the 
other hand, Fisher’s method can still be considered to constitute model selection in 
the sense that in it we test an element of a given model, and if it is deemed to be 
incompatible with data, we then are faced with the choice to either choose a different 
element of the same model, or indeed to choose a different model – that would 
presumably be ‘a matter for the practical statistician’. But we are getting somewhat 
ahead of ourselves. 
 
Let us explain Fisherian methodology by means of an example. Suppose that we 
have a die-rolling set up such that the random variable A represents the number of 
even outcomes of rolling the die. We would like to provide a statistical model for 
this set up. In Fisher’s methodology one hypothesises a single model [referred to as 
the ‘null hypothesis’] with fixed values of parameters. In our case this idea 
corresponds to us hypothesising that, for instance, the phenomenon follows binomial 
distribution with success parameter p = 0.5 [let us define a successful outcome as 
such that when we observe an even number of dots on the die] corresponding to our 
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supposition that the die is fair. So, our model is that A is binomially distributed with 
p = 0.5. In order to complete the model, we also have to decide how many 
observations our sample is to consist of. Suppose for the sake of argument that we 
set out to roll the die 120 times. Hence A is binomially distributed with n = 120 and 
p = 0.5. Then we observe a relevant sample of data. In our case, such a sample would 
have 120 throws of the die, with the outcomes being either even or odd numbers on 
the upper most surface of the die when it comes to rest. It is standard practice to 
approximate binomial distribution by means of a normal distribution. The main 
conditions for doing so are that n is sufficiently large [most authors in statistical 
literature consider n > 50 as large enough] and that p is not too close to either 0 or 1. 
Both of these conditions obtain in our case, so the use of normal approximation is 
warranted. Let us put in some numbers for ease of understanding. Suppose that we 
roll the die 120 times26, and that 70 times it gave us an even number and 50 times an 
odd one. We will use the Normal approximation to the Binomial, where the mean 
and variance are calculated thus: µ = np, σ2 = np(1-p). Hence, A is normally 
distributed with the mean µ = 120x0.5 = 60 and variance σ2 = 120x0.5x0.5 = 30, in 
short: A ~ N(60, 30)  
 
Now, let us distinguish two sub-methods within Fisher’s methodology according to 
which we can proceed from here to test our supposition that the die is fair. The first 
one is the method of rejection trials, the second is the method of calculating so-called 
P-values.  
 
2.1.1 Rejection Trials 
 
So, we have our null hypothesis – that is, the model with the values of parameters 
fixed. In rejection trials the idea is that we test our model against data. The idea of 
testing is that one checks one’s sample of data against one’s model to see whether 
the data are consistent or significantly inconsistent27 with the correctness of the 
model [indeed, this facet of Fisherian methodology is often referred to as a ‘test of 
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 We assume that each throw is independent and identically distributed, that is, each throws follows 
the Binomial distribution where the probability of success is constant and the same for each throw. 
27
 The concept of significant inconsistency may strike the reader as odd, for in, for example, 
propositional  logic the concept of consistency is binary – either a set of propositions is consistent or 
it is not. We will look into this Fisherian use of the concept later in this section. 
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significance’]. Our model specifies a probability of observing every possible sample. 
We set a threshold probability value [it is usually referred to as the level of 
significance] and devise the following decision rule. If our model specifies that the 
observed outcome or outcomes at least as extreme have the probability of occurring 
greater than the critical value, we do not reject our model and tentatively uphold it 
until the next test. By ‘outcomes that are at least as extreme’ we mean those 
outcomes, that under the assumption that the null hypothesis is true have the 
probability that is at most as large as that of the actually observed outcome. If, on the 
other hand, the observed outcome or outcomes that are ‘at least as extreme’ have, 
according to our model, the probability of occurring which is lower than the level of 
significance, then we reject the model and seek an alternative one. With the level of 
significance and decision rule in place, we observe the sample, and comply with our 
decision rule. In order to make this method clearer, let us carry on with our example. 
 
So, in our die rolling example we have binomial set up with n = 120 and p = 0.5, 
which we approximate by A ~ N (60, 30). Suppose [as it is commonly done] that we 
set the level of significance at 0.05. Testing at this level of significance has become 
conventional, although some practitioners prefer 0.01 or other levels – the choice of 
the level of significance appears arbitrary28. We now carry out our experiment and 
suppose that we observe 70 even numbers and 50 odd numbers respectively. Now, 
the question is: how likely are we to observe this outcome or the outcomes that are at 
least as extreme under our hypothesis of the fairness of the die? In our example the 
outcomes at least as extreme are: 71 even and 49 odd, 72 even and 48 odd, and so 
on, as well as 50 even and 70 odd, 49 even, and so on, because observing 50 even 
and 70 odd has the same probability as that of observing 70 even and 50 odd due to 
the symmetry of the distribution around its mean value, which in our case is 60 even 
and 60 odd; and 49 even, 48 even and so on all have lower probability of occurring 
than 50 even and consequently than 70 even. So, due to the symmetry, P (A ≥ 70) = 
P (A ≤ 50). Using the transformation of our normal distribution into the standard 
                                                 
28
 ‘[Fisher] advocated 5% as the standard level (with 1% as a more stringent alternative); through 
applying this new methodology to a variety of practical examples, he established it is a highly popular 
statistical approach for many fields of science. … [Fisher] also wrote that “it is usual and convenient 
for experimenters to take 5 percent as a standard level of significance, in the sense that they are 
prepared to ignore all results which fail to reach this standard…” [Lehmann (1993):1243, 1244] For a 
contemporary debate on this topic see Hoover and Siegler (2008) and references therein. 
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normal, and the tabulation of the standard normal distribution, that we familiarised 
ourselves with previously, we obtain the following:  
P (A ≥ 70) or P (A ≤ 50) = 2p(Z ≥ (70-60)/301/2 ) = 2p(Z ≥ 1.83) = 2(1 – p (Z ≤ 
1.83)) = 2(1 – 0.9664) = 2x0.0336 = 0.0672 
 
That is, the probability of obtaining 70 even numbers out of 120 throws or an 
outcome that is at least as improbable is 0.0672 [that is, 6.72%] on the hypothesis 
that the die is fair. Since this probability is greater than our pre-determined rejection 
threshold value of 0.05, we do not reject our hypothesis of fairness of the die at 5 per 
cent significance level. Note, however, that if our significance level was, say, 0.1, we 
would have rejected the null hypothesis29. 
 
To clarify, the reasoning here is roughly this: we should reject a hypothesis upon 
observing an outcome [in our example that is 70 out of 120 throws] such that the 
probability of observing this or outcomes at least as extreme on supposition that the 
hypothesis is true is ‘low’ relative to the probability of observing other possible 
outcomes of the experiment. The probability is deemed ‘low’ when it is below the 
significance level [here it is 5%]. So our particular model has survived this test. 
 
2.1.2 P-values 
 
The method of p-values is formally very similar to that of rejection trials. The 
difference lies predominantly in the interpretation of results. 
 
The p-value is the probability of obtaining an outcome or a more extreme one on the 
supposition that the hypothesis is true. Recalling the example that we used in the 
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 ‘Another consideration that may enter into the specification of a significance level is the attitude 
toward the hypothesis before the experiment is performed. If one firmly believes the hypothesis to be 
true, extremely convincing evidence will be required before one is willing to give up this belief, and 
the significance level will accordingly be set very low. (A low significance level results in the 
hypothesis being rejected only for a set of values of the observations whose total probability under the 
hypothesis is small, so that such values would be most unlikely to occur if [the null hypothesis] were 
true.)’ Lehmann (1986):70 It seems that in such cases Lehmann advocates using the significance level 
of something like 0.01. However, motivating such choice by ‘firm belief that the hypothesis is true’ 
does not seem to be open to classical statisticians, for they would need to explain further what 
constitutes this ‘firm belief’ [since they deny that hypotheses have probabilities of being true – see 
page 31], whereas this has a natural interpretation within the Bayesian statistics as there being a high 
prior probability of truth of the null hypothesis – cf. section 4.1. 
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rejection trials subsection, the p-value there was 6.72%. However, rather than 
creating a rule which directs us to a decision as to whether to reject or not  to reject 
the hypothesis at the pre-set level of significance, the p-value is taken to signify the 
strength of evidence against the hypothesis. This is based on the so-called Law of 
Improbability [here is a somewhat naïve rendition of it]: If the hypothesis implies 
that the probability p of observing a certain outcome is small, and the outcome has 
been observed, then p is evidence against the hypothesis, and the lower the 
numerical value of  p the stronger this evidence is.30  
 
There are several difficulties that Fisherian method runs into.  Let us consider some 
of them. 
 
Firstly, as we already mentioned, there is arbitrariness in choice of the significance 
level, so that one and the same observation may lead to either rejection or not of one 
and the same null hypothesis depending on that level. To be fair, this criticism only 
applies to the rejection trial method and not to the method of p-values. 
 
Secondly, the accept/reject nature of the rejection trials method does not take into 
account the strength of evidence that the sample provides us with. Again, this is 
prima facie problematic for the rejection trials method, not for the p-values. 
 
Thirdly, another issue with the rejection trials method is in the doubtful nature of the 
concept of what we call significant inconsistency, since in formal logic the concept 
of consistency is binary – for example, a set of propositions is either consistent or 
inconsistent. Fisher argues: ‘[Tests of significance] could ‘disprove’ a theory … and 
… when used accurately, [they] are capable of rejecting or invalidating hypotheses, 
in so far as these are contradicted by the data.’ [quoted in and added italics by 
Howson and Urbach (2006):150] It is rather clear that the data with a low probability 
of occurring under the null cannot be logically inconsistent with it. The quote 
indicates that Fisher wants significant inconsistency to be as close as possible to 
logical inconsistency.  Elsewhere Fisher (1956):39 equates his notion of statistical 
significance with the following disjunction: either the hypothesis is false or a very 
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 For an in-depth analysis cf. Royall (1997):chapter 3. 
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rare event has occurred. Practitioners typically supplement this notion of statistical 
significance with that of practical significance. For instance, Agresti and Finlay 
(2009):163 discuss an example of testing the hypothesis that on average the 
population of the USA holds moderate ideological views. That is, the hypothesis that 
the sampling distribution is normal [with the variance estimated from the sample] 
and that the population mean is 4 as measured on the ordinal scale from 1 
representing extremely liberal views to 7 representing extremely conservative views. 
Supposing that in a very large sample the sample mean is 4.08, Agresti and Finlay 
(ibid.) calculate the p-value of approximately 10-11, which is extremely statistically 
significant. However, they contend that in this context the difference between 4 and 
4.08 is of no practical significance.  
 
Fourthly, there are no alternative hypotheses provided, so that even if we do not 
reject the null, perhaps there is at least one other hypothesis out there that we also 
would not reject, and which perhaps would have a higher p-value indicating that 
there are more evidence against the null, so that the alternative is somewhat better. 
I.e., a hypothesis whose parameters were fixed at the values which turned out to be 
closer to the actual observations; in our example one such hypothesis would be a 
model with the success rate set at p=0.55 rather than p=0.5, as it was the case for the 
null. 
 
Finally, even though the strength of evidence is attempted to be captured with the 
notion of p-values, the numerical expressions of p-values depend on how we define 
the outcome space, and as such they are arbitrary. Recall that in the example in this 
subsection we hypothesised that A ~ N (60, 30), and that we observed A = 70. Since 
the p-value is the probability of observing the actual outcome or outcomes at least as 
extreme on the supposition that the hypothesis is correct, we calculated the p-value 
as 0.0672. Now, for the sake of the argument, suppose that we have a colleague who 
is interested in our experiment31. Suppose that the colleague resides very far away 
from us, and that we have only the most primitive means of communicating with her. 
Knowing that we can only send her a signal in the form of a ‘Yes’ or ‘No’, we 
happened to have agreed with the colleague [when we had got a rare opportunity to 
                                                 
31
 This example is a modified version of the one used in Royall (1997):68. 
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meet her a long while ago] that we would communicate ‘Yes’ if we got A = 70 and 
‘No’ if we got any other value. Hence, her outcome space consists of two values, 
viz., {70, not-70}, whereas ours is made up of 121 values. Now, our colleague also 
uses the Fisherian method, and wishes to calculate the p-value. Since A = 70 is the 
most extreme outcome that she can observe, her p-value is P(A=70) = 0.0138 [4 d. 
p.]32. Our p-values differ whereas we observed the same evidence – 70 even numbers 
out of 120 throws of the die. This example illustrates the point that p-values depend 
on outcomes that did not happen. As Jeffreys eloquently puts it in a much-quoted 
passage [where ‘P [integral]’ stands for ‘p-value’ and ‘law’ stands for ‘hypothesis’]: 
If P is small, that means that there have been unexpectedly large departures 
from prediction. But why should these be stated in terms of P? The latter 
gives the probability of departures, measured in a particular way, equal to or 
greater than the observed set, and the contribution from the actual value is 
nearly always negligible. What the use of P implies, therefore, is that a 
hypothesis that may be true may be rejected because it has not predicted 
observable results that have not occurred. This seems a remarkable 
procedure. On the face of it the fact that such results have not occurred might 
more reasonably be taken as evidence for the law, not against it. The same 
applies to all the current significance tests based on P integrals.’ 
Jeffreys (1961):385 
 
Arguably, the strength of evidence for or against any hypothesis should be solely 
based on the observations that have actually been made, and not on something that 
has never been observed. On this view, the way that one defines the outcome space 
should be irrelevant. The example that we use could hardly happen in modern 
academic life. However, this does not negate the methodological point it raises.  
 
We believe that the discussion in this subsection have served to indicate that there 
are substantial issues with using Fisherian methods for choosing either a family of 
models or a particular model. 
 
2.2 Neyman-Pearson 
 
In the previous section we looked at Fisherian methodology. At the end of that 
subsection we noted several disadvantages that the methodology has. In order to 
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 We performed the calculation for P(A=70) using the binomial formula directly rather than the 
normal approximation, because when A is a continuous variable, any particular point value of it has 
the probability of zero. 
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overcome some of these disadvantages, J. Neyman and E. S. Pearson devise 
methodology that we are going to consider in this subsection.  
 
In Neyman-Pearson hypothesis testing approach one postulates two hypotheses 
[rather than one as in Fisher’s case], which are normally called the null hypothesis 
H0 and the alternative hypothesis H1. These hypotheses normally take one of the 
following three forms. First, both H0 and H1 are point hypotheses [that is, they are 
single models with different fixed values of parameters]. Second, H0 is a point 
hypothesis and H1 is a composite hypothesis [that is, a proper subset of a model with 
more than one element in it]. Third, both H0 and H1 are composite hypotheses. 
Having set up the hypotheses, one works out what the so-called rejection region is. 
The rejection region is calculated according to what is called the Fundamental 
Lemma by satisfying the following inequality: P(observation under 
H0)/P(observation under H1) ≤ k, where k is a constant depending on both the 
significance level [the same concept as in the Fisherian methodology above] and the 
hypotheses themselves [see Howson and Urbach (2006):148]. Informally, this 
guarantees that the rejection region lies between H0 and H1. After that one observes 
the data. Then one follows this decision rule, on the crucial assumption that one of 
the hypotheses is true: if the data is in the rejection region, then the null hypothesis is 
rejected and the alternative hypothesis is accepted; if the data does not fall within the 
rejection region, then the null hypothesis is accepted. This approach is alternatively 
called error probabilistic, because one of the most crucial elements of this method is 
the control of error probabilities. There are two types of errors that can be 
committed. The null hypothesis is rejected whereas it is true [this is called a Type I 
error], and the null hypothesis is accepted whereas the alternative hypothesis is true 
[Type II error]. 
 
A salient analogy here is that of court trials. The null hypothesis there is the 
innocence of the defendant [presumption of innocence]. If the court convicts the 
defendant when she is innocent that is a type I error, whereas when the court of law 
pronounces the defendant innocent while she is guilty that is the type II error. It is 
important which hypothesis is considered to be the null and alternative [just like in 
the court example]. This is because sometimes the inference changes if the null and 
alternative hypotheses are changed around. We will show an example of this later in 
40 
 
this section. Ordinarily the reason that is given for non-arbitrariness of such a choice 
is that it is usually quite clear what is the natural choice as to which hypothesis 
should be the null and which should be the alternative one. The null is usually the 
default ‘sceptical’ hypothesis. E.g., at the drug trial one would naturally want the 
hypothesis that the given tested drug has no effect to be the null and the hypothesis 
that the drug has a positive effect to be the alternative. We only want to accept drugs 
when we are quite confident that they do have an effect. In this case the type I error 
would be to accept the drug as effective whereas it actually has no effect. The type II 
error would be to accept the notion that the drug has no effect whereas it actually has 
a positive effect. Sometimes it is not that clear what should be the null and what 
should be the alternative. We will consider as to why this may matter by using an 
example further in this subsection. 
 
In the Neyman-Pearson [NP] approach one calculates the probabilities of committing 
each type of error. The prescription then is to try to minimise both error probabilities 
as much as possible. It is impossible to achieve these two objectives 
simultaneously33. For a given number of observations reduction in type I error 
implies increase in the type II error. So what normally happens is that the type I error 
is fixed at a desirable level [this level is usually called the critical level α, and is 
usually set anywhere between 10% and 1%] and then the required power of the test 
[power = 1 – P(type II error)] is achieved by increasing the sample size. The power 
of the test is the probability that a false null hypothesis is rejected. 
 
For the purposes of illustrating the idea of Neyman-Pearson testing, to begin with we 
take the most simple example of testing two point hypotheses. That is, both the null 
and the alternative hypothesise that the phenomenon in question follows the 
respective probability distribution models, and that the relevant parameters have  
sharp values. 
 
As it has become customary by now, suppose that we have a die, and that we have 
two alternative ideas as for the probability of obtaining even numbers when we 
throw the die [call it the rate of success]. Just as in the subsection on Fisher, we 
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 This is the case when the number of observations is fixed. However, both types of error can be 
reduced if the sample size is increased. 
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suppose that we are in the binomial set up with the throws of the die assumed to be 
independently and identically distributed – so binomial probability distribution 
models represent both null and alternative hypothesis. Now, suppose for the sake of 
clarity of exposition that our null hypothesis is that the success rate is 0.55, and the 
alternative is 2/3. We set out to test these hypotheses by throwing the die 120 times. 
Since the number of observations is quite large, we will be using the normal 
approximation to the binomial for mathematical convenience. 
 
So, under the null hypothesis on average we expect to observe 66 even numbers, and 
under the alternative hypothesis we expect to observe 80 even numbers. We set the 
probability of type I error at 5%, which is the standard practice in classical statistics. 
Suppose that our experiment yields 70 even numbers [denoted as  = 70]. Then let 
us calculate the minimum number of even numbers that we need to observe in order 
to reject the null. As before, under our null hypothesis the variance is nxpx(1-p) = 
120x0.55x0.45 = 29.7. Using this variance in the standard normal calculation, we 
obtain the following: 
P (Z > 1.64) = 0.05 => P ((( – 66) / 29.71/2) > 1.64) = 0.05 => P ( > 66+1.64x 
29.71/2)) = 0.05 =>  > 74.94 [2 d. p.] 
 
So, in order to reject the null hypothesis in favour of the alternative at α = 5% 
probability of type I error [it is also called the level of significance], we need to 
observe at least 75 even outcomes out of 120 rolls of the die. Since we actually 
observed 70, we do accept the null in this case. 
 
Now, let us work out the probability of type II error, i.e., of accepting  a false null 
hypothesis. In our binary set up, falsehood of null implies the truth of the alternative 
hypothesis. We have just established that we do not reject the null if we observe the 
number of evens to be less than 75. Probability of type II error then is the probability 
of observing less than 75 evens given that the true success rate is 80. Calculating the 
variance under the alternative hypothesis as np(1-p) = 120x2/3x1/3 ≈ 26.67 (2 d. p.) 
and transforming into units of the standard normal and using the tables for it, we 
obtain: 
(75 – 80) / 26.671/2 = -0.9682 So, P (Z < -0.9682) ≈ 0.1664 
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Consequently, the probability of rejecting a false null hypothesis in this test [that is, 
the power of the test] is 1 - 0.1814 = 0.8336. 
 
Now, let us look at testing a point null hypothesis versus a composite alternative, and 
also composite null versus composite alternative. The former in our example above 
would be something like H0: p = 0.55 vs H1: p > 0.55. The latter: H0: p ≤ 0.55 vs H1: 
p > 0.55. Notice that the assumption of the truth of either H0 or H1 becomes 
progressively more legitimate, particularly in the composite H0 vs composite H1 
case, where this assumption is correct providing that we have selection the correct 
model. It is interesting to note that in both of these cases the answer is the same as it 
was in the point H0 vs point H1 case above – we would reject H0 at α = 5% just in 
case we observe 75 or more even out of 120. However, now we cannot calculate the 
power of these tests, because in order to do so H1 has to specify particular point 
values for the parameters. So, what then of the idea that we should maximise the 
power at the given level of significance α? In these cases Neyman and Pearson 
employ the concept of Uniformly Most Powerful Unbiased (UMPU) tests. A test is 
Uniformly Most Powerful when for every model within H1 the power is maximised. 
It is also Unbiased when for each model within H1 the power of the test is not 
smaller than the significance level. Otherwise such a test would have a higher 
probability of rejecting a true H0 rather than rejecting a false one, which Neyman and 
Pearson deem undesirable. Both of our tests above are UMPU. The idea of the 
UMPU test becomes clearer when one considers tests of this type: H0: p = 0.55 vs 
H1: p ≠ 0.55. We will look into this important case in section 1.4.5. 
 
Here is a summary of some salient features of the power of a test from Newbold 
(1995):371: 
1. ‘Everything else being equal, the farther the true mean µ1 from the hypothesized 
mean µ0, the greater the power of the test.  
2. Everything else being equal, the smaller the significance level of the test, the 
smaller the power. In other words, reducing the probability of a Type I error will 
increase the probability of a Type II error. 
3. Everything else being equal, the larger the population variance, the lower the 
power of the test. We are less likely to detect small departures from the hypothesized 
mean when there is greater variability in the population. 
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4. Everything else being equal, the larger the sample size, the greater the power of 
the test. Again, this is intuitively plausible. The more information obtained from the 
population, the greater the chance of detecting any departure from the null 
hypothesis.’ 
 
Having considered the Neyman-Pearson approach in some detail, let us identify 
some key shortcomings that the method has. 
 
Firstly, the binary accept/reject set up is rather crude. The prescription to behave as if 
the accepted hypothesis was true [until further tests are carried out, that is] does not 
provide us with the information as to what amount of evidential support the 
hypothesis enjoys, or what amount of confidence we have in the truth of the 
hypothesis. It has to be stressed, however, that there is much disagreement on this 
point in philosophy of statistics. The proponents of the Neyman-Pearson 
methodology consider the binary nature of this approach as its strength. It allows 
them to answer the question ‘What should we do, given the data?’ rather than ‘How 
should we interpret the data as evidence regarding a hypothesis or one hypothesis 
versus another?’ [Royall (1997):4] Still, arguably we would be much more cautious 
with regards to decisions that we make on the basis of a weakly supported 
hypothesis [or, alternatively if we do not have a great amount of confidence in the 
truth of the hypothesis] rather than if the hypothesis had more evidence indicating its 
truth. On the other hand, error probabilities carry out this function indirectly. 
However, probability of type II error [that is, of accepting a false null hypothesis] 
crucially depends on what one chooses as the alternative hypothesis. As stated in 
point 1 above, the further the alternative hypothesis away from the null, the smaller 
the probability of type II error is [and, consequently the greater is the power of the 
test]. For instance, if in the example that we used in this section our alternative 
hypothesis was p = 0.7 rather than 2/3, then probability of type II error would have 
been approximately 0.0365 rather than 0.166434. 
 
Secondly, there is arbitrariness in the choice of the level of significance and in the 
choice as to which hypothesis is the null and which is the alternative one. The issue 
                                                 
34
 The critical value: (75 – 84)/(120x0.7x0.3)0.5 = -1.7928. So P(Z<-1.7928) ≈ 0.0365 
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with the choice of the level of significance is very similar to the issue with the 
rejection trials method within Fisherian methodology. The problem with the choice 
of the null and alternative is the following. Suppose that in the example that we used 
in this subsection we choose the null hypothesis p = 2/3 and the alternative p = 0.55. 
Then for the rejection region with α = 0.05: P (Z<-1.64) = 0.05 => P (( – 
80)/26.670.5 < -1.64) = 0.05 =>  < 80 - 8.4695 =>  < 71.5305. So if we observe 
the value of  of 71 or smaller, then we reject p = 2/3 hypothesis in favour of p = 
0.55. Suppose that we observe  = 73. Under this set up we would accept the p = 2/3 
hypothesis whereas originally given this observation we would accept the  p = 0.55 
hypothesis! Notice also that, unlike the cases of a court trial or test of a new drug 
[where it is claimed that the default position of the presumption of innocence or the 
hypothesis of the drug having no effect respectively both naturally play the roles of 
the null hypothesis], there is no obvious reason in this case as to why one of these 
hypothesis should be the null.  
 
Thirdly, the approach suffers from something called Lindley Paradox. In fact 
Fisherian approach has the same issue. According to Lindley Paradox, as the number 
of observations grows, the proportion of successes at which we would just reject the 
H0 at a given level of significance becomes arbitrarily close to the proportion 
stipulated by null, and the power of the test tends to one. So even a tiny deviation of 
the proportion in sample from that of H0 is sufficient to reject the H0, which is 
counter-intuitive. Here is an illustration using our example of testing H0: p = 0.55 vs 
H1: p = 2/3. Previously we noted that we would reject H0 at α = 5% if we observed 
75 or more evens out of 120. That is, if the proportion of evens in the sample was 
greater than 74.94/120 = 0.6245. The power of the test was 0.8336. Now, suppose 
that our sample consists of 12000 observations. Then for the rejection region: P (Z > 
1.64) = 0.05 => P ((( – 0.55x12000) / (0.55x0.45x12000)1/2) > 1.64) = 0.05 => P 
( >6600+1.64x 297001/2)) = 0.05 =>  > 6689.38 [2 d. p.], which corresponds to 
observing the proportion of 0.5574 or more of evens in the sample rather than 0.6245 
when the sample had 120 observations. In order to calculate  the power of this test 
we require the following quantity: (6689 – 8000) / 26671/2 = -25.36. So, P (Type II 
error) = P (Z < -25.36) ≈ 0 Hence the power of the test is approximately 1. To 
counterbalance this counter-intuitive result classical statisticians generally advise to 
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reduce the level of significance as the number of observations grows so that the test 
becomes less sensitive to small differences. However, this is a rather ad hoc 
manoeuvre that has no clear rationale with the NP methodology. Nonetheless, 
practical experience in using the NP framework suggests the expedience of this 
move in order to align NP with the intuitions of its practitioners. 
 
2.3 Fisher vs Neyman-Pearson 
 
In Neyman-Pearson approach to hypothesis testing to ‘accept’ the null hypothesis 
means that ‘…the data available do not provide enough evidence for rejection of the 
null hypothesis, given that we want to fix at alpha the probability of rejecting a null 
hypothesis that is true.’35 
 
So, what does this methodology prescribe that we do with regards to selecting a 
probability distribution model? If we accept the null hypothesis in the sense given 
above, then we should behave as if the null hypothesis were true. However, if we 
reject the null hypothesis then Neyman and Pearson urge us to behave as if the 
alternative hypothesis is true. They call this approach ‘inductive behaviour’. 
 
In contrast, Fisher’s rejection trials are very much like Karl Popper’s 
Falsificationism. Here is an unsophisticated rendition of Falsificationism. Scientists 
entertain certain hypotheses [conjectures]. There is no amount of evidence that 
would establish a given hypothesis as true [cf. the well-known problem of 
induction]. However, a single observation that is logically inconsistent with the 
hypothesis shows it to be false. So, rather than confirming hypotheses what one 
ought to do is to try to disconfirm [i.e., falsify] them. Similarly, in the rejection trials 
method, one sets up a structure akin to modus tollens. To repeat the discussion in 
section 2.1, if the hypothesis is true, then the given observation [in statistics usually a 
set of observations – a sample] has a certain probability of being observed. However, 
if the probability of observed sample is below a pre-determined threshold [i.e., the 
level of significance], then the observations are deemed to be significantly 
inconsistent with the hypothesis [in the sense that they are too improbable under the 
                                                 
35
 Newbold (1995):329 
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hypothesis], hence the hypothesis is rejected. If, however, the probability is not 
below the threshold value, then the hypothesis is left in use until next trial. Fisher 
referred to this as ‘inductive inference’, which seems unwarranted because Popper 
considered that by his methodology of falsification he ‘dissolved’ the problem of 
induction. So if Fisher’s method is statistical falsificationism, then, presumably there 
is also no induction taking place, but at best corroboration through survival of 
numerous tests. However, the p-value methodology, which takes the p-value to 
measure the strength of evidence against the hypothesis [the lower the p-value the 
stronger is the evidence against the hypothesis], does not seem to align with 
falsificationism. We shall consider other ideas of Popper in chapters 4 and 5. 
 
Neyman and Pearson [NP] considered their methodology to be an improvement on 
Fisher’s, in that they introduced the idea of the power of the test. From their 
perspective the p-values only measure the probability of rejecting a true null 
hypothesis. However, in Fisher’s method there were no way to control for the 
probability of accepting the false null, which the power allows one to do. Fisher 
thought that the power should be a qualitative notion, for its quantitative calculation 
often involves unknown alternative hypothesis [such as is the case when the 
alternative is composite]. There are more points of disagreement between Fisher and 
NP, but there are of no consequence for our purposes. Interested reader is referred to 
Lehmann (1993) and Lenhard (2006). 
 
Indeed, notwithstanding the issues from which the NP method suffers, it can be 
considered to be a proper method of model selection. There are two competing 
hypotheses. Of course traditionally the hypotheses have the same mathematical 
structure, but this is not a necessary attribute of the method. Also, importantly, in the 
case when we test point [simple] H0 versus composite H1, the null hypothesis has not 
adjustable parameters and the alternative hypothesis has one adjustable parameter. 
This notion is going to be discussed at length in chapter 3. It will for now be 
sufficient to say that the difference in the number of freely adjustable parameters is 
an essential part of the model selection methods discussed in chapters 3 and 4. 
Finally, the Neyman-Pearson point null versus composite alternative case shall be 
used in chapter 5. 
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2.4 Point Estimation 
 
In sections 2.1 – 2.3 we looked at the classical methods of hypothesis testing. 
However, instead of testing hypotheses, scientists sometimes require estimates of 
parameter values from data. So, sections 2.4 and 2.5 are dedicated to brief 
introductions to the classical techniques of estimation by point values and intervals 
respectively, familiarity with which shall be useful for understanding the material in 
the subsequent chapters. 
 
2.4.1 Properties of Estimators 
 
Suppose that, rather than test hypotheses with regards to the probability distribution 
and the value of the population parameter as was done in the previous subsection, we 
would like to estimate a population parameter on the basis of a sample that we have 
drawn from the population and on the assumption that we have the right model-type. 
For instance, we may know that our population of interest is normal and may know 
the value of the standard deviation, but not know the value of the mean. In this case 
we come up with an estimator. That is, a function that has the values of sample 
observation as its inputs and the estimate of the relevant parameter as the output. 
How do we come up with such a function? After all, we can think of many possible 
estimators. In classical statistics the estimators have to have desirable properties, i.e., 
unbiasedness, consistency and efficiency36. In our case, it seems natural to estimate 
the population mean by the sample mean . The sample mean does possess the 
desirable properties.37 
 
2.4.2 Mean Squared Error 
 
Suppose that we have two estimators such that the first one is unbiased but it has a 
relatively large variance, whereas the second one is biased but it has a smaller 
variance. Here the two criteria of desirability are in conflict. In cases like these an 
extra criterion is employed, which allows for a trade-off between the two. Mean 
Squared Error (MSE) is such a meta-criterion. It is the expectation of the square 
                                                 
36
 We briefly touched on this issue in section 1.1.3. 
37
 See Newbold (1995) for the mathematical derivations. 
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difference between the estimator and the population parameter. It can be shown that 
it is equal to sum of the squared bias and the variance of the estimator. The 
corresponding rule is to choose an estimator that has the smallest MSE. 
 
We shall see the relevance of the properties of estimators to our discussion in 
chapters 3 and 4. 
 
2.5 Confidence Intervals 
 
Quite often, however, one is interested in the question as to how confident one 
should be in the reliability of one’s point estimates. Hence there is a method of 
confidence intervals designed to answer such a question. Confidence interval 
procedure gives us an interval estimator, rather than a point one, which has a degree 
of confidence attached to it that the population parameter lies within the interval. 
 
For example, suppose we draw a sample of n observations with mean ̅ from a 
normally distributed population with known standard deviation σ. We would like to 
find a 95% confidence interval for µ. This confidence interval is given by 
 
̅ – 1.96σ / n1/2 < µ < ̅ + 1.96σ / n1/2 Notice that as the number of observations 
increases, the corresponding confidence interval shortens. 
 
For example, suppose that X ~ N (µ, 1), and that we have a sample of 36 
observations where ̅ = 0.5. What is the confidence interval for the µ? It is the 
following:   
0.5 - 1.96/6 < µ < 0.5 + 1.96/6, which is -0.1733 < µ < 0.8267.  
 
The usual interpretation of this interval is that if we keep repeating the experiment 
[i.e., keep drawing random samples from the population], in the limit 95% of the 
intervals yielded by this procedure will contain the true value of the population mean 
µ38. Hence the procedure gives us 95% probability [in the sense of limiting relative 
frequency] that the intervals contain µ. However, once we have observed a particular 
                                                 
38
 For a representative example, see Newbold (1995):275. For a thorough analysis of the issue of 
interpreting confidence intervals see Howson and Urbach (2006): section 5.f.2 
49 
 
sample and calculated the particular lower and the upper limits of the associated 
confidence interval, the frequentist probabilistic interpretation is no longer available 
to us. This is a manifestation of the general difficulty that the frequentist 
interpretation of probabilities has with the single-case probabilities. This issue, 
however, of no consequence to the main issue of this thesis, viz., the problem of 
model selection. 
 
It is interesting to note [and we shall employ this fact in chapter 4] that the 
confidence interval estimation procedure is equivalent to the following NP test 
where c is a constant: H0: µ = c vs H1: µ ≠ c. That is, we would reject H0 at (100% - 
confidence level %) level of significance just in case c lies outside of the confidence 
interval. In the example above we would reject the H0 at 100% - 95% = 5% level of 
significance if and only if either  c < -0.1733 or c > 0.8267. Here our rejection region 
is distributed equally to both ‘tails’ of the distribution [i.e. 2.5% in each tail] in order 
for the test to be an UMPU. For mathematical details see Lehmann (1986). 
 
2.6 Intermediate Conclusion and Plan 
 
In chapter 1 we introduced the issue of prediction in science. We identified the three 
ingredients required for this task: data collection, model selection and parameter 
estimation.  We drew distinctions between theoretical and statistical models, and 
between deterministic and probabilistic models. We stated that this thesis will 
mainly be concerned with statistical model selection. In this chapter we  provided an 
overview of some widely used model selection methods, viz., Fisherian and 
Neyman-Pearson. We noted some shortcomings in each of these methods. Chapter 
three is dedicated to detailed consideration of a relatively new method of model 
selection that is based on so-called Akaike Information Criterion [AIC]. In chapter 
four we consider Bayesian statistics in general as it applies to the problem of model 
selection and relatively novel methodology of model selection based on Bayes 
Information Criterion [BIC] in particular, and then provide comparison and contrast 
with the AIC. Chapter five is dedicated to exploring some philosophical 
consequences of AIC and BIC methods, and in particular to their putative relevance 
to the debate on scientific realism. 
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3. The Akaike Information Criterion 
 
3.1 Introduction 
 
 ‘So far, when speaking of ‘an alternative hypothesis’ I have meant some 
hypothesis genuinely different from the one under test. But in practice 
Neyman and Pearson do not use ‘alternative hypothesis’ in such a sense, 
and this constitutes my second objection to their principle of alternative 
hypotheses. In practice the alternative hypotheses considered by Neyman 
and Pearson are nothing but the same hypothesis with different 
parameter values. Suppose, for example, that the hypothesis under test is 
that ξ is normal µ0, σ0, then the alternatives will be that ξ is normal with 
different µ, σ (or, in some cases, just with different µ). Thus the 
alternatives generally considered when the Neyman-Pearson theory is 
applied are merely trivial variants of the original hypothesis. But this is 
an intolerably narrow framework. We could (and should) consider a 
much wider variety of different alternatives. For example we might 
consider alternatives which assign a distribution to ξ of a different 
functional form.’  
Gillies (1973):208, italics added 
 
Let us revisit some of the highlights from chapter 1 relevant to the project of  this 
thesis. There we identified three problems in parametric statistical modelling – 
coming up with a ‘good’ sample of data, choosing the model-type and fixing the 
parameters thus picking a particular model within the model-type. In the rest of this 
thesis we shall focus on the second issue, viz., the problem of model selection. We 
will be working on the assumption that we already have a sample of data which has 
been collected in an acceptable way as discussed in section 1.1.1. The choice of a 
family of models and estimating the parameters thus picking a particular model 
within the chosen family quite often goes hand in hand. However, we shall focus on 
choosing model-types since, even though there are disagreements about how to 
estimate parameters, the pros and cons of each estimation method are rather well 
established, whereas there still much more light that needs to be shed on the issue of 
model selection. We will consider the issue of parameter estimation only when it has 
a bearing on the issue of model selection. 
 
We think that it would be fair to say that the quote above represents a common 
perception of the NP framework. In our view, however, the NP framework can be 
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viewed as providing a method for model selection. Firstly, just because the 
alternatives generally considered in the NP approach are of the same functional 
form, it does not imply that they have to be – this is a limitation due to the users of 
the method, and not of the method itself. Although we are not aware of any actual 
attempts of NP testing the null and alternative hypotheses of different functional 
forms, we do not see why in principle this cannot be done. Naturally this would 
introduce extra mathematical difficulties for, for example, data would be assumed to 
be arising from different sampling distributions, but this is still a theoretical 
possibility – cf. Gillies (1973):216. Secondly, even when it is used in the way it 
commonly is, there are cases when model selection can be said to occur. That is, in 
the special case of simple null versus composite alternative testing. Admittedly, this 
is a substantial limitation, although we would reserve the term ‘intolerably narrow 
framework’ to the Fisherian methodology. We of course would like to use a broader 
framework than either Fisherian or Neyman-Pearson for model selection, and indeed 
this chapter is dedicated to considering one of such frameworks – the Akaike 
Information Criterion [AIC]. The other framework – that of the Bayes Information 
Criterion [BIC] – we shall discuss in chapter 4. 
 
Nowadays, there are myriads of methods for model selection. The main reasons why 
we concentrate our attention on the two methods – the AIC and BIC – are that, 
firstly, a lot of methods are related to these two, so the methodological and 
philosophical points that are raised in this thesis by and large carry over, and 
secondly the AIC and BIC have attracted most attention out of all the other model 
selection methodologies in recent philosophical literature. 
  
So, the subject of this chapter is the model selection method based on the so-called 
Akaike Information Criterion39 [AIC]. 
 
In order to illustrate the idea of AIC let us come back to one of the examples 
employed in chapter 1, i.e., to the problem of finding an association between weights 
and heights of the males within the London Borough of Waltham Forest. Assume 
that we have collected an admissible sample. Suppose, for ease of introduction, that 
                                                 
39
 Our presentation of AIC is largely based on Burnham and Anderson (2002) and Konishi and 
Kitagawa (2008) 
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we have two competing deterministic statistical models – linear and quadratic. By 
the linear model we mean the infinite set of polynomials of the first degree that have 
the functional form y= ax + b such that each individual model is an element of this 
set with the values of parameters a and b fixed at particular levels. Examples of such 
models would be linear curves y = 2x + 3, y = 1.6x – 5, etc.  Likewise, the quadratic 
model is the infinite set of polynomials of the second degree that have the functional 
form y= ax2 + bx + c such that each individual model is an element of this set with 
the values of parameters a, b and c fixed at particular levels. Notice that in the 
quadratic model there is no model with the value of parameter a set to zero, for such 
a model would be an element of the linear family. Thus we define our families of 
models to be non-nested. The importance of this point will be discussed in section 
4.3.1. 
 
Now, why is it that we are comparing the models simpliciter, whereas   previously 
we were often looking at comparing models with the parameters set at particular 
values as it was the case in Neyman-Pearson methodology in chapter 2? This is 
because now we focus on comparing the functional forms of models [that is, 
concentrating on the model selection step] rather than on comparing functional forms 
of models together with the particular values of parameters. 
 
An obvious way of going about choosing between these two models would be to 
start with a plot of the data points from the sample in the Cartesian plane such that 
the heights would be measured along the x-axis and the corresponding weights of the 
individuals measured along the y-axis. Then, following the most wide-spread 
approach which urges one to prefer models that reflect the observations as closely as 
possible, one could find the linear model and the quadratic model that 
correspondently lie maximally close to the data points. This closeness of fit to data 
points is conventionally calculated by the sum of the squared vertical distances 
[hereafter – by the SOS] from each point to the given curve. Unless data point lie on 
a perfectly straight line, the best fitting member of the quadratic model will provide 
closer fit to data than the best fitting element of the linear model because of the extra 
flexibility allowed by having three adjustable parameters [a, b and c] rather than two 
[a and b]. The notion of an adjustable parameter will receive detailed attention 
further in this chapter. It shall for now suffice to define an adjustable parameter as a 
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parameter such that every change in its value would pick out a different element 
within the given model.  
 
Following the reasoning above, a family of polynomials of the third, fourth, and so 
on degrees would contain elements that provide progressively closer fit to the given 
data points. This culminates with a perfect fit of a model within the family of 
polynomials of (n-1)th degree, where n corresponds to the number of observations 
that comprise our sample. In this case that best fitting element of this family will go 
through every data point [as long as there are no data points such that one data point 
is vertically directly above the other data point], thus having the sum of the squared 
vertical distances [SOS] at zero. If the closeness of fit is our one and only criterion 
for choosing a model, we will choose such a polynomial [Forster and Sober 
(1994):4]. Now, what of our objective of modelling? Recall that we set out in chapter 
1 to do modelling for predictive purposes. How predictively successful would we 
expect the chosen polynomial of (n-1)th degree to be? Would we expect the data 
points from a new sample within the population to lie on or close to the polynomial? 
Intuitively the answer is ‘no’, because such a polynomial would have picked up all 
the idiosyncrasies of the observations making up this particular sample. Even though 
the sample may have been chosen well – for instance, it may well be representative 
of the population [which in itself is not a given – recall section 1.1.1], still we would 
expect the sample to have at least some variation from the population as the whole 
[again section 1.1.1].  
 
So, why exactly did we get into this trouble with the polynomial of (n-1)th degree? 
One answer is that the corresponding family of polynomial models was too flexible, 
that is, it contained too many adjustable parameters. Since the closeness of fit 
increases with more adjustable parameters, it would be natural to think that any 
given family of models should be penalised for the number of adjustable parameters 
that the model uses. On the other hand, one would not want the model to have too 
few adjustable parameters so that the model reflects the given data too remotely. So, 
there seems to be a trade-off between closeness of fit of a model and the number of 
adjustable parameters it uses to achieve this fit, with an optimal balance of these two 
attributes somewhere in-between the two extremes. In fact, this is the notion that one 
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arrives at through using the AIC methodology, to detailed consideration of which we 
now turn. 
 
3.2 Components of AIC 
 
In the 1970s the Japanese statistician Hirotugu Akaike derived a formal expression 
of the idea of the trade-off between the closeness of fit of a model to the data points 
and the number of adjustable parameters that the models employs to do so40. Let us 
consider his method, which consists of two main components – the maximum 
likelihood estimation and Kullback-Leibler divergence.  
 
3.2.1 Maximum Likelihood Estimation 
 
Maximum Likelihood Estimation [MLE] is a popular statistical method of estimating 
parameters given a statistical model form. We delayed consideration of this method 
to this chapter [the reader will recall that we went through estimation techniques 
used in classical statistics in the previous chapter] because it naturally aligns with the 
subject matter of this chapter, i.e., the AIC methodology. The reason for considering 
the MLE method here is that the Akaike Information Criterion can be viewed as an 
extension of this method which allows us to not only estimate parameters of the 
model given the model, but also to choose the model as well.  
 
It is simplest to understand the MLE method by coming back to the Bayes Theorem: 
P(H|E) = P(E|H)xP(H)/P(E) where ‘E’ stands for observed evidence [a sample of 
data, in our case] and ‘H’ stands for a statistical model with parameters. Recall that 
we said in the previous chapter that P(E|H) is commonly referred to as the 
likelihood. That is, P(E|H) is the probability of observing the sample of data at hand 
given that our statistical model is correct. The MLE method allows us to provide 
estimates of the parameters of the model on assumption that the model is correct. 
The methodological prescription in MLE is this: choose the values of parameters in a 
way that maximises the likelihood. As per usual, in order to comprehend the concept, 
it is most convenient to look at an example. 
                                                 
40
 Akaike (1973). It is curious to note that this is the same year in which Gillies suggested testing 
alternative hypothesis with different functional form as per quote at the beginning of this chapter. 
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Let us again consider the example of throwing a die and noting whether the outcome 
is an even or an odd number. Suppose that we roll the die 4 times, and that we 
observed 3 odd and 1 even outcome. Let us define the success rate p as the ratio of 
the number of odd outcomes to the total number of throws. In order to estimate the 
success rate p using MLE we need to maximise P(E|H), where ‘E’ stands for the 
observation that 3 out of 4 throws are odd, and ‘H’ stands for the binomial model 
with unknown success rate p. So, unlike our example in the section dedicated to NP 
statistics in chapter 2 where we tested null and alternative hypotheses about 
particular point values of the success rate p, here we would like to estimate this value 
without any particular ideas as to what it could be. 
 
Recalling the formal expression of Binomial distribution [for details please see 
chapter 1], the following obtains: 
P(3 out of 4 odd | success rate p, binomial probability model) = 4!p3(1-p)/3!1! =  
4 p3(1-p) 
We can now conceptualise this expression as a function of the success rate parameter 
given the observation, say, L(p|data, functional form of the model). This is called a 
likelihood function. Here p is variable and data is fixed. Now, in order to find the 
MLE estimate of p we maximise the obtained likelihood function using conventional 
mathematical techniques, which yields an MLE estimate p = 0.75 (recall that p ∈ 
[0,1]). This means that given the binomial probability model, p = 0.75 maximises the 
probability of observing 3 out of 4 odd numbers. In general, the MLE technique 
provides parameter estimates that fit the given model as close as possible to the data. 
 
3.2.2 Kullback-Leibler Divergence 
 
Kullback-Leibler divergence [K-L] is the second ingredient necessary to obtain 
Akaike’s result. Kullback and Leibler (1951) derived a measure that aims to 
calculate the information lost when a given distribution [say, f] is approximated by 
some other distribution [say, g]. This information measure [from now on the K-L 
measure] turned out to be equal to the Shannon’s entropy used in information theory 
[cf. Shannon and Weaver (1949)]. The K-L measure is in the continuous case 
defined as:  
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I (f, g) = ∫ f(x) ln (f(x) / g (x | θ)) dx                                                           (1) 
where “ln” stands for the natural logarithm and θ is a vector of adjustable 
parameters. 
 
The K-L measure is sometimes incorrectly referred to as a ‘distance’. It can only 
heuristically be thought of as a directed ‘distance’ [or divergence] from a model g to 
a model f. It is directed because for any model f and any model g such that if it is not 
the case that f ≡ g then I (f, g) ≠ I (g, f). So it does not satisfy the usual conditions on 
a distance measure41. Hence we shall only refer to the K-L measure as a divergence 
or information in the precise sense as provided in the first paragraph of this section. 
Also, I (f, g) = 0 if and only if f ≡ g and for any f, g: I (f, g)  ∈ [0, ∞). 
 
For illustration, here is an example of using the K-L information for two discrete 
models. The example is due to Konishi and Kitagawa (2008):33, notation has been 
modified to fit our usage: 
 
Assume that two dice have the following probabilities for rolling the numbers 
one to six: 
ga = {0.2, 0.12, 0.18, 0.12, 0.20, 0.18} 
gb = {0.18, 0.12, 0.14, 0.19, 0.22, 0.15} 
In this case, which is the fairer die? Since an ideal die has the probabilities f = 
{1/6, 1/6, 1/6, 1/6, 1/6, 1/6}, we take this to be true model. When we 
calculate the K-L information, I (f, g), the die that gives the smaller value 
must be closer to the ideal fair die. When we deal with discrete random 
variables, calculating the value of I (f, g) = ∑ 	

   we obtain I (f, ga) = 
0.023 and I (f, gb) = 0.020. Thus in terms of K-L information, it must be 
concluded that die gb is the fairer of the two. 
 
Now, if we interpret distribution f as the truth [or the actual data generating 
distribution, or some such like notion – we will leave a more careful consideration of 
this notion until the next chapter] and g as a model which is used to approximate f, 
and in addition assume that the truth is fixed, then under some general conditions [cf. 
Burnham and Anderson (2002) for a fully rigorous mathematical derivation] Akaike 
(1973) established that a relative divergence from g to f can be estimated by the 
                                                 
41
 A function is a distance measure if for any three vectors l, m and n, it assigns positive real numbers 
r subject to the following conditions: 
r (l, l) = 0; r (l, m) = r (m, l) [symmetry]; r (l, m) ≤ r (l, n) + r (n, m) [triangular inequality] 
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maximised log-likelihood function ln(L( | data, gi )) for each model gi, [i = 
{1,…,r}] from the set of r models in the choice set. However, Akaike found that 
such a maximum likelihood estimator is asymptotically positively biased [cf. section 
2.4.1], and that in large samples the bias is approximately equal to K – that is, the 
number of adjustable/estimable parameters in the model. 
 
Then by multiplying ln(L( | data, gi )) – K by (–2)42 he defined the Akaike 
Information Criterion:  
(AIC)                        – 2ln(L( | data, gi)) + 2K. 
 
Model selection using AIC proceeds thus. First of all, a set of competing models is 
compiled on the basis of the background information, theoretical results/ideas in the 
field or research, previous research, etc. Hereafter we refer to such a set as the choice 
set. Then the data are considered.43 Then in each model the adjustable parameters are 
set at their maximum likelihood levels so that an element of each model is obtained 
such that it provides the closest fit to the given data. Then the AIC scores are 
calculated for each of these closest fitting elements. In a sense the closest fitting 
elements of each model represent their respective models. The model which has the 
maximum likelihood element with the smallest AIC score is chosen. 
 
Since we do not know the “full reality” f, only the differences in the AIC scores 
between the models in the choice set are interpretable, and not the absolute values. 
When considering the differences, the constants C cancel out, so Akaike scores are 
on an interval scale lacking a true zero but preserving the relative distances [i.e., 
ratios of distances], whereas the K-L information itself is measured on a ratio scale 
with a true zero. So, AIC gives us an expected directed K-L distance from the given 
model to the unknown full reality relative to models in the choice set, and no others. 
This means that by using AIC we do not have epistemic access to the directed 
distance from models to the truth in the absolute sense. This highlights the 
importance of picking the models for the choice set with the utmost care and 
                                                 
42
 Multiplication by (– 2) was done for “historical reasons”. For instance, under certain assumptions, – 
2ln (ML1/ML2) is asymptotically χ2 distributed. 
43
 The sample could have been gathered prior to the compilation of the choice set or afterwards. This 
is irrelevant so long as the data were not used in creation of the choice set. For the discussion of this 
point please see section 3.4.1.4 below. 
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consideration for the background information and available experience and 
knowledge in the field at hand. This is what we meant when we drew a distinction 
between theoretical and statistical modelling [cf. section 1.1] and said that the 
distinction is not sharp because we are concerned with statistical modelling which 
has theoretical elements in it. These theoretical elements play their part when one 
picks the families of models to compile the choice set. 
 
Due to the meaningfulness only of AIC differences, it is recommended to calculate 
the AIC differences, ∆i = AICi – AICmin, for each model in the choice set.  These 
are estimates of the expected K-L differences from gi(x | θ) to f relative to the model, 
which has the smallest AIC score [denotes by AICmin]. The best estimated model has 
∆i = ∆min = 0. There is always at least one best AIC estimated model within the 
choice set. The ∆i values allow for ranking of models within the choice set. The 
(naïve) methodological rule is: choose the model with ∆i = ∆min = 0. A refinement of 
this rule is considered further. 
 
In order to work out the relative strength of evidence for each model, the likelihood 
L(gi | x) of model gi, given data x, is defined in the literature to be proportional to exp 
( - 0.5 ∆i)) Then, for ease of interpretation, all L(gi | x) for each model in the choice 
set are normalised to yield so-called “Akaike weights”, wi, which all add up to 1. 
 
wi = exp ( - 0.5 ∆i) / Σni=1 exp ( - 0.5 ∆i) 
 
Burnham and Anderson (2002) refer to these weights as “model probabilities” or 
“the weight of evidence in favour of model i”. Akaike weights ratios are equal to 
relative likelihood ratios [i.e., for a pair of models i and j, L(gi | x) / L(gj | x) = wi / 
wj], which are in the AIC literature taken to ‘…represent the evidence about fitted 
models as to which is better in a K-L information sense.’ [Burnham and Anderson 
(2002):78] 
 
Let us consider an example of actually using the AIC method for model selection. 
Naturally, it would be great to develop further one of our earlier examples, say, the 
one from chapter 1 on relating weights and heights of male residents of the London 
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Borough of Waltham Forest.  Unfortunately we do not have any data for our mock 
example, so we shall have to use a different example which is structurally similar to 
our weights/heights e.g. In any case we can use the weights/heights example to 
introduce the actual example we shall use. 
 
So, starting with the simplest case, suppose that we come up with a probabilistic 
statistical model for our weights/heights example and suppose that this model is of a 
linear regression type. That is, weights [the response variable Y] and heights [the 
regressor variable X] are linearly related thus: Y = aX + b + ε, where a is the 
gradient of the line, b is the intercept with the y-axis and ε is the residual error term 
which accounts for the deviations of data from our linear model. It is commonly 
assumed that the deviations from the line are probabilistically independent from one 
another [cf. section 1.3], and that ε is normally distributed with zero mean and a 
constant standard deviation σ, where σ is estimated from data. We shall go along 
with this assumption. Suppose that we wish to use the least squares method of linear 
regression. That is, we find the element of our linear model in such a way that the 
sum of the vertical distances from this element to the data points [SOS] is the 
smallest among all the elements of our model. The least squares linear regression is 
in fact a special case of general maximum likelihood estimation. We can thus obtain 
the AIC scores with the output of standard regression packages using this formula:  
AIC = n ln(2) + 2K   
where K is the number of estimated regression parameters including σ 2 [in our case 
there are three adjustable parameters – a, b and σ]; 2 [the estimated variance] is 
equal to its maximum likelihood estimator (Σ̂i2/n). 
 
However, our mock example of weights/heights is very artificial. Although it seems 
reasonable to think that weights increase with heights, trying to predict weights with 
heights seems insufficient. For instance, we may also wish to include the dietary 
preferences [on the thinking that those with preference to foodstuffs that contain 
more energy would be heavier], the weight of the mother and the weight of the father 
reflecting the idea that our males’ weight could possibly be related to that of their 
parents. There can be many other variables we may wish to consider. Now instead of 
simple linear regression we have a multiple regression case:  Y = aX1 + bX2 + cX3 + 
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dX4 + ε, where X1 stands for the height, X2 – for the preference for particular type of 
food [perhaps as measured by the average amount of kilocalories such food 
contains], X3 and X4 – for the weights of the mother and the father respectively. 
Now, which variables are relevant for predicting the value of Y? In the absence of 
further knowledge, it seems that we have 24 – 1 = 15 possible models to choose 
from, assuming that at least one variable is relevant. 
 
So, here is a much used example which is commonly referred to as Hald’s Cement 
Hardening Data – several references are cited by Burnham and Anderson (2002):99-
103. This example is structurally the same as our multiple regression case above. 
The table below represents heat evolved during the hardening of 13 samples of 
Portland cement and four variables that may be related to it – the tables are from 
Ghosh and Samanta (2001). 
 
Cement hardening data with four regressor variables x1, x2, x3 and x4 and a 
response variable y 
x1 x2 x3 x4 Y 
7 26 6 60 78.6 
1 29 15 52 74.3 
11 56 8 20 104.3 
11 31 8 47 87.6 
7 52 6 33 95.9 
11 55 9 22 109.2 
3 71 17 6 102.7 
1 31 22 44 72.5 
2 54 18 22 93.1 
21 47 4 26 115.9 
1 40 23 34 83.8 
11 66 9 12 113.3 
10 68 8 12 109.4 
where the regressor variables (in percentage of the weight) are: x1 = calcium 
aluminate (3CaO.Al2O3), x2 = tricalcium silicate (3CaO.SiO2), x3 = tetracalcium 
alumina ferrite (4CaO.Al2O3.Fe2O3) and x4 = dicalcium silicate (2CaO.SiO2); the 
response variable is y = total calories given off during hardening per gram of cement 
after 180 days. 
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Our purpose is to select a model for predicting the evolution of heat in Portland 
cement on the basis of its chemical composition. We assume no detailed knowledge 
of physics or chemistry, and so engage in probabilistic statistical model selection [as 
opposed to theoretic]. Thus we put the 15 possible models in our choice set [of 
course we could also consider models with quadratic, cubic etc. terms, but that 
would be unnecessary for our purposes] and calculate Akaike differences AIC (∆). 
That is, the model with AIC (∆) = 0 is deemed AIC-best. In the table below the first 
column indicates the type of model by showing which variables are included in each 
model. For example, the model in the first row has only x1 and x2 in it and thus it has 
four adjustable parameters [K = 4] – the two parameters that are multiplied by the 
variables, the intercept with the y-axis and the variance. Another point to note is that 
below there is a column for AICc, which is a version of AIC used when the number 
of data points are small [remember that AIC is an asymptotically unbiased estimator 
of relative expected K-L divergence] relative to the number of adjustable parameters 
used in the ‘maximal’ model in the choice set – viz., the model which has the highest 
number of adjustable parameters of all models in the choice set. Sugiura (1978) and 
Hurvich and Tsai (1989) found that when the ratio of the sample size to the number 
of adjustable parameters in the maximal model is small [some consider that this is 
the case when the ratio is below 40 – cf. Burnham and Anderson (2002):66] there is 
a small sample bias which requires a [second order] correction. An intuitive 
explanation for this bias is that when the ratio is small there are more adjustable 
parameters than can be justified with such limited data. So, AICc penalises  models 
that use extra adjustable parameters relative to other models in the choice set 
disproportionately more than does the AIC. Our sample consists of only n = 13 
observations, and the maximal model in the choice set has six adjustable parameters, 
so it is more appropriate for us to use AICc for model selection. All the 
methodological points about AIC carry over pretty much verbatim to AICc.  
AICc = AIC + 
()
  
 
In the table below the model which has only variables x1 and x2 in it is AICc-best. 
The maximum likelihood (ML) element [i.e., the element that fits the data most 
closely] of this model is:  
y = 52.6 + 1.468x1 + 0.662x2, and  = 2.11 [Burnham and Anderson (2002):103] 
Also notice that there are some models that are not that far from the AICc-best one. 
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In particular, models in rows two, three, four and five all have the AICc differences 
below 4. According to the ‘rule of thumb’ that is used in AIC methodology [which 
applies equally to both AIC and AICc], these models also have some support. The 
rule of thumb is that models that are within 2 units of the AIC-optimal model have 
substantial support, those that are between 4 and 7 units away from the AIC-optimal 
model have considerably less support, and those that are more than 10 units away 
have virtually no support at all [Burnham and Anderson (2004):271]. 
Model K AIC (∆) AICc (∆) 
12 4 0.45 0 
124 5 0 3.13 
123 5 0.04 3.16 
14 4 3.77 3.32 
134 5 0.75 3.88 
234 5 5.6 8.73 
1234 6 1.97 10.52 
34 4 14.88 14.43 
23 4 26.06 25.62 
4 3 33.88 31.1 
2 3 34.2 31.42 
24 4 35.66 35.21 
1 3 38.55 35.77 
13 4 40.14 39.7 
3 3 44.09 41.31 
Ghosh and Samanta (2001):1143 
 
3.3 Some Features and Properties of AIC 
 
Here are some properties of the AIC, some of which may seem self-evident. 
 
• AIC differences between models based on different sets of data cannot be 
compared.  
• The order of computation of AIC scores is irrelevant.  
• Models that are not in the choice set are out of the consideration.  
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Probably the most important feature of the AIC methodology is its use of K-L 
divergence. However, there are several alternative measures of discrepancy between 
distributions [cf. Konishi and Kitagawa (2008):31]. Is there a justification for using 
the K-L divergence rather than any other measure of divergence or distance between 
distributions? 
 
Burnham and Anderson (2002) assert that ‘the relative K-L distance is the link 
between information theory and the log-likelihood function that is a critical element 
in AIC model selection.’ [Burnham and Anderson (2002):87] ‘The K-L distance 
between models is a fundamental quantity in science and information theory … and 
is the logical basis for model selection in conjunction with likelihood inference.’ 
[Burnham and Anderson (2002):54] 
 
Burnham and Anderson’s (2002) argument for the use of the K-L discrepancy in 
model selection rather than any other measure is in its essence nothing over and 
above an argument by analogy – roughly, success in some fields implies success 
other fields. Their argument for the special status of K-L discrepancy is two-fold. 
Firstly, this quantity has its natural place in information theory [e.g., Shannon 
information entropy], which they consider to be a fundamental advance in 20th 
century science. Secondly, entropy is of fundamental importance in statistical 
mechanics. So, the former seems to assert that K-L actually arises from the 
information theory and the latter is an argument by analogy. They site as important 
Bolzmann’s theorem connecting entropy to negative logarithm of probability. 
 
With regards to the latter argument we agree with Jaynes (1957):621: 
‘The mere fact that the same mathematical expression -∑pilogpi occurs 
both in statistical mechanics and in information theory does not in itself 
establish any connection between these fields. This can be done only by 
finding new viewpoints from which thermodynamic entropy and 
information-theory entropy appear as the same concept.’ 
 
On the matter of asymmetry of K-L discrepancy measure Burnham and Anderson 
[arguably the authors of the most definitive and up-to-date work on the subject of 
AIC – i.e., Burnham and Anderson (2002)] say only the following: ‘…I (f, g) ≠ I (g, 
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f); nor should they be equal, because the roles of truth and model are not 
interchangeable.’ [Burnham and Anderson (2002):56] It is hard to say what to make 
of this remark. One may try to interpret it in a way that approximating a model by 
truth is not a sensible thing to do because it is the approximation the other way 
around that interests us, hence, calculating the distance makes sense in one direction 
only. However, granting to the truth the special status, it still does not constitute a 
reason as to why a distance to it should be any different from the distance from it. 
This asymmetry seems to a natural interpretation in thermodynamics as an increase 
in entropy, and it represents the arrow of time: to go back to the previous state 
requires more energy than to go from it. However, in our context of model selection 
there is no obvious reason of this sort for the asymmetry of our divergence. So much 
for the argument from analogy with thermodynamics! 
 
We find that the most convincing argument for using the K-L divergence rather than 
any other is that the K-L divergence lends itself easily [and some may say naturally] 
to approximation by the ML technique, which is well-established within modern 
statistics.44 Still, the lack of symmetry is worrisome and should be born in mind as a 
shortcoming. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
44
 According to Akaike himself, the connection occurred to him in March 1971 when he was standing 
on the train from his home to the institute where he worked at the time [Findley and Parzen 
(1995):111]. 
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3.4 Philosophical Issues with AIC 
Recent philosophical literature contains/identifies several issues with the AIC 
methodology. Issues considered in this section are to do with adequacy of AIC as a 
model selection methodology, its use and limits. Some external applications of AIC 
in broader philosophy of science context are dealt with in chapter 5. 
 
  3.4.1 The Subfamily Problem 
 
3.4.1.1 Statement of the Problem 
 
The problem that is identified in this section is related to the issue as to where we get 
the models from to compile the choice set.  
 
The subfamily problem [identified by Forster and Sober (1994)] can be explained in 
the following manner. Suppose that a model that we pick for the choice set is an (n-
1)th degree polynomial such that it contains an element which perfectly fits the n 
data points that we have [i.e., SOS = 0]. Moreover, this particular polynomial is the 
only element of the given model [that is, the model constitutes a singleton set]. This 
‘model’ and its element will be chosen by an information criterion45 as optimal 
whatever the alternatives since it has no adjustable parameters [K = 0] and it fits the 
data perfectly! 
 
3.4.1.2 The Forster-Sober Solution 
 
Forster and Sober’s (1994) apparent solution of this problem is based on what they 
call the Error Theorem and the distinction that they draw between statistically 
unbiased and epistemically unbiased estimation. 
The Error Theorem: Error[Estimated(A(F))] = Residual Fitting Error + Common 
Error + Sub-family Error.46 Here A(F) denotes the predictive accuracy of the family 
of curves F. 
                                                 
45
  All information criteria suffer from this problem – cf. Forster and Sober (1994):18, fn 27. 
46
 Forster and Sober (1994):19 
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An estimator is statistically unbiased if and only if its expectation is equal to the 
actual value of the parameter that it is used to estimate. The idea of epistemic bias is 
best described by means of an example. Suppose that we have a statistically unbiased 
estimator. Let us increase its variance arbitrarily in such a way that the estimator’s 
mean value is unaffected. We still have a statistically unbiased estimator. But, argue 
Sober and Forster, it is epistemically biased since there is at least one other unbiased 
estimator, which has a smaller variance than the one at hand. Forster and Sober argue 
that the ad hoc application of Akaike’s Theorem to the singleton models as described 
above is statistically unbiased but epistemically biased, and that this is implied by 
the Error Theorem. Let us see how. 
 
The Common Error is the same for all the models, so it cancels out. The Residual 
Fitting Error is both statistically and epistemically unbiased. However, the Sub-
family Error is statistically unbiased but sometimes epistemically biased. 
 
Forster and Sober illustrate how this epistemic bias arises in the following way. 
Suppose we have a very large data set that exhibits strong linearity. We 
wish to estimate the predictive accuracies of L(LIN) and L(POLY-n), 
where POLY-n is the family of n-degree polynomials with n parameters 
free, and L(F) is obtained by using the data to single out the best fitting 
curve in family F. We may apply Akaike’s Theorem to (LIN) and 
(POLY-n) directly, or we can apply it to the singleton families 
containing just L(LIN) and L(POLY-n), respectively. The surprising fact 
– that the ad hoc Akaike’s estimate for L(POLY-n) and L(LIN) will 
always favour L(POLY-n), because it is always closer to the data. In 
sum, both the direct and the ad hoc method of accuracy estimation are 
statistically unbiased (as required by Akaike’s Theorem), but the ad hoc 
application of Akaike’s method yields an estimate that we know is too 
high. The ad hoc application yields an estimate that is epistemically 
biased. [Footnote 31: Although the estimate is known to be too high, 
given the data at hand, the Akaike estimate of the predictive accuracy of 
that same singleton family relative to other data sets generated by the 
true ‘curve’ will be too low. On average, of course, the estimate will be 
centred on the true value.]  
Forster and Sober (1994):21 
 
Forster and Sober say that the Error Theorem is in fact a ‘meta-theorem’ – it is 
a theorem about the ‘meaning’ of Akaike’s Theorem.47 They state that this 
                                                 
47
 Ibid. 
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result is closely related to the one in Sakamoto et al. (1986):77. So, let us 
consider it48. 
-½AIC(K ) = (mean expected log likelihood) + (common error) + 
(individual error) 
Let us analyse this result. The common error does not depend on the number of 
adjustable parameters, K, in a given model, so K does not have a bearing on the 
model selection. The individual error is a sum of two expressions. Let individual 
error = (C + D)49. C’s variance is equal to K, and C increases as K increases. 
However, D decreases with increase in K. Now, due to the subfamily problem, K = 
0. Hence the individual error does not have a bearing on the model selection either. 
But the mean expected log likelihood of L(POLY-n) is higher than that of L(LIN). 
Thus, the AIC(L(POLY-n)) is smaller than AIC(L(LIN)). So the AIC methodological 
rule prescribes the choice of L(POLY-n). Therefore, we conclude that using 
Sakamoto’s result does not solve the subfamily problem. Hence, it appears to be the 
case that the closely related Error Theorem does not solve it either.50 There is a 
reason to think that the ad hoc application of Akaike’s Theorem is epistemically 
biased, viz., our perception that L(POLY-n) picks up too many errors by fitting the 
data too closely. But we argue that the epistemic bias is not implied by the Error 
Theorem. So, we are seemingly back where we started from – the subfamily 
problem. We thus conclude that Forster and Sober (1994) do not succeed in 
resolving the subfamily problem by using their Error Theorem and the distinction 
between the statistical and epistemic bias. 
 
3.4.1.3 Replies from Kukla and Kieseppä 
 
Kukla (1995) starts off with noting that: ‘(1) …there are infinitely many equally 
good candidate-curves relative to any given set of data, and (2) … these best 
candidates include curves with indefinitely many bumps.’ [Kukla (1995):248] 
Presumably by ‘equally good candidate-curves’ Kukla means models that fit the data 
equally well, but differ in their predictions of future data. 
                                                 
48
 This part follows Sakamoto et al. (1986): 76-81. 
49
 For the full mathematical rigor cf. Ibid. 
50
 Indeed, Kieseppä [(1997): 40] aptly remarks on this argument from Error Theorem: ‘This is a 
clever argument, but the unrigorous way in which it has been presented makes it very difficult to 
evaluate whether it really solves the subfamily problem.’ 
68 
 
 
So, the first problem is: just SOS fitting with (n-1)th degree polynomial allows for 
any prediction whatsoever; the second problem: linear relationships would never be 
used contrary to common scientific practice. Kukla states that Forster and Sober 
(1994) ignore the first problem and concentrate on the second. 
 
Kukla raises the following issue. Take families of models which contain as their 
elements polynomials, say, of (n-1)th degree such that they have (n-1) adjustable 
parameters [i.e., one of the parameters is fixed] and the best fitting element in each 
such family has the SOS equal to that of the best fitting element of the family that 
contains polynomials of (n-2)nd degree with (n–1) adjustable parameters. AIC would 
give these two models an equal score. Importantly, both models have the same Sub-
family Error [as per Forster and Sober – cf. section 3.4.1.2], but the elements in the 
former have an arbitrary number of bumps. So, seemingly we do not have an 
epistemic criterion for showing that a polynomial of a degree lower than another and 
the same SOS is epistemically preferable/predictively more accurate. 
 
As an example, consider linear and quadratic functions. Pick a quadratic function 
with one fixed parameter [thus the number of adjustable parameters that are left is 
two] and adjust the remaining adjustable parameters in such a way that the 
expression has the same SOS as the linear function. There are in fact infinitely many 
expressions of this sort [we can repeat the procedure with polynomials of higher and 
higher order].  
 
Forster (1995a) says that there is nothing wrong with having infinitely many curves 
with the same predictive accuracy. The problem arises when the criteria consider 
curves predictively equally accurate whereas they are in fact not [In footnote 2 page 
349 he says that a bumpier curve could be closer to truth if the truth were bumpy, but 
on average would not be.]: ‘…Kukla appeals to the intuition that very bumpy curves 
are not expected to have equal predictive accuracy…I concede that Kukla’s intuition 
is correct.’ [p. 349] Forster51 addresses the second problem raised by Kukla by 
                                                 
51
 In what follows Best(PAR) stands for the actual truth; L(PAR) – best fitting member of the model 
of all parabolas; L(LIN) – best fitting element of the model of all linear curves; Qi – a model of 2nd 
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devising a geometric example and showing that it can be interpreted interpretation 
within the Akaikean framework in the case of curve fitting, on  
the key assumption … that the location of L(PAR) is governed by a 
Gaussian (i.e. Normal) distribution centred at Best(PAR) with a variance 
inversely proportional to the number of data. As a result L(PAR) will 
stray less from Best(PAR) as data accumulate. … Note that this 
‘normality’ assumption does not require that the noise in the data itself is 
Gaussian. [Footnote 8: ‘Kukla’s presentation is potentially misleading in 
that he talks as if the sum of square deviations (SOS) is always the 
appropriate measure of fit, but this is only the case for Gaussian errors. 
AIC uses the general measure of log-likelihood to measure fit, as we 
made clear in Forster and Sober [1994].’] The assumption is about the 
effect of noise in parameter space… The significance of this ‘normality’ 
assumption is that it licenses a geometrical interpretation of hypothesis 
space.  
Forster(1995b):353-354 
 
Forster’s interpretation of the geometric example shows that a randomly selected 
L(Qi) will do worse [in the sense of being on average less predictively accurate] than 
L(LIN). Going through the mathematical details of his Theorem, Forster states that 
‘[a] remarkable feature of this result is that the average advantage of LIN over Qi 
does not depend on the amount that curves in PAR are capable of performing better 
than anything in LIN.’ [Forster(1995b):356] 
 
Forster proposes a modification of the AIC in order to correct for the problem 
introduced by Kukla’s way of choosing families of models for the choice set. 
According to him, the AIC score for the polynomial should be increased by ∆K/n, 
where ∆K is the increase in the number of adjustable parameters and N is the number 
of data points. In his subsequent papers on the Akaike methodology [and information 
criteria in general[, however, Forster does not include the proposed correction of 
AIC52. This seems to indicate that correcting AIC measure by quantity ∆K/n has to 
be used when among the models that one considers at choice set step are those of the 
Qi type. Moreover, in order for the reply to Kukla to work, one has to randomly 
select a model Qi among the models of its type to be considered the choice set. 
 
                                                                                                                                          
degree polynomials with one fixed parameter; L(Qi) – the best-fitting element of Qi, which is equal in 
simplicity and fit to L(LIN). 
52
 Nor is it generally used by statisticians. 
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Even if we accept Forster’s answer as a partial solution to Kukla’s challenge, 
Kieseppä (1997):39-40 poses a problem to which Forster’s geometrical construction 
has no answer. Kieseppä considers a situation where one happens to include a model 
of Qi type in the family of models for consideration prior to observing data. Then 
Forster’s solution does not apply, but arbitrariness in the choice of models for the 
choice set remains. Would Forster call this arrangement ad hoc? Kieseppä states that 
to choose the hierarchy, we seem to require the knowledge about what good 
scientific hypotheses look like, which does not stem from mathematical theorising.  
 
3.4.1.4 Our Own Dissolution of the Problem 
 
Interestingly, we have not come across the subfamily problem anywhere in the 
extensive literature aimed at statisticians, who are interested in foundational issues as 
well as in application of the statistical techniques. Perhaps this is due to this issue not 
being seen as a serious problem. We think that it is not a serious problem, although 
as we argue in sections 3.4.1.2 and consider in section 3.4.1.3 it has evaded proper 
resolution hitherto.  In fact we go as far to argue that this is not a problem for model 
selection – we dissolve it. 
 
Firstly, suppose that we put in the choice set a model which contains all linear 
functions as its elements and a model which only contains a single element, e.g., y = 
2x2 +3x – 5. Why would we want to include the latter model? There are two potential 
reasons – either we have had a preliminary analysis of data and found out that this is 
the best fitting parabola out of the model of all parabolas or we have good reasons to 
think that this is a good model on the basis of currently accepted theories, our 
experience in the field, etc. If we do it for the first reason, then we suggest that a 
‘counterfactual’ move could be made in order to stop the subfamily problem from 
appearing. That is, one should not check the data first – the models should be chosen 
for the choice set on the basis of the background knowledge that we have prior to 
observing/considering the data set that we are using for model selection. And if one 
is already quite familiar with the data, one should ‘forget’ that one is familiar with it.  
Arguably, even if we already have collected our data sample, we should not attempt 
to reflect the sample in the hypotheses in our choice set. Even if we have strong 
familiarity with the data, we should ‘delete’ it or ‘forget it‘ when considering which 
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models to include in our choice set. For instance, we are quite surprised that Howson 
and Urbach (2006) do not adopt this stance on the subfamily problem rather than 
calling it ‘…this rather devastating objection.’ [Howson and Urbach (2006):294] On 
the contrary, this argument is analogous to, and our stance is very much consistent 
with the one adopted by them with regards to the Old Evidence Problem in Bayesian 
Confirmation theory53. Here is a brief rendition of the Old Evidence Problem [for 
more details see Howson and Urbach (2006):297-301; for an overview of other 
attempts to solve the old evidence problem cf. Earman (1992):chapter 5]. It is 
commonly thought in the philosophy of science that if you build a hypothesis to 
entail known data, that hypothesis cannot draw any support for itself from that data. 
Only new data can confer confirmation onto a hypothesis. Sometimes, however, new 
theories are not purpose-built to fit old data, but once they are developed 
independently of the already known data, on occasion it is post factum found that 
they do fit old data. It is commonly thought that in such a case the old data supports 
the new hypothesis. However, in Bayesian confirmation theory [which, very briefly, 
is the idea that data E confer evidential support onto a hypothesis H when the 
posterior probability of the hypothesis H in the light of data E is greater than its prior 
probability] the probability of data that has already been observed [called it ‘Eold‘] is 
P(Eold)=1 and also the likelihood of Eold is P(Eold|H)=1. Hence using the Bayes 
Theorem, P(H|Eold)=P(H), so the old evidence does not confirm the hypothesis, 
contrary to our intuition. Howson and Urbach propose a counterfactual move to 
remove the evidence implied by the hypothesis from the background information, on 
which all the propositions in Bayesian theory are conditional. Then the old evidence 
can provide support to the hypothesis H. 
 
A closely related idea is the use-novelty account of support of hypotheses by 
evidence [cf. Worrall (2002)]. 
 
‘A fact will be considered novel with respect to a given hypothesis if it did 
not belong to the problem-situation which governed the constitution of the 
hypothesis.’ 
Zahar (1973):103 
                                                 
53
 We think it would be fair to say that Howson and Urbach (2006) do not consider the Old Evidence 
Problem to be a problem at all, and find it incredible to see that so much effort has been expended on 
trying to resolve it. Again, we find ourselves in an analogous position with regards to the Subfamily 
Problem. 
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Under this account only novel facts in this sense provide support to hypothesis. So 
on this idea using the singleton hypothesis y = 2x2 +3x – 5 would be fine as long as 
the given sample of data has not been used in order to construct this hypothesis 
[irrespective of the period of time in which such a sample was collected]. If this 
element of the parabolic model then would provide a perfect fit, that would be 
absolutely fine. 
 
Secondly, we have good prior reasons for choosing the particular values for the 
parameters only if we already have a good idea as for the functional form of the 
relationship between variables. In other words, there is hardly any model uncertainty. 
Since the problem of model selection is essentially the problem of model 
uncertainty, there is no place for model selection and hence for model selection 
criteria’s use in such a case. So, this defeats the very purpose of model selection. 
Employing this procedure is akin to doing the following. Instead of carefully 
selecting a small number of competing hypotheses on the grounds of our background 
knowledge and theoretical research and then observing the data, we are now going to 
have a thorough trawl through the data and find the best fitting model of an arbitrary 
dimension. Then we shall form a model consisting of this singleton model and retro 
check whether it obtains the highest AIC score among any other possible models. 
And then – low and behold – we will find out that it does! The question then arises 
as to the purpose of such an exercise – we know in advance that such a procedure 
would give us the top AIC score, whatever the data we are going to observe. Of 
course this emphasises the logical point of the subfamily problem, but in the process 
it defeats the very purpose of model selection, which is to choose the optimal 
mathematical structure of a model for predictive purposes because there is 
uncertainty as to what this structure should be, and some prima facie viable 
alternatives available. 
 
Finally, even if one might find the ‘counterfactual’ move unappealing, we think that 
for the purposes of model selection in the case when the ‘artificial’ fixing of 
singleton hypotheses within the choice set takes place, the sense in which K is the 
number of adjustable parameters should be that “capable of being adjusted at some 
point in time”, rather than just “free to be adjusted now”. Hence, a model containing 
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y = 2x2 +3x – 5 as its sole element would still have three adjustable parameters in the 
relevant sense. This is because it is an element of the model with three adjustable 
parameters. From this point of view, in section 3.4.1.3 L(Qi) would have more 
adjustable parameters than L(LIN), since we deliberately fixed (importantly, at a 
non-zero value) an adjustable parameter in L(Qi). Problem dissolved. 
 
3.4.2 The Problem of Language Variance 
 
3.4.2.1 Grue Problem 
 
 De Vito (1997):392 makes a two-fold claim: ‘The problem with using Akaike’s 
theorem for hypothesis choice is that the number of parameters associated with a 
given hypothesis is a matter of convention. In addition, for any hypothesis there is no 
a priori way to generate the right family of curves to which the hypothesis belongs.’  
 
De Vito demonstrates the former claim by applying the information criteria (he 
focuses on AIC, but the argument, if correct, would also apply to BIC and other 
information criteria) to Goodman’s New Riddle of Induction. 
 
Here is the argument. Suppose that we hypothesise as to the colour of emeralds over 
time. Let us define a predicate Grue such that ‘object x is grue at time t if and only if 
x is green at time t and t < 2100, or x is blue at time t and t ≥ 2100.’ [Forster (1999): 
92] Hence, we have two hypotheses regarding the properties of emeralds: 
 
Green Hypothesis: ‘All emeralds are green (at all times).’ 
Grue hypothesis: ‘All emeralds are grue (at all times).’ 
 
These hypotheses fit the current data equally well, but De Vito argues the Grue 
hypothesis contains one adjustable parameter [viz., t] whereas Green hypothesis has 
none, so AIC would lead us to favour Green hypothesis. Now, define predicate Bleen 
such that ‘object x is bleen at time t if and only if x is blue at time t and t < 2100, or x 
is green at time t and t ≥ 2100’. [Forster (1999):94] Note that in the language in 
which the predicates Grue and Bleen are taken to be ordinary, an ‘…object x is green 
at time t if and only if x is grue at time t and t < 2100, or x is bleen at time t and t ≥ 
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2100.’ [Forster (1999):94] Hence, Green hypothesis becomes: ‘All emeralds x are 
such that, if t < 2100 then x is grue at time t and if t ≥ 2100 then x is bleen at time t.’ 
[Forster (1999):94] whereas the Grue hypothesis in this language is still the same: 
‘All emeralds are grue (at all times).’ Now, in this new language both hypotheses fit 
the data equally well, but now the Green hypothesis has more parameters than the 
Grue one. So, by application of AIC, in this language one should favour the Grue 
hypothesis. The number of adjustable parameters that models have depends on the 
particular conceptualisation of the world. Hence, information criteria suffer from 
language variance. 
 
Forster (1999) replies to this argument by agreeing with De Vito that the application 
of AIC does not solve Goodman’s New Riddle of Induction and that this problem is 
a curve-fitting one. Forster argues, however, that De Vito draws from this an 
incorrect conclusion. The correct conclusion is that AIC does not apply to all curve-
fitting problems. 
 
Forster argues that De Vito misconstrues the notion of adjustable parameter. In fact, 
neither the Green nor the Grue hypothesis contain any adjustable parameters in the 
sense that this notion is used in Akaike’s methodology. A model contains adjustable 
parameters just in case a change in these parameters will pick out a different element 
in the model. In the case discussed by De Vito, the competing models are singleton 
sets [containing exactly one element respectively], hence all the parameters are 
adjusted. Exactly the same applies to the hypotheses when they are described in the 
‘Grue’ language. So, in either case AIC is unable to distinguish between the 
hypotheses. Another problematic aspect of posing the problem the way that De Vito 
does is that AIC applies only to probabilistic hypotheses: ‘The concept of fit in 
Akaike’s theorem is derived from the Kullback-Leibler discrepancy, which requires 
that the competing hypotheses are probabilistic (so that the likelihoods are well-
defined.)’ [Forster (1999):93] We could turn Green and Grue hypotheses into 
probabilistic ones by assuming that the observation errors are probabilistic. Even if 
we do so, AIC will not give us any reason to prefer one hypothesis over the other, 
which is contrary to our intuitions that Green hypothesis should be preferable to 
Grue hypothesis. 
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Forster modifies De Vito’s example in such a way that Grue hypothesis does contain 
an adjustable parameter –instead of fixing time parameter at value of 2100, it is now 
t = θ. Now, does AIC tell us to pick Green hypothesis rather than Grue? No, it does 
not, because ‘…Akaike’s notion of simplicity aims to quantify the sampling error in 
the parameter estimates. But in this example, there is still no sampling error in the 
estimation of the grue parameter θ. …[T]he grue model is unidentifiable in the sense 
that there is no unique value of θ that maximizes the fit with the seen data. There is 
no over fitting or under fitting in the relevant sense.’ [Forster (1999):96] Intuitively, 
AIC helps us when we have to predict future data by considering the observed data 
and stipulating that the future data comes from the same distribution. In this case, 
however, no such assumption can be made – we have no idea how (if at all) the 
distribution of θ is connected to the distribution of the observed data. 
 
3.4.2.2 Reparametrisation under Transformation 
 
De Vito poses a more general argument than that considered in the previous sub-
section. He gives an example in virtue of which under a certain transformation of the 
coordinate system a family of parabolic functions (PAR) becomes a linear one 
(LIN), and a linear family becomes parabolic. On the assumption that the SOS of the 
perspective best fitting elements of both is the same, De Vito argues that the AIC 
will recommend different curve in each situation. De Vito concludes that in virtue of 
his results a realist solution to the curve fitting problem is not warranted since the 
closeness to truth cannot be relative to a particular conceptualisation of the world. 
 
Forster replies to this charge as well. ‘The main problem is that transformations do 
not map a single member of PAR into a unique member of PAR’, so there is no 
sense in which the transformed families are equivalent representations of the old 
families.’ [Forster (1999):95] The argument is based on the assumption, which is 
used in the derivation of Akaike’s Theorem. That is, if F is a subfamily of G that F 
cannot be more complex than G and this subset relation is preserved under any one-
to-one transformation. So, if F is a subset of G then F’ is a subset of G’ and so is less 
than or equally complex. 
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As a part of his argumentation, Forster rather informally goes through the first part 
of a proof of Akaike’s Theorem. An intermediate step in the proof is an estimation of 
the discrepancy between the curve that fits best the observed data and the true curve 
[∆(θ)] by Taylor-expanding this discrepancy around θ* in terms of ∆(θ*), [where θ* 
is presumably the best fitting element of a given model (Forster (1999) does not 
define what he takes θ*  to be)] and showing that Taylor expansion is language 
invariant. Having gone through the theorem, Forster concludes that ‘…[K] is not 
simply the number of adjustable parameters, but the number of parameters that 
contribute to the expected discrepancy in a certain way. Given the fact that Taylor 
expansion is language invariant, and expected values are language invariant, there is 
no way in which this number can change by any redescription of the families of the 
curves. … It is convenient to describe k as equal to the number of adjustable 
parameters only because the equality holds in most cases. … [L]anguage invariance 
is built in at the very beginning.’’ [Forster (1999):100] 
 
Kieseppä (2001b) comments that one has to fix the representation in which one 
makes decisions. In Bayesian context, if one has not fixed a particular representation 
then one cannot use the difference in the visual simplicity of curve in order to fix the 
priors – lower for more ‘complicated’ curves and higher for ‘simpler’ ones, because 
different polynomials can have identical mathematical properties under a 
transformation. [Kieseppä (2001b):784] 
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4. Bayesian Statistics and the Bayes Information Criterion Methodology 
 
In the previous chapter we considered the AIC model selection methodology and 
defended it against various objections brought to bear in the literature. The purpose 
of this chapter is to see how Bayesian statistics approaches the issue of model 
selection, to consider the Bayes Information Criterion [BIC] methodology which is 
placed within Bayesian statistics, to defend the BIC methodology against various 
objections, and finally to compare and contrast the AIC and BIC methodologies. 
 
  4.1 Bayesian Statistics 
 
   4.1.1 Bayes Theorem 
 
Bayesian statistics is a unified methodology of statistical inference that is based on 
Bayes Theorem [cf. section 1.3.1]. Recall the Theorem: 
 
P(A|B) = P(B|A)xP(A)/P(B) where P(B) > 0 
 
Let us replace proposition A with proposition H, which stands for ‘the hypothesis is 
true’, and proposition B with proposition E – ‘a certain amount of evidence has been 
observed’. Hence: 
 
P(H|E) = P(E|H)xP(H)/P(E) where P(E) > 0 
 
P(H|E) is called the posterior probability of H in the light of evidence E [in other 
words, the probability that H is true after data has been observed], P(E|H) is the 
likelihood of observing the evidence E conditional on the truth of the hypothesis H 
[often simply referred to as the likelihood], P(H) is the prior probability of H being 
true [or the probability of H being true before data has been observed] and P(E) is 
the probability of observing data mentioned in proposition E. The prior probabilities 
in Bayesian statistics are always conditional on the background knowledge. So 
properly speaking we should write P(H|background knowledge) instead of simply 
P(H). However, we omit the background knowledge to simplify the notation.  
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In Bayesian statistics, the Bayes theorem is usually expressed as 
 
P(H|E) ∝ P(E|H)xP(H) 
 
That is, the posterior is proportional to likelihood times the prior. The constant of 
proportionality is 1/P(E). 
 
The process by which we draw inference in Bayesian statistics is the following. We 
first have a prior probability P(H) of the hypothesis being true in the first place. Then 
we observe data and work out what the likelihood of it is. Then we update our 
probability of the hypothesis H in the light of data E through the Bayes Theorem. 
The prior does not have to be purely a priori. It is in fact conditional on all the 
available information before we observe the new data sited in proposition E [or the 
data that we are not aware of as yet]. The important point to note about Bayesian 
statistics is that once the posterior distribution [or posterior probability density in 
case of continuous variables] is generated by means of the Bayes Theorem, further 
inference in it [such as the determination of the highest density region – Bayesian 
equivalent of the confidence intervals] is solely based on this posterior, that is, on the 
probability distribution in the light of the current observations. Let us now consider 
in detail the formation of prior probabilities. We shall not impart similar attention to 
likelihoods since their calculation is uncontroversial. 
 
4.1.2 Priors 
 
4.1.2.1 Objectivity and the Principle of Indifference 
 
Let us begin by considering the origins of a prior probability distribution. As we 
already mentioned, the prior distribution [as, indeed, any other probability 
distribution in Bayesian statistics] reflects the subjective degree of belief of a given 
researcher about, for instance, distribution of probabilities associated with different 
values of a parameter. The use of prior distributions is considered by many to be the 
major weakness of the Bayesian approach [indeed, its Achilles heel]. The charge is 
that since it is possible for different researchers to come up with widely divergent 
priors, their posteriors would be quite different as well, thus making the science of 
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statistics a thoroughly subjective enterprise. This is an unpalatable conclusion if 
objectivity is something that science should strive for. There have been several 
proposals over the years [indeed over a couple of centuries] as the possible ways in 
which the priors can be made more ‘objective’. By far the most popular idea has 
been the Principle of Indifference [POI].54 The POI states that every basic event  in 
the outcome space should be assigned equal probability. To illustrate, in our die-
throwing example we have two basic events - odd and even number on the face of 
the die. So, by the POI, prior probability of odd number and prior probability of even 
number should be 0.5 respectively. Unfortunately the POI runs into trouble. If we 
transform the continuous parameter space in a non-linear way [say, if we have 
parameter v, we transform it into something like 1/v], then what was a uniform 
distribution over v [uniform distribution is the result of application of the POI in case 
of continuous parameters] becomes a non-uniform one. Here is a nice example: 
 
‘Suppose we have a mixture of wine and water and we know that at most 
there is 3 times as much of one as of the other, but nothing more about the 
mixture. We have 1/3 ≤ wine/water ≤ 3 and by the Principle of Indifference, 
the ratio of wine and water has a uniform probability density in the interval 
[1/3, 3]. Therefore P(wine/water ≤ 2) = (2–1/3)/(3–1/3) = 5/8. But also 1/3 ≤ 
water/wine ≤ 3 and by the Principle of Indifference, the ratio of water to wine 
has a uniform probability density in the interval [1/3, 3]. Therefore 
P(water/wine ≥ 1/2) = (3–1/2)/(3–1/3) = 15/16. But the events ‘wine/water ≤ 
2’ and ‘and water/wine ≥ ½’ are the same, and the Principle of Indifference 
has given them different probabilities.’  
Gillies (2000):38 
 
There are other approaches to the ‘objective’ priors, such as the use of entropy 
priors55. However, in the limit this prior is uniform, and hence does suffer from the 
POI paradoxes as well as the original POI itself [cf. Howson and Urbach 
(2006):section 9.a.3]. 
 
Subjective Bayesians respond with two arguments. Firstly, said subjectivity of priors 
is not a weakness of the method, but its strength. Secondly, there are various 
technical results that can crudely be called ‘washing out theorems’ that show that 
under quite general conditions [the most important of which is that the prior assigns 
                                                 
54
 Here we use terminology introduced by Keynes (1921).  
55
 cf. Williamson (2007) and (2010) 
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a non-infinitesimal probability in the region of likelihood], as the number of 
observations accumulates, the likelihood rapidly gains disproportionately larger 
weight than the prior, and the posteriors obtained with different priors in the limit 
converge onto the same value. 56 We shall say more about priors in the next section. 
 
4.1.2.2 Conjugate Priors 
 
Suppose that we have managed to bring ourselves to be happy with the idea that 
there is no such thing as objective priors [for a lot of people this happiness is 
unreachable]. How are we to build our prior distribution then? Let us use the 
example of throwing the die and noting the even and odd numbers. Theoretically our 
prior can be of any shape [naturally subject the constraints given by the probability 
axioms]. However, if the prior comes from a different family of distributions to that 
of the posterior, our calculations would be rather difficult. So quite often in practical 
applications so-called conjugate priors are used. That is, conjugate priors are such 
that they come for the same family of distributions as the posterior. Naturally, one 
would not want to sacrifice the ability of express one’s beliefs for sheer 
mathematical convenience. Very often, however, conjugate priors are flexible 
enough to allow one to express one’s prior degrees of belief sufficiently well.   
 
So, back to rolling the die. As was the case in the section of classical statistics,  
suppose that we are happy that we have the Binomial set up. A conjugate prior for a 
Binomial is a Beta distribution. 
 
A random variable X has a Beta distribution if its p.d.f. is: 
x
a-1(1-x)b-1/B(a,b), 0 < x < 1,  
where B(a,b): B(a,b)=∫xa-1(1-x)b-1dx (integrated from 0 to 1) 
The mean and variance of X: E(X) = a/(a+b), Var(X) = ab/(a+b)2(a+b+1) 
 
Below are some diagrams showing some examples of Beta distribution plots, where 
‘First’ stands for the parameter a, and ‘Second’ - for b57. 
                                                 
56
 Howson and Urbach (2006):chapter 9 
57
 The diagrams have been generated with the MiniTab software. 
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Diagram 2 
 
Diagram 3 
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Diagram 4 
 
Diagram 5 
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Diagram 6 
 
Diagram 7 
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The diagrams allow visual appreciation of a high degree of flexibility with which 
one’s prior probability distribution can be expressed using the Beta distribution. In 
particular, when a = b, the corresponding p.d.f. is symmetric [diagram 2 is a special 
case of the uniform distribution [when a = b = 1] and diagram 7 looks similar to the 
Normal distribution with a = b = 5; generally when a = b = constant, as the constant 
grows larger, the distribution concentrates around the middle values with 
increasingly smaller variance]. When both a and b are smaller than 1 then the 
distribution is almost bi-valued, that is, most of the probability density is distributed 
in the extremes of the distribution, rather than in the centre [see diagrams 3 and 5]. In 
particular, when a < b, there is more density on the left hand side, and the greater the 
difference between a and b, the more density there is on the left hand side. The 
opposite holds when b > a. Finally, on diagrams 4 and 6, both a and b are greater 
than 1. On the diagram 4 a > b, hence the distribution is skewed to the right, whereas 
when b > a the opposite holds [see diagram 6]. The severity of the skew depends on 
the magnitude of the difference between a and b.  
 
The prior distribution is pa-1(1-p)b-1 
The likelihood is pr(1-p)n-r, where p is the probability of success, r is the number of  
successes out of n observations. 
So, the posterior probability is proportional to pa+r-1(1-p)b+n-r-1 
The posterior distribution is pa+r-1(1-p)b+n-r-1/B(a+r,b+n-r), 0<p<1 
So, for instance, if we have a uniform prior, i.e., a = b = 1, the posterior distribution 
is pr(1-p)n-r/B(r+1,n-r+1) 
 
4.1.3 Model Selection Based on Bayes Factors 
 
Suppose that we have two point hypotheses H0 and H1 [just as in chapter 2] that we 
would like to compare in the light of observed data. In the Bayesian approach it is 
done on the basis of the Bayes factor. The easiest way to define the Bayes factor is in 
terms of the odds ratio. Posterior odds is the ratio of posterior p0 probability of H0  to 
the posterior probability p1 of H1 – that is, p0/p1. Prior odds is the ratio of prior 
probability c0 of H0  to the prior probability c1 of H1 – c0/c1. So, Bayes factor (B) in 
favour of H0 against H1 is the ratio of the Posterior odds: 
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B = (p0/p1)/(c0/c1) 
 
Good (1950) proposed an interpretation of B such that 0 < B < 1 means that H1 is 
favoured in comparison to H0, 1 < B < 10 means that H0 is moderately favoured to 
H1, 10 < B < 100 – that H0 is strongly favoured to H1. 
 
Let us apply this reasoning to an example that we used in the subsection on Neyman-
Pearson methodology. There we had a die-rolling set up such that we set out to roll 
the die 120 times in order to test two hypotheses against one another, viz., that the 
probability of obtaining even outcomes is 0.55 [denote it as H0] or 2/3 [denote it as 
H1]. Suppose, as we did, that we observe 70 even numbers out of 120 rolls of the die. 
What inference would we draw within the Bayesian methodology? 
 
In the previous subsection it was noted that the likelihood in this set up is pr(1-p)n-r, 
so here it is p70(1-p)50. Let us use the conjugate prior in the form of Beta distribution. 
Hence our prior is pa-1(1-p)b-1, where we should determine the value of parameters a 
and b. Suppose that we opt for a uniform prior a = b = 1. The posterior probability is 
proportional to pa+r-1(1-p)b+n-r-1, so in our case it is p70(1-p)50. Let us calculate the 
Bayes factor B: B = 0.5570x0.4550/0.6670x0.3450 = 4.6608 (4 d. p.) Now suppose that 
we had a different prior, say where a = 3 and b = 2. Let us calculate the Bayes factor 
for this eventuality: B = 0.5572x0.4551/0.6672x0.3451 = 4.2826 (4 d. p.) The Bayes 
factors are very similar. On the basis of I. J. Good’s interpretation of Bayes factors, 
this implies that H0 is moderately favoured over H1. Note that on the basis of this 
quite moderately sized set of data, the Bayes factor is not that sensitive with respect 
to the priors – it is dominated by the likelihoods. 
 
4.1.4 Point Estimation and Bayesian Confidence Interval 
 
Very often Bayesian point estimates are biased in the Classical sense [cf. section 
2.4.1] and are different to the Classical estimators. For example, in the Binomial case 
the Bayesian point estimate for the probability of success is: (a+r)/(a+b+r). If the 
prior is uniform, this corresponds to (r+1)/(n+2). In fact, the only prior that 
corresponds to the Classical estimate of r/n is when a = b = 0. 
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Bayesian confidence intervals are often [but not always] the same as those derived in 
Classical statistics, but their interpretation is quite different. That is, unlike their 
classical counterparts [cf. section 2.5] the Bayesian confidence intervals are 
interpreted directly in terms of probabilities. So, to say that a parameter lies within a 
certain interval with 95 % confidence is to say that the parameter has a 95 % 
probability of lying within said interval. 
 
4.2 Bayes Information Criterion 
 
In fact the name ‘Bayes Information Criterion’ is somewhat misleading since what 
has come to be widely known as BIC neither has anything to do with Shannon’s 
Information Theory [cf. Shannon and Weaver (1949)], nor is it the one and only 
Bayesian Information Criterion. Indeed, there is a plethora of model selection criteria 
within Bayesian framework – cf. Spiegelhalter (2002), Konishi and Kitagawa 
[(2008):chapter 9]. However, we will concentrate on BIC in particular, for three 
reasons. Firstly, even though BIC and other Bayesian criteria differ in details, they 
remain based within the same methodology, so the philosophical points by and large 
apply to them all. Secondly, BIC has received particular attention in the 
philosophical literature. Thirdly, like AIC, BIC is the most widely used Bayesian 
model selection criterion in statistical practice. 
 
BIC is due to Schwarz (1978). That is why it is sometimes referred to the SIC 
[Schwarz Information Criterion] or the Schwarz Criterion or Schwarz’s Bayesian 
Information Criterion. However, we shall continue referring to it as BIC following 
the most common usage in the literature. 
 
To get started, recall the discussion in section 4.1. One of the features of Bayesian 
statistics that we looked at there were the Bayes factors. Bayes factors are used to see 
which model from a given range is favoured by the sample data at hand. Bayes 
factors are the basis of model selection in Bayesian statistics.  
 
Recall that if we suppose that we have two models, say, H1 and H2, and for 
simplicity of exposition assuming that H1 and H2 are mutually exclusive and 
exhaustive, so that our data E arose from one of these models, the following holds: 
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where θi is a K-dimensional vector of parameters of the model Hi, and π(θi|Hi) is the 
prior probability of the vector of parameters θi given the model Hi – so called 
parameter prior. In order to obtain the full Bayesian solution the Bayes factor has to 
be combined with the model priors. Thus there are two prior distributions involved. 
 
The integrals involved in the above expression for B12 are often mathematically 
intractable, and have to be estimated by numerical methods such as Laplace 
approximation [cf. Kass and Raftery (1995): 777-778, and Konishi and Kitagawa 
(2008): 231-236]. Bayes Information Criterion is essentially an easy-to-calculate 
approximation to the natural logarithm of the Bayes factor. 
 
In a large sample with independent identically distributed data points the following 
holds [for a full formal proof cf. Schwarz (1978), Cavanaugh and Neath (1999) or 
Burnham and Anderson (2002)]: 
 
iiiiiii
BICdHHEprHEpr ≈−=− ∫ })|(),|(ln{2)|(ln2 θθpiθ  
 
where BICi = nKHE iii ln),ˆ|ln(2 +− θ , and iθˆ  is the maximum likelihood estimator 
of the Ki–dimensional parameter vector θi of the model Hi. In the notation of chapter 
2, BIC = – 2ln(L( | data, gi)) + Kln(n) 
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Notice that –2lnB12 ≈ BIC1 – BIC2 
 
The BIC methodological rule is the same as for the AIC – that is, to choose the 
model which has the smallest BIC score. 
 
The following table shows how the differences in BIC scores between two mutually 
exclusive exhaustive models correspond to the differences in Bayes factors and 
posterior probabilities [on the assumption of equal model priors]. This table 
resembles a similar ‘rule of thumb’ used in the AIC methodology [cf. section 3.2.2]. 
 
Grades of evidence corresponding to Values of the Bayes Factor for H1 against 
H2, the BIC Difference and the Posterior Probability of H1 
BIC Difference Bayes Factor pr (H1|E) Evidence 
0 – 2 1 – 3 0.5 – 0.75 Weak 
2 – 6 3 – 20 0.75 – 0.95 Positive 
6 – 10 20 – 150 0.95 – 0.99 Strong 
> 10 > 150 > 0.99 Very Strong 
From Raftery (1995):138, notation modified to fit our usage 
 
We shall provide an example of use of the BIC in section 4.5.2. In fact it shall be the 
same Hald’s Cement Hardening Data example that we employed in section 3.2.2. 
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4.3 Philosophical Issues with BIC 
 
4.3.1 Nesting 
 
Let us return to models LIN and PAR that we used as examples to introduce the AIC 
in chapter 3. LIN is a model which has all linear equations as its elements: y = a + 
bx. PAR is a model which has all parabolic equations as its elements: y = a + bx + 
cx
2
. As things stand, LIN is a proper subset of PAR, i.e., every element of LIN is an 
element of PAR, and PAR has more elements than LIN. LIN is said to be nested in 
PAR. Hence according to probability calculus pr(LIN) ≤ pr(PAR) [Popper (1968)]. 
Probability of LIN equals to probability of PAR just in case all the elements of PAR 
in which c ≠ 0 have probability zero. The same inequality applies to the posterior 
probabilities of LIN and PAR. That is, for any data E, the following holds: pr(LIN|E) 
≤ pr(PAR|E). So the posterior probability of PAR is at least as large as that of LIN 
whatever evidence we observe. Hence the posterior odds ratio 
[pr(LIN|E)/pr(PAR|E)] ≤ 1, so in Bayesian methodology LIN would not be preferred 
to PAR on any evidence at all. However, on the basis of the BIC methodology it is 
possible to prefer LIN to PAR. That is, it can be the case that [BIC(LIN) – 
BIC(PAR)] < 0. This leads Forster (2000):214 to a conclusion that ‘Bayes’ method is 
one thing and BIC is another. The latter is not always an approximation of the 
former.’ Let us see where the difference between Bayes’ method and BIC lies in this 
case. 
 
Recall from section 4.2 of this chapter that the BIC method provides an 
approximation to the Bayes Factor B12. The Bayes factor is essentially a ratio of 
integrated likelihoods of the data, which is an average of the likelihoods assigned to 
the data by each element of the model weighted by the prior probability distribution 
over all the elements of the model given that the model is correct. Even though LIN 
is nested in PAR, their Bayes factor is not restricted to any particular interval of 
values. That is, the Bayes factor of LIN against PAR (BLIN,PAR) can be greater than 1. 
Intuitively this is because the prior probability distribution over the parameters in 
PAR is spread more ‘thinly’ over the three parameters rather than over the two, as it 
is the case in LIN. If the data exhibits considerable linearity then the likelihoods of 
the elements in LIN are weighted higher by their priors within the integrated 
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likelihood than their linear counterparts in PAR. [cf. Kuha (2004):213] Hence the 
possibility of BLIN,PAR > 1. In general, for any model H1 that is nested in another 
model H2 the following holds. If H1 contains an element which is ‘true’ (we shall 
spend more time on the topic as to what is a ‘true’ model in the next subsection) and 
thus H2 contains the true element as well, then as the number of observations tends 
to infinity, B12 also tends to infinity. This is the case for almost any distribution of 
prior probabilities to the parameters given the respective models [cf. Dawid and 
Senn (2011):19]. 
 
Recall, however, that fully Bayesian model selection is based on posterior odds, 
where Posterior odds = Bayes factor x Prior odds. If we base our model selection 
solely on Bayes factors, our model selection is not affected by the issue of nesting of 
models, but our methodology is semi Bayesian, because we only use the priors over 
the parameters given the correctness of respective models, but do not employ priors 
over models themselves. Once we combine a Bayes factor with prior odds we obtain 
the result that the posterior odds of LIN against PAR are never greater than one. The 
BIC method provides an approximation of Bayes factor, so it also provides an 
approximation to the posterior odds just in case the priors over models themselves 
are equal, i.e., the prior distribution of the models is uniform – the Prior odds are 
then equal to 1. So the fully Bayesian model selection based on nested models would 
never favour a model with fewer adjustable parameters to an alternative with more 
adjustable parameters. As we discussed in the beginning of chapter 3, this is not a 
desirable feature of a model selection methodology. 
 
Forster’s conclusion cited above is correct in the case of nested models – if we wish 
to do fully Bayesian model selection properly we cannot work with nested models. A 
natural solution to this issue seems to present itself. Once we remove all linear 
elements from PAR and thus define PAR*: y = a + bx + cx2 where c ≠ 0, then LIN is 
no longer nested in PAR*, and there are no longer any restrictions on what values 
both prior and posterior odds can take. Moreover, surely it is more fruitful to select 
among incompatible models rather than between general models and their special 
cases [cf. Howson and Urbach (2006):289]. 
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Nonetheless, there are further arguments that the move from, in Forster’s 
terminology, truly nested models (like LIN and PAR) to quasi-nested models (like 
LIN and PAR*) makes the Bayesian model selection somehow inferior to the other 
methods which do not have this issue: ‘This maneuver succeeds in restoring 
consistency to [Bayesian] claims. Nevertheless, it does not resolve the puzzle about 
why there should be any difference between truly nested and quasi-nested models. In 
the other methods of model selection, such as AIC …, there is no difference between 
these two cases.’ [Forster(2000):214] 
 
Curiously we have not come across the following considerations being made explicit 
in the extensive literature on model selection. Let us investigate as to why the AIC 
methodology works equally well with both nested and non-nested models. Let us use 
models LIN and PAR again. To calculate the AIC scores we find an element of each 
model which has the maximum likelihood within the respective model. Within LIN 
that would obviously be a particular line. What about the element which has the 
maximum likelihood within PAR? It would almost invariably be a parabola with c ≠ 
0 [unless all the data points lie on a straight line, in which case the element with the 
maximum likelihood will be the same in both LIN and PAR. In the realm of 
probabilistic statistical modelling that we are concerned with we would expect this 
eventuality to be extremely rare.]. A parabolic curve has three adjustable parameters 
rather than two as it is the case for a linear curve, hence allowing the former to fit the 
data better, and thus to have a higher maximum likelihood. So, even though LIN is 
nested within PAR, as far as using AIC for model selection is concerned, PAR 
would almost always be represented by a parabola and penalised for using three 
adjustable parameters. The fact that LIN is nested in PAR is therefore irrelevant – 
LIN and PAR* would always yield exactly the same AIC scores as their nested 
counterparts [bar the case of complete linearity in data]. AIC-based model selection 
would have exactly the same outcome whether the models in the choice set are 
nested or not. This result generalises to nested models of any mathematical structure. 
By using only incompatible models in our choice set we can use both AIC and BIC 
at the same time and compare their results. 
 
In our view the puzzle as to why the move from truly nested to quasi-nested models 
in the choice set should make a difference is answered rather simply in the light of 
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the discussion in this section. It makes a difference in the case when we wish to use 
BIC methodology in the fully Bayesian way. We think that ‘quasi-nested’ 
terminology makes the move from LIN and PAR to LIN and PAR* in the choice set 
sound insubstantial whereas it is a rather important move. After all, by taking LIN 
out of PAR, we remove an uncountably infinite subset of PAR, which is not that 
trivial. Another important move, once the non-nesting of the models in the choice set 
is established, is the assumption of a uniform prior over the models in order for the 
differences in BIC scores to directly approximate the posterior odds on models. We 
shall look further into this assumption in section 4.4.1. 
 
4.3.2 Truth 
 
There are two closely related issues that have been identified with regards to the BIC 
methodology and truth. 
 
Firstly, it is often argued [for example, Spiegelhalter et al. (2002)] that in order for 
the BIC to perform properly as a model selection criterion it is necessary to have a 
“true” model in the choice set. In this context by the “true” model it is usually meant 
something along these lines: “a model precisely representing the full reality 
underlying the phenomena in question”. Within the AIC methodology a true model 
is such that its Kullback-Leibler divergence from the putative “truth” is zero. It 
seems rather unlikely that every time that we choose models to constitute the choice 
set we manage to include a true one in it. So in what are no doubt numerous cases 
when there are no true models in the choice set the application of the BIC 
methodology seems meaningless and inappropriate. 
 
Secondly, it is said [for example, Forster and Sober (1994):22] that AIC and BIC 
were designed for different purposes. Namely, AIC was designed to maximise 
predictive accuracy and BIC to maximise the probability of a model to be true. So, 
they are best for the respective jobs they were designed for, and no more. 
 
Indeed, the original derivation of the BIC due to Schwartz (1978) contains an 
assumption that the true model is within the choice set. However, since then the BIC 
has been derived in a more general way without employing the true model 
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assumption – cf. Cavanaugh and Neath (1999). Given this, a question naturally arises 
as to what we are to make of model probabilities within the BIC methodology. There 
is a mathematical theorem which states that for independent identically distributed 
sampling as the number of observations n tends to infinity one of the models within 
the choice set tends to 1 and the rest tend to 0 in probability [Burnham and Anderson 
(2004):276]. What are we to make of this result? What does pr (Hi|E) = 1 mean in 
the case when no model in the choice set is true? 
 
We can say that a model is quasi-true if it is the closest model to truth in the 
Kullback-Leibler sense in the choice set. The asymptotic convergence in probability 
to 1 of one of the models within the choice set means that this model is quasi-true in 
the sense indicated [Burnham and Anderson (2004)]. It is curious to see the K-L 
divergence emerging in the Bayesian context of the BIC methodology. Nevertheless 
here it is. There is actually another interesting way this connection works via scoring 
rules. 
 
Scoring rues are designed to measure predictive performance against observations of 
probabilistic models [both theoretical and statistical as per distinction introduced in 
chapter 1] or of probability judgements expressed by individuals. Here, as in the rest 
of thesis, we shall concern ourselves with probabilistic predictions derived from 
models. As usual, it is perhaps most illuminating to explain the concept by means of 
an example. [For a rigorous overview of scoring rules cf. Gneiting and Raftery 
(2007).] Suppose that we have two models H1 and H2 which provide probabilistic 
predictions of whether it will rain on a given day. Suppose that we would like to 
have a comparison of their predictive performance by means of using a mathematical 
rule which quantifies a discrepancy between the probabilities that the models yield of 
it raining next day and the actual observations of the events. In the table below 
[which is a stylised version of the table in Baron (2008):120] in the top row denoted 
‘Event occurred?’ ‘Yes’ stands for the observation that it rained the next day after 
the models provided probabilistic forecasts, and ‘No’ stands for the event that it did 
not rain. In each column there are probabilities of it raining on the given day 
provided by each of the two models respectively. 
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Now that we have data what formal expression should we use to measure the 
predictive performance? One of the popular scoring rules is the quadratic rule. It 
works the following way. Let us take the first ‘Yes’ column in the table above as an 
example. There model H1 predicted rain with probability 0.9 and model H2 with 
probability 0.8. Since it did actually rain we take the ‘true’ probability of it raining 
on that day to have been 1. [As we mentioned in chapter 1 when introducing the 
elementary probability theory, it is not an aim of this thesis to delve into the issue of 
interpreting probabilities.] In the quadratic rule we square the discrepancy between 
the ‘true’ probability and the predicted probability. So, for the day in the first column 
the discrepancy for model H1 is (1 – 0.9)2 = 0.01; for model 2: (1 – 0.8)2 = 0.04. The 
total quadratic score is provided by adding all of the discrepancies together thus: 
 
Quadratic Total Score for model H1 = (1 – 0.9)2 + (0 – 0.1)2 + (0 – 0.4)2 + (1 – 0.8)2 
+ (1 – 0.3)2 = 0.71 
 
Quadratic Total Score for model H2 = (1 – 0.8)2 + (0 – 0)2 + (0 – 0.3)2 + (1 – 0.9)2 + 
(1 – 0.1)2 = 0.95 
 
The model with the lowest quadratic total score is considered to be the most 
predictively successful for a given sample of data. The minimum achievable total 
quadratic score is zero. In fact within the theory of scoring rules the quadratic rule is 
identified as a strictly proper rule. Informally [for the formal definition cf. Gneiting 
 Event 
occurred
? 
Yes No No Yes Yes Logarithmic 
Total Score 
Quadratic 
Total Score 
Probability 
of event 
occurring 
given by: 
        
H1  0.9 0.1 0.4 0.8 0.3 -2.14866 0.71 
H2  0.8 0 0.3 0.9 0.1 -2.98776 0.95 
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and Raftery (2007):359], strictly proper rules are such that there is no strategy of 
assigning probabilities to events in order to improve the total score (in the quadratic 
rule’s case that would mean to lower the total score) except than to stick to the 
probabilities that a given model issues. That is, there is no way to ‘beat the system’, 
in a manner of speaking. Strictly proper scoring rules bear a certain similarity to the 
exclusion of gambling systems in the context of gambling. A gambling system is a 
set of instructions specifying when and how much to bet when playing a game of 
chance [for example, roulette] with the aim of improving monetary gain – ‘beating 
the odds’ [for an in depth consideration of the law of excluded gambling systems cf. 
Gillies (2000):chapter 5]. Baron (2008):121 gives an example of an improper scoring 
rule. 
 
Another example of a strictly proper rule, which is in fact pertinent to our topic of 
the BIC methodology is the logarithmic scoring rule. It works in the following way. 
If a model predicts the occurrence of an event with probability p and the event 
subsequently occurs, then the score is ln(p).  If the event does not occur, then the 
score is ln(1 – p). So, for the day in the first column the logarithmic score for the 
model H1 is ln(0.9) = -0.10536; for H2: ln(0.8) = -0.22314. The total logarithmic 
score is provided by the sum of the individual scores. Hence: 
 
Logarithmic Total Score for Model H1 = ln(0.9) + ln(1-0.1) + ln(1-0.4) + ln(0.8) + 
ln(0.3) = ln(0.9x0.9x0.6x0.8x0.3) = -2.14866 
 
Logarithmic Total Score for Model H2 = ln(0.8) + ln(1-0) + ln(1-0.3) + ln(0.9) + 
ln(0.1) = ln(0.8x1x0.7x0.9x0.1) = -2.98776 
 
The model with the highest logarithmic total score is considered to be the most 
predictively successful for a given sample of data. The maximum achievable total 
logarithmic score is zero. 
 
Good (1952) points to the following result: 
ln(BF12) = total logarithmic score of model 1 – total logarithmic score of model 2, 
which with simple algebraic manipulations is approximated by -0.5x(BIC1 – BIC2). 
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So there is a way to interpret BIC scores as providing a measure of predictive 
success, on par with the AIC methodology. Another striking result is that the 
mathematical expectation of a logarithmic score is equal to the Kullback-Leibler 
divergence [Ehm and Gneiting (2009, Addendum 2010):4]. 
 
Recall that the AIC methodology aims to provide an unbiased estimate of the 
expected relative K-L divergence to ‘truth’. Then it seems surprising that even 
though the BIC methodology also has a link to the K-L divergence, the numerical 
expressions of the AIC and BIC criteria are different. In a nutshell, the difference lies 
firstly in the use of maximum likelihoods in the AIC as opposed to the integrated 
likelihoods in BIC and secondly in the fact that the penalty term 2K appears as a 
correction of a bias [in the sense that this notion is explained in chapter 1] in the AIC 
whereas Kln(n) in the BIC appears during approximation of the integrated likelihood. 
The connection between AIC and BIC is explored further in section 4.4. 
 
4.4 Connection between BIC and AIC 
 
Perhaps it does not come as a huge surprise that AIC and BIC are connected. After 
all, the only difference in the formal expressions between AIC and BIC is that the 
penalty term K [i.e., the number of adjustable parameters] is multiplied by 2 in AIC 
and by ln(n) in BIC. There are two ways in which we shall explore this connection. 
Both of these shall show what would be required in order to yield the AIC from the 
Bayesian perspective of BIC. This is the easiest way to exhibit the link between AIC 
and BIC, since Bayesian methodology allows us the flexibility of priors. Recall that 
in order to use BIC as an approximation to the fully Bayesian way, two sets of priors 
are determined – the priors over parameters given the models, and the priors over 
models themselves. In two subsections below we shall explore the kind of priors 
required to yield AIC from BIC. In section 4.4.1 we shall look at the type of model 
prior required [while using the same parameter prior as in BIC] in order to derive 
AIC. In section 4.4.2 we shall look at the type of parameters prior required [while 
using the same uniform prior over models as in BIC] in order to derive AIC. 
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4.4.1 Connection via Model Priors 
 
Burnham and Anderson (2004) show that if we use the following model prior instead 
of a uniform one, we derive the AIC rather than BIC: 
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This prior is an increasing function of both of the size of data sample and of the 
number of adjustable parameters. That is, for a given number of observations in the 
sample, models with relatively larger number of adjustable parameters have higher 
probabilities than models that have relatively fewer number of adjustable parameters. 
Also an increase in the sample size brings about an increase in the difference in 
probability of models with different numbers of adjustable parameters. This can be 
seen in the simple example in the table below, where we performed calculations of 
such prior probabilities of two models with two and three adjustable parameters 
respectively with samples consisting of 10 and 100 observations respectively. The 
two models are assumed to be exhaustive and mutually exclusive.  
 
 n = 10 n = 100 
K = 2 0.4626 0.2137 
K = 3 0.5374 0.7863 
 
Burnham and Anderson call the model prior which takes us from the BIC to the AIC 
a ‘savvy’ prior and argue that this prior is more sensible than the uniform prior used 
in BIC. In fact they go as far as to state that the very use of the uniform model prior 
implies that the model selection is done in order to find the true model rather than in 
order to maximise the predictive performance. Unfortunately they do not offer any 
argument as to why this should be the case. We disagree with their position. In our 
view any model prior whatsoever expresses the probability assignment to each 
model in the choice set that it is (quasi-)true given the background knowledge in the 
domain of inquiry. The model prior does not and cannot by itself express our belief 
[or lack thereof] that the choice set contains a true model. For any model prior 
whatsoever we can represent the posterior odds as the difference in logarithmic 
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predictive scores. Moreover, there is another way to show that Burnham and 
Anderson’s claim with regards to the “meaning” of model priors is incorrect. We 
shall consider it in the next section. 
 
There is a way, however, to argue for Burnham and Anderson’s contention that the 
savvy model prior is more sensible than the uniform one. In fact Popper (1968, 
Appendix viii) provides a version of such an argument. Popper argues that simpler 
hypotheses [‘simpler’ in the precise sense that they have relatively fewer adjustable 
parameters] have relatively lower probabilities. In his view simpler hypotheses have 
more empirical content, which is measured by the degree of their testability. Simpler 
hypotheses are more testable in the sense that there is a greater variety of 
observations that would falsify them. That is in Popper’s view there is a larger 
number of possible data points that would be incompatible with a simpler 
hypothesis, and so more possibilities for the simpler hypothesis to be wrong relative 
to a more complex hypothesis. 
 
‘Simple statements, if knowledge is our object are to be prized more highly 
than less simple ones because they tell us more; because their empirical 
content is greater; and because their better testable’.  
Popper (1968):142, original italics 
 
Jeffreys (1961) holds the opposite view to Popper on the issue of probability of 
relatively simpler hypotheses. In his opinion the simpler the hypothesis is, the higher 
its prior probability, ceteris paribus. This he calls the Simplicity Postulate. He gives 
two reasons for this postulate. Firstly, simpler hypotheses are more likely to be 
predictively successful [Jeffreys (1961):4]. Secondly, the Simplicity Postulate fits 
well the common scientific practice, at least in physics. That is, Jeffreys argues that 
physicists behave as if they consider simpler hypotheses more likely to be true  by 
always considering a linear hypothesis first, and only then a quadratic one, and so on 
[Jeffreys (1961):47 and Jeffreys (1973):63].  
 
Starting with the second of Jeffreys’ reasons, our view is that it is perfectly 
compatible with physicist’s behaviour to think that she considers simpler hypotheses 
first for ease of calculations and in an exploratory way, rather than necessarily due to 
believing that the simpler hypotheses are true. The order in which a scientist 
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considers hypotheses does not necessarily imply any particular order of probabilities. 
Indeed, as we just have seen, Popper reached the opposite conclusion, and his 
approach fits this scientific behaviour as well as that of Jeffreys. 
 
The first reason for adopting the Simplicity Postulate [that simplicity is the guide to 
predictive success] requires an independent argument for it. As it stands, it is just an 
assertion. Prima facie, it would be equally reasonable to state that complexity is the 
guide to predictive success. It is true that simplicity has for a long time been 
considered to be one of the attributes of a good scientific theory [cf. for instance 
Kuhn (1977)]. However, we do not think that adopting the Simplicity Postulate as 
the constraint on setting the model priors is a sensible strategy. Scientists should be 
free to set the model priors in the way that they deem appropriate given the particular 
background knowledge and the domain of inquiry. Note that even though Jeffreys’ 
Simplicity Postulate implies that the prior probability over the models in the choice 
set is a decreasing function of the model complexity as measured by the number of 
adjustable parameters that the model contains, still in his own examples he uses the 
uniform prior over models – “for calculation”. We shall consider Popper’s argument 
that the simplicity of a hypothesis varies in the opposite direction to its probability in 
detail in chapter 5. 
 
Notice, incidentally, that we have so far managed to avoid talk of simplicity, 
parsimony and such-like notions. In our view, the interpretation of the penalty terms 
in both AIC and BIC as ‘simplicity in action’ is unnecessary. In both AIC and BIC 
the penalty for complexity arises from the formalism itself – in the AIC the penalty 
term for the number of parameters arises as the correction term for the asymptotic 
bias, and in the BIC it arises during the process of approximation to the integrated 
likelihood. The notion of simplicity was not input into either of these methods – it 
emerged from the formalism as a by-product. Thus we do not concentrate our 
attention on this feature, for we get no epistemic purchase on it over and above the 
model selection criteria themselves. 
 
For us there is no full proof formal way to prescribe how model priors should be set. 
Each particular case demands deliberation on this issue. Every purely formal rule for 
setting priors is ad hoc. 
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4.4.2 Connection via Parameter Priors 
 
We mentioned in the beginning of this section that there are two ways of deriving the 
AIC result from the BIC methodology. The first way was to keep the parameter 
priors the same as in the BIC and to derive a model prior which would take us to the 
AIC result. This is what we did in the previous section. Now we shall keep the 
uniform model prior fixed, and show that there is a parameter prior which again 
takes us to the AIC result from the BIC setting. 
 
This section closely follows Kieseppä (2001a). His approach is to consider how 
informative any given probability distribution is. From chapter 1 recall that it is often 
possible to fully determine a probability distribution by two numbers [depending on 
the distribution] – by its mean and its variance [this is the case for the normal 
distribution – cf. section 1.3.2]. The variance is the measure of dispersion of a given 
distribution. That is it measures how spread out the possible values that the 
parameter can take given the structure of the distribution. The higher the variance the 
more spread out the distribution is around its mean value. So the variance is said to 
measure the informativeness of a given distribution in the sense that the higher the 
variance the less informative the distribution is since there are more possible values 
that the parameter can take. In the multiple regression case the variance is substituted 
by the covariance matrix, but the idea is the same. It is also noted that the 
informativeness of a probability distribution is proportionate to the number of 
observations. That is the more observations it is based on, the higher its 
informativeness. It is then possible to rank different probability distributions by their 
informativeness in terms of the number of observations expected to be required in 
order to obtain given variance. [For formal treatment of this topic cf. Kieseppä 
(2001a).] Here is the formula for a general Bayesian model selection criterion 
without assuming any particular parameter prior: 
 
– 2ln(L( | data, gi)) + Kln(n/n0) 
where n0 is the measure of informativeness in terms of how many observations the 
information in the parameter prior is based on. Kieseppä applies this idea to the AIC 
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and BIC results and shows that the informativeness of BIC parameter prior is 
equivalent to a sample with one observation [with n0 = 1] whereas the parameter 
prior required in order to obtain the AIC result has the informativeness equivalent to 
e-2n observations. Hence the BIC parameter prior has constant informativeness 
independent of the number of observations contained in a given sample, whereas the 
AIC result is equivalent to the Bayesian result with the parameter prior which is 
more informative and its informativeness grows with the number of observations in 
the sample. 
 
In fact there are infinitely many Bayesian models selection criteria – it all depends 
what value of n0 one finds appropriate. Kieseppä (2001a) argues that this is a 
potential weakness of the Bayesian approach, because it seems to lose any normative 
character to the conclusions of model selection. In our view this flexibility is a 
positive attribute of Bayesian model selection methodology allowing one to reflect 
one’s ideas about the way the parameters distributed within each individual model 
selection problem. 
 
Finally, regarding Burnham and Anderson’s contention in the previous section that 
imposition of a uniform model prior in BIC somehow commits us to the search for 
truth whereas their savvy model priors that lead to AIC do no such thing. In this 
section all of our results assume the uniform prior distribution over models. We have 
derived AIC under this assumption. Hence, their contention is incorrect. 
 
4.5 Comparison between BIC and AIC 
 
4.5.1 Statistical Consistency 
 
Numerous sources [e.g., Keuzenkamp and McAleer (2001)] state that AIC is not a 
statistically consistent estimate. However, the BIC is statistically consistent. 
 
Different questions can be asked about consistency of AIC. 
1 ‘..[W]hether AIC is a consistent method of maximizing predictive accuracy in 
the sense of converging on the hypothesis with the greatest predictive accuracy 
in the large sample limit. 
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2 …[W]hether AIC is consistent estimator of predictive accuracy, which is a 
subtly different question from the first. 
3 …[W]hether AIC converges to the smallest true model in a nested hierarchy 
of models. 
The answer to the first two questions will be yes, …while the answer to the third is 
no, AIC is not consistent in this sense, but this fact does not limit its ability to 
achieve its goal.’ [Forster (2001):113] 
 
The AIC was designed as an estimator of predictive accuracy, so the charge should 
be that AIC fails to be consistent with respect to estimating the predictive accuracy. 
Forster shows that this is not the case. ‘Akaike’s own criterion minimizes the 
quantity –2(logL(θ^K) – K), which estimates –2nA(θ^K). But note that this is a strange 
thing to estimate, since it depends on the number of seen data, n.’ [Forster 
(1999):113] ‘The correct response to the ‘problem’ is to divide the estimator and 
target by n, so that the target does not depend on the sample size. … AIC does 
provide a consistent estimate of predictive accuracy when it is properly defined.’ 
[Forster (1999):114] It seems that Forster asserts that the AIC as it is commonly 
defined (see Introduction) is inconsistent with respect to predictive accuracy.  
 
However, Kieseppä also discusses the question of consistency of AIC and reaches 
similar conclusions to Forster, but still uses the original form of AIC. So, it seems 
that either Forster is incorrect in saying that the proper definition of AIC score is the 
one divided by the number of data points in the sample, or Kieseppä is correct in 
using the original AIC.  
 
Bandyopadhayay and Boik (1999) note that ‘[Forster’s claim] is true in the special 
case of regression models where σ2 is a known constant. In addition, if one is willing 
to assume that the approximating family is identical to the true family of models, 
then AIC is a consistent estimator of predictive accuracy. Forster’s claim, however, 
is not true in general. If the approximating family misspecifies the true family, then 
AIC no longer is consistent.’ [Bandyopadhayay and Boik (1999):S400] 
 
Now, Forster turns to the charge that AIC is inconsistent with respect to estimating 
K. Forster considers the case of nested models, and distinguishes two cases. In the 
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first case, ‘…the true hypothesis will first appear in a model of dimension K*, and in 
every model higher in the hierarchy.’ [Forster (2001):114] Now the question arises 
of the desirability of estimating k as close as possible to K*. Forster notes that in 
cases where data is drawn from quite a narrow range and supposing that we are 
choosing between LIN and PAR, ‘…for even quite large values of n, it may be best 
to select LIN over PAR, and better than any other family of polynomials higher in 
the hierarchy. Philosophically speaking, this is the interesting case in which a false 
model is better than a true model. However, for sufficiently high values of n, this 
will change, and PAR will be the better choice [because the problem of over fitting is 
then far smaller]. Again, this is an example in which asymptotic results are 
potentially misleading because they do not extend to intermediate data sizes.’ 
[Forster (2001):114] 
 
‘In the second case the true hypothesis does not appear anywhere in the hierarchy of 
models. In this case the model bias will keep decreasing as we move up the 
hierarchy, and there will never be a point at which it stops decreasing. …There is no 
universally valid theorem that shows that BIC does better than AIC.’ [Forster 
(2001):115] ‘In both cases, the optimum model moves up the hierarchy as n 
increases. In the first case, it reaches maximum value K*, and then stops. The crucial 
point is that in all cases, the error of AIC (as an estimate of predictive accuracy) 
converges to zero as n tends to infinity.’ [Forster (2001):115, italics added] Forster 
says that other information criteria are also consistent and he urges that it is most 
important what happens in the intermediate case and not in the limit. 
 
It is rather difficult to see what exactly Forster claims at the end of the day. At the 
beginning of the section on consistency he seems to argue that AIC is not consistent 
with respect to estimating k and that this is of no consequence since this is not what 
AIC was designed to estimate anyhow, whereas the end of this section seems to 
suggest that AIC is actually consistent with respect to K {for example, ‘After all, 
AIC does successfully converge on the true hypothesis!’ [Forster (2001):115]}. 
 
Kieseppä (2003) sheds clearer light on the issue by stating the result that ‘…when 
the sample size is large and the true curve is actually a horizontal straight line, the 
probability with which AIC will correctly recommend the model which contains 
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only horizontal straight lines is approximately 95%, and the probability that it will 
recommend the larger model which contains also all the other straight lines is 
approximately 5%.’ [page 18] Unfortunately, Kieseppa had to omit the proof of this 
result due to the limitations of space. This result is in line with Forster’s 
argumentation that AIC serves the purpose of picking hypotheses that are 
predictively accurate rather than that of finding/converging upon the true model with 
the minimum number of dimensions: ‘…it [AIC’s recommendation] will with a very 
great probability be an acceptable choice, if the aim of the researcher is to find a 
curve which is “predictively accurate”, although it will be a bad choice if her aim is 
to find out whether the true curve is a horizontal line or not.’ [page 19] 
 
4.5.2 Relative Performance 
 
When the number of observations in a sample exceeds 8 [i.e., when ln(n) > 2], BIC 
starts to give progressively greater weight to hypotheses with fewer adjustable 
parameters relative to AIC. Studies indicate that, all other things being equal, BIC 
performs better in set-ups where there are very few variables with strong effects 
whereas AIC performs best in contexts when there are several variables with 
moderate effects. 
 
Let us return to the example that we used in chapter 3 to show how the AIC 
methodology works, and add the BIC to it. We repeat the table it here for 
convenience. 
 
Cement hardening data with four regressor variables x1, x2, x3 and x4 and a 
response variable y 
x1 x2 x3 x4 y 
7 26 6 60 78.6 
1 29 15 52 74.3 
11 56 8 20 104.3 
11 31 8 47 87.6 
7 52 6 33 95.9 
11 55 9 22 109.2 
3 71 17 6 102.7 
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1 31 22 44 72.5 
2 54 18 22 93.1 
21 47 4 26 115.9 
1 40 23 34 83.8 
11 66 9 12 113.3 
10 68 8 12 109.4 
Where the regressor variables (in percentage of the weight) are: x1 = calcium 
aluminate (3CaO.Al2O3), x2 = tricalcium silicate (3CaO.SiO2), x3 = tetracalcium 
alumina ferrite (4CaO.Al2O3.Fe2O3) and x4 = dicalcium silicate (2CaO.SiO2); the 
response variable is y = total calories given off during hardening per gram of cement 
after 180 days. 
 
Model K BIC (∆) AIC (∆) AICc (∆) 
12 4 0 0.45 0 
124 5 2.73 0 3.13 
123 5 2.65 0.04 3.16 
14 4 3.46 3.77 3.32 
134 5 3.4 0.75 3.88 
234 5 8.31 5.6 8.73 
1234 6 5.06 1.97 10.52 
34 4 14.8 14.88 14.43 
23 4 26.82 26.06 25.62 
4 3 29.6 33.88 31.1 
2 3 29.78 34.2 31.42 
24 4 34.42 35.66 35.21 
1 3 32.18 38.55 35.77 
13 4 36.84 40.14 39.7 
3 3 37.9 44.09 41.31 
Ghosh and Samanta (2001):1143 
 
As we can see, in this case BIC and AICc results broadly agree with one another. 
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5. Model Selection Methods and Scientific Realism 
 
5.1 Introduction 
 
In the previous chapters we surveyed the classical and some most recently developed 
approaches to model selection. We have seen that all methods have their strengths 
and weaknesses. We reviewed the objections to the methods and argued that none of 
them were devastating so long as one is aware of their foundations. In this chapter 
we explore what consequences, if any, the methods of model selection that we have 
considered have for some wider issues in the philosophy of science. In particular, 
what bearing these methods have on the debate on the scientific realism/anti-realism. 
 
There are several versions of scientific realism available out there. However, we find 
that the following three theses capture the features of scientific realism well.  
 
‘Scientific Realism is a philosophical view about science that consists in three 
theses. The Metaphysical Thesis: the world has a definite and mind-independent 
structure. The Semantic Thesis: scientific theories should be taken at face value. 
They are truth-conditioned descriptions of their intended domain, both observable 
and unobservable. The Epistemic Thesis: mature and predictively successful 
scientific theories are well-confirmed and approximately true of the world.’  
[Psillos (2007):226] 
 
First, our focus is going to be the Epistemic Thesis. It presupposes both the 
metaphysical and the semantic theses. We will look at the epistemic thesis in its 
simplified form. That is, as the notion that predictively successful scientific theories 
are approximately true. There are numerous arguments both pro and con scientific 
realism in general and the epistemic thesis in particular. Arguably, among many 
arguments about scientific realism, the two most prominent ones so far are the no-
miracles argument [some, including ourselves, consider it an intuition – cf. Worrall 
(1994)] and the argument from pessimistic meta-induction. 
 
The no-miracles argument [NMA – this formulation is due to Putnam (1975)] 
purports to establish that predictive success of scientific theories licences the 
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inference to their [approximate] truth. That is, why else would a theory be 
predictively successful? It would be a ‘miracle’ if a theory were predictively 
successful but false. 
 
In counterbalance to the NMA there is the argument from pessimistic meta-induction 
[cf. Laudan (1981)]. It has been noticed that there have been some very predictively 
successful theories in the history of science that eventually turned out to be, strictly 
speaking, false. The paradigm example is Newtonian mechanics, which was 
superseded by Einstein’s theories of relativity. If such predictively successful 
theories like Newton’s can be shown to be false, it may well be the case that other 
predictively successful theories that are currently entertained may eventually turn out 
to be false too. 
 
Second, we shall look at an argument against the popular idea within the scientific 
realism field that science aims to find true theories. 
  
5.2 Sober’s Counterexamples 
 
Model selection methods that we have been considering in this thesis attempt to 
capture predictive success, so it is natural to wonder whether these methods have any 
bearing on the issue of scientific realism. In fact, Elliot Sober (1999, 2002) takes up 
the challenge to show, firstly, contrary to the Epistemic Thesis of Scientific Realism, 
that there are false scientific theories [in our case probabilistic hypotheses] that are 
predictively successful. In fact Sober does not quite put it this way himself, but his 
argument clearly goes against the epistemic thesis. We consider this counterexample 
in section 5.2.1. The second counterexample purports to show that seeking truth and 
maximising predictive accuracy do not always go together. We consider this 
counterexample in section 5.2.2. 
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5.2.1 On the Epistemic Thesis of Scientific Realism 
 
Let us consider Sober’s example with differences in mean heights of corn plants in 
two different fields. Suppose that there are two adjacent fields in which corn grows, 
and suppose that we are interested in testing the following hypotheses about the 
average heights of wheat plants in both populations. We are doing so in the Neyman-
Pearson way:  
H0: |µ1 – µ2|  = 0 
H1: |µ1 – µ2| ≠ 0  
 
Sober argues that the null hypothesis is obviously false – surely the two population 
means cannot be exactly equal to several decimal places. Hence H1 is obviously true. 
Scientists, however, routinely test such false hypotheses against true hypotheses. 
Assuming that scientists are rational and that the predictive accuracy is their only 
goal, Sober urges us to conclude that false hypotheses can be maximally predictively 
accurate – that is, sometimes even more predictively accurate than true hypotheses. 
Unless scientists believe that H0 is more predictively successful than H1, they would 
not bother testing such obviously false hypotheses against obviously true ones. 
Scientists seem to be willing to accept a false hypothesis as long as it is predictively 
successful. This argument, he contends, lends credence to methodological 
instrumentalism – ‘the idea that theories are instruments for making predictions, 
[and] that predictive accuracy is the only consideration that matters [in science]’ 
[Sober (1999): 4, 5]. 
 
There are counter arguments that deny that the sole goal of scientists is the accuracy 
of prediction. However, we have a different angle, and are willing to grant predictive 
accuracy as the goal in this particular example from statistics. Indeed in this thesis 
we have been looking at model selection exclusively for predictive purposes. We 
shall concentrate on the part of the argument that goes against the simplified version 
of the epistemic thesis of scientific realism. This argument against the epistemic 
thesis seems to be the following. The epistemic thesis asserts that predictively 
successful hypotheses are approximately true. Here we ostensibly have an example 
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of a hypothesis which is predictively successful [we assume so] but which is 
obviously false. 
 
Recall from chapter 2 a feature of the NP hypothesis testing methodology is that it is 
important which hypothesis is H0 and which is H1. The method is more conservative 
towards H0, so [depending on H1] it can take quite a substantial difference between 
µ1 and µ2 to reject H0 in favour of H1 [the actual testing for this difference is done 
using respective sample means θ1 and θ2]. We contend that rather than thinking that 
a false hypothesis is more predictively accurate, scientists in this case use  
H0: |µ1 – µ2| = 0 as a place-holder for H0: ‘the difference between µ1 and µ2 is 
sufficiently small for us to disregard for our purposes’. What is ‘sufficiently small’ 
or statistically insignificant in the NP methodology is defined by the range of values 
of the parameter which is not the critical region [cf. section 2.2]. However, we 
briefly considered the notion of practical significance in section 2.1.2. We believe 
that our interpretation of what scientists take H0 to stand for is consistent with this 
notion. There is also a notion of substantive significance [cf. Mayo and Spanos 
(2006) and references contained therein] that relies on the meta-statistical principle 
of severity of a statistical test. Unlike practical significance, the severity of a test and 
hence its substantive significance has a precise quantitative expression. It is 
calculated on the basis of observed data. The severity of a test is analogous to the 
concept of severe testing used by Popper (1968) – the more severe a test that a 
scientific theory survives, the more corroborated it is. Here the greater degree of 
severity confers more evidential support to a statistical hypothesis. Hence the 
concept of severity of a statistical test moves away from the behavioural 
interpretation of NP tests towards evidential support one. There is a lively debate on 
this subject of severity testing – cf. Achinstein (2003), Howson (1995, 1997), Mayo 
(1996, 2003, 2005). Here we shall no pursue this topic further, but note that it may 
constitute a fruitful avenue for further research in general, and in connection with 
Sober’s views in particular.  
 
Returning to the case that Sober discusses, it is important to note that in this case the 
testing of H0 against H1 at, say, the 5% level of significance is equivalent to finding a 
95% confidence interval for |µ1 – µ2| [cf. section 2.5]. In fact Sober seems to have 
found just such an interval by means of simulations: ‘[The] simulations closely agree 
110 
 
with the analytic solution that Branden Fitelson obtained, according to which [H0] 
will be more predictively accurate (in expectation) than [H1] precisely when  
| µ1 – µ2 | < 1.34898 σ/√n.’ Sober (1999):21, footnote 7 
 
Sober and Fitelson in fact found a confidence interval for |µ1 – µ2|! Once we 
reinterpret this case in such a way that rather than using a deliberately false 
hypothesis for greater predictive accuracy, the scientists implicitly check whether the 
differences in means fall within the confidence interval, i.e., they implicitly check 
whether | µ1 – µ2 | < 1.34898 σ/√n , it is no longer obvious at all that the H0 is false. 
We contend that scientists who use such point versus composite hypothesis tests 
simply do not spell out in detail what they intend to achieve by such testing, for it is 
often makes little practical difference for them if there is an insignificant deviation 
from zero. On this basis we argue that the putative connection between the falsity of 
a hypothesis and its predictive accuracy disappears. Scientists may be just a bit fast 
and loose with regards to describing the hypotheses, for the NP framework allows 
them to do so.  
 
‘If scientists interpret the [H0] as saying that the means are no more than 2 
inches apart, then they should not reject the [H0] when they find that θ1 and 
θ2 differ by 1 inch in a large sample. However, this is precisely what they do. 
This argument generalizes to any setting of ε, large or small. The behaviour 
of scientists shows that they interpret [H0] literally.’ 
Sober (1999):28, notation modified to fit our usage 
 
In our confidence interval for | µ1 – µ2 | above, ε = 1.34898 σ/√n. That is, ε is the 
critical value beyond which H0 is rejected. As n increases, the critical value ε 
becomes smaller. In the limit as n tends to infinity, ε tends to zero. Hence, if this was 
the way that the NP method was used, in a large enough sample more or less any 
deviation in the difference between sample means θ1 and θ2 from zero would lead to 
rejection of H0. We contend that in the quote above Sober’s account of statistical 
practice is inaccurate. The users of NP tests often reduce the critical region [or, 
equivalently in our case of the confidence interval interpretation, they would increase 
the level of confidence beyond 95%] to account for the over-sensitivity of the test 
with large n to the tiniest differences in values – cf. our discussion of Lindley 
Paradox in section 2.2. The behaviour of scientists as we know it is consistent with 
our interpretation that they do not take H0 literally. 
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So, if Sober’s attempt to show that H0 is obviously false does not succeed, is there a 
way to reformulate his counterexample? We think that there is, but it does not 
succeed either. Let us start with consideration of the notion of hypothesis 
‘acceptance’ that Sober employs. 
 
 
‘In formulating the question as one about “acceptance”, I leave open whether 
“acceptance” means believing that the hypothesis is true or believing that it 
will be predictively accurate. [footnote: Although I’ll formulate the problem 
in terms of the concept of “acceptance”, this is a matter of convenience; the 
dichotomous concept of acceptance could be replaced with the concept of 
degree of belief. Formulated in the latter way, the question would be whether 
the goal of science is to say how probable it is that various hypotheses are 
true, or to say how predictively accurate one should expect those hypotheses 
to be.]’  
Sober (1999):14 
 
As it is usually understood, to accept a hypothesis within the NP framework means 
to behave as if it is true [cf. sections 2.2 and 2.3 for elaboration]. Thus in the 
example with corn plants accepting H0 [when the difference between sample means 
falls within the confidence interval] involves behaving as if H0 is true, and not 
behaving as if it was false, as Sober suggests. In the quote above Sober would be 
happy to replace this dichotomous concept of acceptance by talking of probability of 
hypotheses. As we know, there is no place for probabilities of hypotheses in the NP 
methodology. We would need to move to the Bayesian framework to use this 
concept sensibly. Let us try to recast the counterexample in a Bayesian way. 
 
In a Bayesian rendition of the corn plant example the scientists would have to be 
explicit about what range of values they would expect the differences in the mean  
values of the two populations of plants to lie in. Let us then take the de facto 
confidence interval of a kind that Sober and Fitelson yielded in the NP example 
above as our null hypothesis and the interval outside the confidence interval as our 
alternative – thus null and alternative are exhaustive and mutually exclusive. For the 
sake of an argument let us suppose that ε = 3 so that our hypotheses are: 
H0: (µ1 – µ2) ∈  [-3, 3] 
H1: (µ1 – µ2) ∈ (-∞, -3) ∪ (3, ∞) 
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We need to assign prior probabilities to these hypotheses. Sober could argue that H0 
should be assigned much lower probability than H1, possibly on the grounds that the 
interval of possible values that is suggested by H0 is much shorter than that of H1. So 
in this context rather than arguing that the null hypothesis is obviously false but is 
nonetheless deemed by the scientists predictively successful [as before], Sober could 
argue that the null has much lower probability of being true [prior to observing the 
difference in sample means], but it is still deemed more predictively successful than 
the alternative which has a higher probability. This argument sounds Popperian – 
recall our discussion of model priors in section 4.4.1. It could be argued in the spirit 
of Popper that H0 has a much higher empirical content than H1 – that is, there are 
many more possible observations that are incompatible with H0 rather than with H1. 
If this were the case then we would assign much lower prior probability to H0 than to 
H1 – in proportion to their respective empirical contents. 
 
Unfortunately this argument does not work either. Choice of the interval [-3, 3] may 
suggest that the scientists have an expectation of (µ1 – µ2) to lie within this interval, 
presumably on the basis of their background knowledge. This suggests that at the 
very least there is no reason to set the prior on the null much lower than that of the 
alternative.  
 
5.2.2 Truth and Predictive Accuracy 
 
In philosophy of science it is commonly thought that in addition to the three theses 
cited in section 5.1, scientific realist is committed to seeking truth as the aim of 
science.  How does it connect with the aim of predictive accuracy, which we have 
been assuming in this thesis? The two aims seem to occur together – we would 
expect true theories to be most predictively accurate [cf. Nagel (1979):139]. 
However, Sober (1999) uses the following example to show that seeking truth and 
maximising predictive accuracy do not always coincide. 
‘Suppose that one of the buses numbered 1-10 takes you right to Fred’s door, 
while the other nine take you very far away; on the other hand, all of the 
buses numbered 11-20 go very near Fred’s house, though none of them goes 
right to his door. … If your goal is to get as close as possible to Fred’s house, 
you should take a bus numbered 11-20. The point is this: even if a bus with a 
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low number is the one that goes closest to Fred’s house, it doesn’t follow that 
the best way to get close to Fred’s house is to take a low-numbered bus. … 
This suggests that there may be inference problems in which trying to find 
the truth and trying to maximise predictive accuracy lead to different 
decisions. The bus example suggests that this may be possible even if no 
hypothesis is more predictively accurate than the truth.’  
Sober (1999):13 
 
Here finding the truth maximises predictive accuracy, but the probability of picking 
the true hypothesis is low whereas the alternative is to pick a hypothesis which is 
very close to truth with certainty. 
 
We agree with Sober that in his bus to Fred’s house example trying to find the truth 
and trying to maximise predictive accuracy leads to different decisions, and that we 
would also take a bus numbered 11-20. However, we argue that if we refine the goal 
of finding the truth in a quite natural way, then we restore the connection between 
truth and predictive accuracy. 
 
In this example there is uncertainty as to how far a given bus would take us from 
Fred’s house. We suggest that this uncertainty can be handled probabilistically. In 
this case we can substitute the goal of seeking the truth by the goal of minimising the 
expectation [in the statistical sense of a probability weighted average – cf. chapter 1] 
of the divergence from truth. Then trying to minimise the expectation of the 
divergence from truth and trying to maximise predictive accuracy lead to the same 
decision – choosing a higher numbered bus. In contexts of uncertainty of the kind 
that is there in the bus to Fred’s house example a scientific realist should refine her 
aim from seeking truth to minimising expected divergence from truth. Indeed, it is 
not accidental that scientific realists use the concept of approximate truth in the 
epistemic thesis of scientific realism. Likewise the aim of approximate truth is more 
realistic than that of truth simpliciter. Minimising expected divergence from truth 
can be thought of as operationalising the concept of approximate truth. 
 
Using the bus to Fred’s house example Sober argues against the principle that: 
 
(*) If you want to maximize A and T maximizes A, then the best way to maximize A 
is to try to maximize T. [Sober (1999):12] 
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We think that once we refine our goal in the way suggested, the bus to Fred’s house 
example provides support to the principle (*). In the example we are urged to choose 
a bus 11-20, because such a choice would minimise the distance to the Fred’s house 
[which is the proxy for actual truth in the example]. Arguably such minimisation of 
distance to truth can be thought of as maximisation of truth. Indeed, this is the very 
idea behind the AIC framework, which aims to minimise the K-L divergence to 
‘truth’. In this example the expected distance to Fred’s house in each case is a 
probability-weighted average of minimum Euclidean distances within Fred’s house 
that each bus from No. 1 to 10 and from No. 11 to 20 respectively brings one. For 
instance, using the Principle of Indifference as per section 4.1.2.1 the probability of 
picking the bus to ‘truth’ is 0.1. It is obvious that the expected average distance 
would be shorter if one were to choose a bus from No. 11 to 20. This does not 
violate the idea that the search for the minimum expected divergence [in this case 
Euclidean distance] from truth and search for predictively accuracy go hand in hand. 
 
5.3 AIC, BIC and the Epistemic Thesis of Scientific Realism 
 
In section 5.2.1 we argued contra Sober that when properly understood the Neyman-
Pearson methodology was logically consistent with the simplified epistemic thesis of 
scientific realism [that predictively successful scientific theories are approximately 
true]. There we attempted to give Sober’s corn plants example a Bayesian twist, but 
conclude that it was not successful either. 
 
Let us now see what relation if any the AIC and BIC methods have to the epistemic 
thesis of scientific realism.  
 
In section 3.2.2 we saw that the AIC was derived as the asymptotically unbiased 
estimator of relative expected Kullback-Leiber divergence from the putative ‘truth’. 
In section 4.3.2 we saw that the BIC can also be thought as estimating the Kullback-
Leibler divergence from the ‘truth’, but in a Bayesian way and on the assumption 
that the predictive performance of models in the choice set is properly judged by the 
logarithmic scoring rule. There we referred to the AIC or BIC-best model as quasi-
true in the precise sense that such a model is relatively K-L closer to the ‘truth’ than 
any other model within the choice set, although the quasi-true model can still be 
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arbitrarily far away from such ‘truth’ – we have no idea about the absolute rather 
than relative divergence. In section 4.4 we showed the connection between AIC and 
BIC within the Bayesian setting. Therefore, the following deliberations apply to both 
AIC and BIC methods, although for ease of presentation we will be mentioning AIC 
only. 
 
So in the AIC model selection we set out to find a quasi-true model within the range 
of models that we think may be relevant to the problem at hand. Suppose that the 
AIC-best model that we have found actually turns out to be predictively successful. 
Does it then mean that this model is approximately true? Unfortunately the answer 
has got to be – not necessarily. Just because the AIC method was explicitly set up to 
approximate the relative K-L divergence from truth in a given set of models in order 
to maximise predictive accuracy, and the AIC-best model is then found to be 
predictively successful, this is no argument for success in approximating the truth. 
We simply do not know whether we succeeded in this endeavour – to re-iterate, it is 
still possible for the AIC-best model to be arbitrarily far away from the truth, nothing 
in the AIC method precludes this. The person in the bus to Fred’s house example [let 
us call her Daisy] in section 5.2.2 potentially has epistemic access to how 
approximately true her selected hypothesis turns out to be. All she has to do is to 
bring a tape measure [or some device that utilises the Global Positioning System – 
we are going to take it for granted that there is some reliable method of measuring 
the distance that Daisy can use] with her and measure the actual distance from the 
bus stop at which she eventually gets off to Fred’s house. Notice that this measure 
simultaneously serves as a measure of the predictive success of the hypothesis that 
Daisy selected and as a measure of its approximate truth [or divergence from truth, 
which we use interchangeably]. In our case we also have epistemic access to how 
predictively successful our AIC-best model has turned out to be, but crucially we do 
not have the luxury of epistemic access to the actual divergence between our AIC-
best model and truth. Hence the AIC model selection methodology does not yield an 
argument against the epistemic thesis of scientific realism either. That is, there is no 
way to argue that, despite our best efforts to the contrary, our predictively successful 
AIC-best model is in fact further away from the truth than all the other models 
within the choice set. In other words there is no way to show by means of an 
argument that our predictively successful model is in fact quasi-false. 
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Of course it is tempting to argue that it is highly unlikely that the predictive success 
of our AIC-best model is attributable to anything else except for its relative closeness 
to truth. However, that puts us back on the familiar grounds of the No-Miracles 
Argument, which in its turn familiarly counted by a type of pessimistic meta-
induction [which we contend is more accurately referred to as ‘the pessimistic 
induction from the history of science’ – cf. Godfrey-Smith (2003):177]. There are 
instances of model selection not leading to predictively successful models or 
yielding models that are predictively successful for a while, and then cease to be 
such, particularly in a field such as economics where successful predictive modelling 
is notoriously elusive. 
 
We thus conclude that the model selection methodologies considered in this thesis 
are neutral with respect to the arguments regarding the epistemic thesis of scientific 
realism. They do, however, serve the purpose of recasting the familiar arguments in 
the new light, which can be illuminating. 
 
There is a further worry that our neutrality conclusion could play into the hands of 
the antirealists since being a scientific realist is not required in order to understand 
the model selection methods considered in this thesis. This worry seems to stem 
from an argument that antirealists such as van Fraassen (1980) put forward, viz., the 
argument that scientific realism is unnecessarily inflationist. That is, the statement 
that predictively successful scientific theories are [approximately] true is logically 
stronger than the statement that predictively successful scientific theories are 
empirically adequate. One can maintain the latter [as van Fraassen does] while 
remaining agnostic about the former, and not lose anything scientifically important 
in the process. 
 
We think that there is no onus on someone who finds the No-Miracles Argument 
plausible, and accepts the philosophical position of scientific realism, to provide 
further justification of their philosophical stance by having to demonstrate what 
useful purpose their commitment to scientific realism serves in a particular field of 
science. Naturally, it is superb when one’s philosophical views lead to advances in 
the empirical realm, but it would in our view be too strong a requirement for 
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judgement of viability of such views. In this work there is nothing to undermine the 
plausibility intuitions behind the No-Miracles Argument. We venture that our 
neutrality conclusion really is neutral with regards to the debate between scientific 
realists and antirealists. 
 
Finally, one may wonder, as indeed some have done, whether the model selection 
methodologies that we consider in this thesis can be used to rationally reconstruct the 
key moments of model choice in history of science. For example, Forster and Sober 
(1994):14-15 argue that the AIC methodology provides a reason for choice of 
Copernicus’s astronomy as compared to Ptolemy’s astronomy. Kieseppä (1997):37-
39 points out that the AIC framework has not been proved to apply to periodic 
functions [in fact there are examples of failures of such applications] and that neither 
of the astronomical systems are in the form of statistical hypotheses specifying 
different probability distributions for the observable quantities. On these grounds we 
agree with Kieseppä [ibid.] that reconstructing this case in terms of AIC model 
selection is implausible. We struggle to come up with another case in history of 
science which could be reconstructed in the model selection fashion with some 
plausibility. Does this affect our analysis of the relation between the model selection 
criteria and the issue of scientific realism? We believe that it does not. It does, 
however, remind us of exactly which types of models the model selection methods 
are applicable to. 
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6. Conclusion 
 
In this thesis we have considered the classical approaches such as those due to 
Ronald Fisher and to Jerzy Neyman and Egon Pearson, as well as more recent 
approaches of Akaike Information Criterion and Bayes Information Criterion to the 
problem of model selection for predictive purposes. We find that the Fisherian 
approach can be thought of as an approach to the problem of model selection only in 
a rather Pickwickian sense, the Neyman-Pearson method in a limited but nonetheless 
viable sense, and the AIC and BIC methods in the fully-blown sense of aiming to 
choose a model with the optimal mathematical structure. We then move onto 
considering the numerous objections that have been raised in the recent 
philosophical literature to the AIC and BIC methods. Chief among these objections 
is the Subfamily Problem [about rendering the method defunct by fixing of 
adjustable parameters within models in the choice set in the light of the sample of 
data at hand] that we look into within the AIC setting, and the issues with the nesting 
of models and the ostensible requirement for inclusion of the ‘true’ model within the 
choice set for the BIC method. Upon careful consideration of the foundations of the 
AIC and BIC and of the arguments involved, we argue that at the very least none of 
these issues are devastating for the two methodologies of model selection. We then 
show that there are ways to connect AIC and BIC within the setting of the Bayesian 
theory of statistics and argue pace Burnham and Anderson (2004) that the way in 
which one sets model priors does not imply any particular attitude towards the aim 
of using the BIC method. We also show that within the Bayesian setting there are in 
fact infinitely many model selection criteria that have similar form to AIC and BIC. 
Namely, they penalise the maximum likelihood of the best-fitting element of the 
given model by a function of the variance of the parameter prior multiplied by the 
number of adjustable parameters that the model contains. We argue that this state of 
affairs is favourable for the scientists who can choose the prior according to their 
ideas and the background knowledge about the problem at hand – the diagrams in 
section 4.1.2.2 exhibit the amazing flexibility of priors. We then provide an overview 
of the circumstances under which the AIC and BIC are said to perform better than 
one another. 
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Then we consider two counterexamples that are due to Elliott Sober (1999 and 
2002). The counterexamples were against the simplified form of the Epistemic 
Thesis of Scientific Realism [that predictively successful theories are approximately 
true] and against the idea popular among scientific realists that the aim of science is 
to search for theories that are true. In the former counterexample Sober argues that 
the way that scientists put the Neyman-Pearson methodology to in every day use 
indicates that they expect to be predictively accurate hypotheses that are obviously 
false. Assuming that the scientists are rational, Sober concludes that scientists’ 
behaviour implies that they are methodological instrumentalists. Sober states that 
methodological instrumentalism commits one to using theories as tools for making 
predictions, and to having predictive accuracy as the one and only goal of scientific 
endeavour. We go along with Sober’s assumption about the goal of predictive 
accuracy, but argue that he misconstrues the way that scientists use the NP 
methodology. Contrary to Sober, we argue that the Neyman-Pearson methodology is 
logically consistent with the epistemic thesis of scientific realism. We attempt to 
give Sober’s counterexample Bayesian rendition using some ideas in the spirit of 
Karl Popper, but conclude that his argument does not succeed this way either. 
 
Sober’s second counterexample attempts to show that searches for theories that are 
true and for the theories that are predictively successful do not always coincide. 
Sober thus argues that the popular idea in the scientific realist camp that the goal of 
scientific enterprise is to find theories that are true can go against maximising 
predictive accuracy, the latter arguably being a desirable feature of any scientific 
theory. We argue that his counterexample does not succeed in demonstrating that the 
link between [at least approximate] truth and predictive accuracy is bogus. 
 
However, we go on to argue that the AIC and BIC methods are actually neutral with 
regards to the debate about the epistemic thesis of scientific realism. That is, these 
methods neither lend support to nor go against the epistemic thesis. On the other 
hand, we think that AIC and BIC do provide a different angle from which to view 
the familiar arguments within scientific realism, namely, the No-Miracles Argument 
and the Pessimistic Meta-Induction. Our view is that the conclusion of neutrality of 
our formal methods of model selection with respect to some issues within scientific 
realism is indicative of the general idea that it is extremely rare for purely formal 
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methods to settle philosophical disputes. Nonetheless, in trying to do so one at the 
very least gains additional valuable insights. 
 
It is important for us to emphasise that notwithstanding the fact that in the domain of 
the AIC and BIC methods the talk of simplicity and its predictive accuracy 
maximising virtue has been pervasive, in this thesis simplicity is hardly mentioned, 
and when it is mentioned, it is only as short hand for ‘relatively fewer number of 
adjustable parameters’. The reason for not paying homage to simplicity in the AIC 
and BIC context is this. The AIC was designed to provide unbiased estimates of 
relative expected Kullback-Leibler divergence from a set of models to the ‘truth’, 
where the penalty for complexity in the form of the number of adjustable parameters 
arose as a by-product in order to correct the asymptotic bias. In the BIC the penalty 
for complexity arose as a by-product of approximating often computationally 
intractable integrated likelihoods. So in neither of these frameworks was simplicity 
built-in as an important consideration. Moreover, we find that we do not lose 
anything by ignoring simplicity and treating it as an epiphenomenon. 
 
Finally we suggest that the best handle on the problem of model selection is to be 
gained by applying different approaches to the same issue with full awareness of the 
foundational and philosophical issues involved. We sincerely hope to have at least 
partially served this purpose in this thesis. 
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